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ABSTRACT 
As oil bearing country, the issue of development in Nigeria has been a complex one 
that has attracted attention of both the government and scholars because oil politics 
appears to shape resource management and the development process. While 
academic focus has been on the analysis of national development, there is a paucity 
of academic studies on the internal dynamics at the regional level that shape the 
development process. This study therefore aims to: “examine the effect of oil 
resources on Nigeria’s development and the South-South compared with the 
situation in the South-West”, with an explicit focus on the complex nexus between 
oil, politics and regional development in Nigeria.  
 
The thesis adopts both methodological and theoretical triangulation to generate data 
to test the main and supporting hypothesis adopted for the study:  “the oil industry 
has had an adverse impact on the development of Nigeria, and, in particular, the 
Niger Delta region in which it is concentrated”. In so doing, it explores the failure of 
oil politics to mix effectively to engender both national and regional development; 
leading to a regional development disparity. The study concludes that oil wealth 
failed to fuel development in Nigeria but instead, led to leadership failure. This failure 
is particularly found to have given vent to the negative impact of oil wealth on elite 
behaviour that is shaped by corruption, made worse by a dis-functional federal 
system where those with links major ethnic groups, get resource allocation and 
development advantage.  
 
The study consequently recommends that elite induced oil politics and attendant 
corruption, be tackled to pave way for both national and regional development in 
Nigeria. The study also recommend replication of this study in a larger scale in other 
oil bearing developing nations to further explore the relationship between 
management of resource wealth and regional development.  
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OIL, POLITICS AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: A COMPARISON 
OF THE SOUTH-SOUTH AND THE SOUTH-WEST REGIONS 
 
1.1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Do natural resources retard growth or engender internal development disparity in a 
nation? Who controls and what shapes the development narratives in a multicultural 
but resource endowed states? Are there issues that underpin the development 
discourse? Can we attribute weak growth and disparate regional development to the 
struggle for the control of valuable resources? In clear terms, what role do natural 
resources play in the development of endowed nations? These questions resonate 
throughout this thesis as it focuses on the complex nexus of natural resource 
management and the development as well as the inter-play in a multicultural society 
such as Nigeria. In particular, this thesis explores the complex interplay between oil, 
politics and regional development in Nigeria. It focuses on two regions out of the six 
that make up the Nigerian federal system. These are the South-South and South-
West regions. The latter is home to the bulk of oil that helps sustain the Nigerian 
economy, while the former is seen to be more developed, but does not produce oil to 
the degree of the former. The seeming development disparity in both regions attracts 
popular debate, thus raising questions about the development of both regions in the 
face of oil wealth. In other words, the regional development of Nigeria since the 
discovery and exploration of oil in 1956 will be comparatively analysed with the two 
aforementioned regions as case study. 
 
BACKGROUND: 
Accruable benefits derived from exploration of natural resources are in most cases, 
expected to birth positive development outcomes. This is however not a rule as there 
are exceptional cases. While it can arguably be said that the Nigerian resource 
management and development inter-phase has failed to yield positive results (Obi, 
2010; Ikelegbe, 2013), available records of other resource rich and dependent 
states, also suggests a similar experience.  According to Shaxson (2005) and Obi 
(2010), the discovery of oil in most African states has, so far, failed to translate into 
development. From Angola to Sudan, Equatorial Guinea to Nigeria, the story is 
similar. While this shows failures of natural resources to positively impact upon the 
living standards of the people and to combat poverty in the states concerned, 
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mention is scarcely made of disparate regional development internally within a 
country, as seems to be occurring in Nigeria. Available statistical data and economic 
indicators show a general lack of improvement in development terms in Nigeria. With 
7.72% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the nation, (Kale 2011) and occupying the 
49th position of the poorest countries of the world (UNDP 2010), the nation appears 
to have benefited very little as a whole since the exploitation of oil resources in since 
the 1960s. 
 
What can be gleaned from the above is inability of the nation to achieve measurable 
improvement in the living standard of the people; a situation that prompted Ikeanyibe 
(2009:13) to conclude that "Nigeria remains an underdeveloped nation occupying a 
low position among the poorest countries of the world in spite of her tremendous 
natural and human resources endowment". The question that comes to mind 
therefore is: what became of the $350 billion realized between 1970 and 2000 
(Shaxson 2007) or the over twenty nine trillion dollars ($29, Trillion) the nation 
earned between 1958 and 2007 (Tell 2008:18) from oil revenues? Despite this oil 
revenue, available official records show little improvement in the nation’s 
development with manifest disparate regional development, (See table 2.1 and 5.4 
below). A clearer picture of the development situation in both Nigeria and the 
regions, will receive more attention in Chapters two and five where the political 
economy of Nigeria and Regional Development in Nigeria are considered 
respectively. In the meantime, relevant concepts central to this study such as 
development, are clarified. 
 
Scholars’ views differ on what development means especially in the social sciences 
where concepts can be subjected to a variety of interpretations. For Escobar (1995), 
development is historically located while Said (1979) considers development as a 
creation of the West in his oriental construction. The cultural perspective that could 
shape development Said contend, differs; he thus questions the assumed cultural 
superiority of the West that portray western advancement as development by 
extension. Sen (1999) argues that development should be considered as “creating 
freedom” for the individual. This he argues is to avoid deprivation that could either be 
social, political or economic. Lucid as his point appears, there is however a 
clarification that needs to be made on the concept of freedom. In generic terms, 
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attempt would be made to pin down the concept of development to aid 
understanding as the study advances since the concept is expected to run through 
the entire study. 
 
As a political concept, ‘freedom’ like most concepts in the social sciences, can also 
be subjected to varied interpretations. What may be freedom to one may be 
‘unfreedoms’ to yet another. Moreover, the extent to which individual freedom 
translates to national development cannot be easily determined. The degree of 
‘unfreedoms’ which Sen would have us see as underdevelopment varies among 
individuals and this again depends largely on the country in question. While some 
are entrapped in the struggle for daily survival, others may be fixed on the 
consumption of goods as their wealth and status allows. Unfreedoms in Sen’s 
postulation fails to meet a generic benchmark because of the disparity in taste, class 
and social orientation as well as economic status. Sen’s framework can thus be said 
to be inadequate because it lacks measurable tools to expressly say what 
constitutes freedom and extent to which individual freedom translate to national 
development. 
 
While appreciating scholars divergent views on what development means, it is 
imperative to understand that a common benchmark for measuring development as 
many interpretations shows, is the extent of improvement in the wellbeing and living 
conditions of people in the face of poverty often associated with political, social and 
economic factors. The social and political life of individuals, tend to be influenced by 
their economic status. That again, explains why most states appear to pay attention 
to enhancing the economic status of the people by creating measures that can free 
them from poverty. The result of such efforts varies from country to country. From 
whatever prism we have chosen to look at the Nigerian situation, lack amidst plenty, 
appears to be a common feature. From the oil bearing South-South region where 
basic amenities appear to be in short supply to the South-West zone adjudged by 
development scholars such as Adepoju (2012) to be comparably better off, a lack of 
development can be noted, (Aigbokhan, 2008 and Teriba, 2013). 
 
Table 1.1 below captures regional poverty levels in Nigeria, to shed light on the 
development position in Nigeria. While national average remains weak in the face of 
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abundant oil wealth, a disparity in the living condition across the regions is also 
perceptible as indicated in the table. 
 
Table 1.1: National Living Standards: South-South & South-West 
SOURCE: National Office of Statistics, 2010,  
 
NOTE:  
Table 1.1 is extracted from NOS database, 2010 for the whole nation Very poor’, 
connotes those that are extremely poor, living on less than $1 a day in both regions 
depicted. 
 
Focusing on the two regions, we can see that there is an uneven distribution in some 
of the variables. While higher levels of poverty at 93.1% can be seen in the oil 
bearing region of the South-South, the South West region has 30.4%, leaving the 
latter with higher poverty rate despite having higher number of people classified as 
rich at 8.3% as against 5.2% in the South-West. Though little can gleaned from the 
table to explain this ironical scenario, one can hold lack of equitable wealth 
distribution at the regional level; responsible. If this is explored further, it can be can 
be seen associated with the larger concept of urban-rural dichotomy which I noted, 
account for coexistence of urban rich and rural poor in chapter five where regional 
economies of both chosen regions is considered. If commensurate development 
appears to elude the nation and there appear to be regional development disparity, 
Zones States 
 
Very 
poor %  
Poor % 
Moderat
e %  
Fairly 
Rich 
% 
 
Rich  
% 
 
Akwa Ibom 14.0 
 
36.4 43.3 
 
4.5 
 
1.8 
 
Bayelsa 
 
32.6 
 
35.0 28.6 
 
1.7 
 
2.1 
South Cross Rivers 17.0 
 
52.7 26.0 
 
3.7 
 
0.7 
South Delta 
 
13.6 
 
43.5 36.2 
 
6.0 
 
0.7 
 
Edo 
 
3.9 
 
29.8 59.1 
 
6.1 
 
1.1 
 
Rivers 
 
12.0 
 
45.9 33.9 
 
6.2 
 
1.9 
           
 
Ekiti 
 
8.0 
 
37.6 51.1 
 
2.7 
 
0.6 
Lagos 
 
4.3 
 
20.5 66.2 
 
8.3 
 
0.7 
South Ogun 
 
2.7 
 
21.8 69.2 
 
5.2 
 
1.0 
West Ondo 
 
5.9 
 
46.4 44.2 
 
3.4 
 
0.0 
 
Osun 
 
1.9 
 
23.6 65.3 
 
7.0 
 
2.3 
 
Oyo 
 
7.6 
 
38.3 49.5 
 
3.9 
 
0.6 
National Average 9.5 
 
37.2 47.2 
 
5.2 
 
0.9 
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how did the nation fare prior to the discovery of oil? Subsequent paragraphs briefly 
consider pre-oil economic situation in Nigeria. 
 
At independence in 1960, the Nigerian economy depended on agricultural produce 
where some levels of development at both national and regional levels birthed basic 
infrastructures such as roads (Ikeanyibe, 2009). At the regional levels, besides other 
development strides, the South-West was able to build the cocoa house in Ibadan 
while groundnut in the North, gave Kaduna a development boost as Zaria was built 
up as a modern city. In the South East, palm oil production helped develop Enugu as 
a regional development model in the then young Nigerian state. The situation is 
believed to have changed with the discovery of oil. The expected national and 
regional development from oil exploration never came with the emergence oil based 
economies as it failed to engender internal development and growth process. While 
this was happening, oil based mono-cultural economic system, stifled other sectors 
such as manufacturing, services, marketing, transportation sectors expected to 
engender development, (Aigbokhan, 2008). The economy consequently suffered 
sectoral disarticulation as gains from oil, failed to find tangible expression in 
development terms (Ibaba and Ikelegbe, 2010). Instead, proceeds from oil sparked a 
new form of elite struggle for power at the expense of development, reminiscent of 
the resource curse postulation (Obi, 2010). This left the nation in no vantage 
development position. 
 
The agricultural era is largely seen a one laced with political struggle among the elite 
class for the control of natural resources. Akpabio et al (2010:119) noted the struggle 
was less intense compared to what became of oil politics from late 1950s. This 
means that arrival of oil in commercial quantities heightened the struggle for 
resource space among the political elites in Nigeria. This invariably establishes the 
issue of the relationship between oil, politics and regional development in Nigeria, 
one this study considers crucial that needs careful analysis.  
 
Unravelling the intricate dynamics of resource politics in Nigeria, with a view to 
understanding how it works, has been the pre-occupation of several scholars 
(Omeje, 2006; Ikelegbe, 2005; Shaxson, 2005; Obi, 2010; Mahler, 2010; Higgins, 
2009; and Watts, 2008). These scholars in their works sought plausible explanations 
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for why Nigeria appears to be in a weak development situation in the face of oil 
wealth. In particular, ascertaining how much the nation realizes from the sales of 
crude oil, which gives the nation substantial foreign exchange, and matching it with 
the level of development, has been a focus of the aforementioned scholars. All said 
in respect of the aforementioned rather than proffer solutions, open door for further 
questions which includes some of the following. 
 
(i) Why has the oil sector failed to positively impact the nation’s drive to 
development?  
(ii) To what extent did the inter-play of elite induced oil politics and resource 
allocation affect development?  
(iii) What led to the neglect of Agriculture that once sustained the economy? 
 
Efforts made to answer these questions have provoked an intellectual debate among 
scholars with citing ethnic induced oil politics in Nigeria as responsible, (Eke (1975). 
Submission as this, made the Nigerian political scene peculiar since social dynamics 
and perverted rule of political engagement are capable of neutralizing accountability 
needed to transparently manage oil resources to birth development. Allowing those 
in position of authority abuse same because of ethnic related interest, negatively 
affect both national and regional development, (Ikelegbe, 2005). This throws up 
issue of elite dominance and how same shape resource allocation and development 
that needs further exploration as briefly done here and in more details in chapter 
three. 
 
Drawing attention to the issue of elite struggle for resource space, Obi, (2010) and 
Omeje (2006) had noted that self-interest and sectional sentiment drives resource 
politics in Nigeria. This is believed to also manifest in the larger national politics 
where struggle for political office as witnessed recently in the 2015 general, pitch 
elites against themselves along ethno-regional lines. Larger picture that can be seen 
is that of the system that appear frail and as such, unable to support viable 
development path. For example, many believe that the federal system the nation 
operates, encourages elite struggle for resource space and as such, “bedevils the 
nation with politics of allocation and fiscal federal imbalance”, (Eghweree and 
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Otoghile, 2010). This again, opens the issue of resource based elite struggle, one 
that needs careful analysis. 
 
Elite and the Struggle for Resource Space 
Issues of resource politics amidst elite struggle seen in details in chapters two and 
three are briefly introduced here.  As earlier noted, discovery and exploration of oil 
heightened hopes of development that appear elusive with avoidable elite struggle 
for resource space birthed. This is believed to be responsible for seeming 
disequilibrium in distribution of oil resources which Ibaba, (2010:223) said, skewed 
regional development in Nigeria. Ethnic coloration and poor management of the elite 
‘resource space struggle’, was only to worsen as it was introduced into the nation’s 
political system. Nigeria is made up of three major ethnic groups with several 
minority groups. With elite struggle for resource introduced into politics, focus was on 
how those involved can achieve vantage political position to champion their interest 
in the resource distribution politics (see chapter three). What importation of elite 
struggle into politics with ethnic contours connotes is compromised viable 
institutional framework needed to champion the course of development, (Henley et 
al, 2012). In similar vein, Lewis (2010) noted how elite induced resource struggle 
stifles development efforts as it appears to be the case in Nigeria. According to him, 
self-seeking elite class, sacrifices national interest and needed development. It is 
thus important though that we look at the issue more broadly by considering the 
political struggle for resource space, elite interest and how these engender 
development. This study in subsequent sections, place these issues in perspective, 
drawing on the theoretical lens provided by resource curse and elite theories 
adopted to underpin this study. Both theories receive detailed attention in chapter 
three. 
 
Consequently, issues of oil, political inter-play of how its proceeds are distributed to 
shape both national and regional development process, will be carefully examined. 
Doing this, variables such as resource curse, rent seeking, corruption, state 
functionality as well as elite dominance are given careful attention to find plausible 
explanation to the issue of underdevelopment in Nigeria amidst abundant oil 
resources. In addition, the development situation of the oil bearing region of South-
South would be compared with that of the South-West that lacks equivalent natural 
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resource abundance with the latter. More generally in resource rich nations, mention 
is hardly made of internal development disparity. In the case of Nigeria, little has 
been done in terms of looking at regional development differences, hence the 
comparative regional perspective taken in this thesis. Doing this, will help enrich 
development political economies as resource based development discourse appear 
to lack the comparative understandings at the moment. It is thus with the question of 
how to solve the puzzle of underdevelopment in the midst of abundant resources in 
Nigeria, that this topic; “Oil, Politics and regional Development in Nigeria: 
Comparison of the South-South and South-West regions” is carefully considered to 
find solution to the development challenges facing Nigeria despite available petro-
dollar. Subsequent sections, deal with crux of this thesis followed by objective and 
significance of the study. Research questions, hypothesis as well as theoretical 
framework, subsequently follows. Other major sections are the brief methological 
design and significance of the study with chapter organisation for the thesis coming 
last to end this introductory chapter. 
 
1.2 NATURE OF PROBLEM 
While many expect that availability and exploitation of natural resources such as oil 
can help a nation achieve positive development outcomes, this is often not the case. 
Nigeria, as well as other African states with natural resources, has little to show in 
development terms for the exploitation of these resources despite revenue derivable 
from it.  For instance, Nigeria reportedly realized $350 billion from the sales of oil 
resources between 1970 and the year 2000 (Shaxson, 2007). This by all standards 
is an enormous amount that one expect, would aid the development process in 
Nigeria. Ironically, this appears not be the case as accruable oil benefits appear to 
have failed to make significant impact on the nation’s wellbeing. The impact this has 
cut across the nation with varying degree of severity at the regional basis. In the face 
of this, scholars such as Obi (2010) and Ikelegbe (2013) have come to identify the 
disadvantaged position of the resource bearing region of the South-South region 
where there is an alleged lack amidst plenty compared to the situation in the South-
West region of the country where oil resources are found in isolated places unlike 
what obtains in the Delta (Oil bearing region in Nigeria). There is measurable level of 
development in the former unlike the latter, a situation many believe (Obi, 2010, 
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Ibaba et al, 2010 and Omeje, 2006), runs contrary to expectation of speedy 
development of the oil bearing region. 
 
Available scholarly works that attempted to explain the Nigerian situation seen 
through the lens provided by the two regions as done above, achieved little besides 
linking it to the resource curse thesis often adopted to underpin resource based 
economies, (Lewis. 2010, Obi, 2010).  Credited to Mahdavi Hossein who in 1970 
studied the patterns and problems of economic development in pre-revolutionary 
Iran, (Yusufu-Bagaji etal 2011), resource curse theory received scholarly attention; 
especially by those writing on natural resources utilization. Known to manifest ‘Dutch 
disease’ syndrome, the theory explains a paradoxical situation where nations with 
abundant natural resources that should help them achieve positive development 
outcomes, experience growth stagnation due to neglect of other sectors  and 
therefore undue to reliance on a single sector of national economy that is often times 
unable to either drive or sustain the growth process. The net result of over reliance 
on a single sector to the neglect of other major sectors is a negative impact on 
overall GDP that with time becomes volatile. 
 
This captures a situation known as ‘paradox of plenty’, (Jeffrey, 2010) which can 
ironically leave resource rich nations in a state of underdevelopment. When this 
happens, a nation finds a valuable natural resource and focuses on its exploitation to 
the exclusion of other vital sectors such that skilled workers from other sectors 
migrate to the favoured sector with higher wages, experiences loss in value of its 
currency as it becomes less attractive as other sectors suffer. This appears to tell the 
Nigerian story. Mahler (2010) for example, was convinced that Nigeria is a prime 
example of resource curse as his rhetorical question of ‘whether Nigeria is a prime 
example of the resource curse debacle’ suggest. Other scholars such as Obi (2010), 
Omeje, (2006), Ikelegbe, (2005), Shaxson, (2007) and Yusufu-Bagaji et al (2011) 
etc., equally linked the seeming lack of development in Nigeria to the broad thematic 
thrust of the resource curse theory adopted to underpin this study. 
 
Though the thrust of the theory is that resource rich countries are underdeveloped 
because of the difficulties that are associated with the exploration of their natural 
resources, scholars are yet to focus on case-specific application of the theory. This 
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in part, explains why scholars’ attempt at analysing the puzzle of resource utilization-
development disparity in Nigeria, have paid little attention to peculiar variables that 
may be accentuating the resource curse problem in Nigeria (See Ibaba et al 2010). 
There is thus the need to pay attention to the internal national and regional dynamics 
that accentuate resources curse and as this study intends doing. 
 
Consequently, consideration of these internal dynamics will provide insights into the 
largely under-researched problem of why the oil bearing Delta remains poor in the 
midst of abundant resources compared to the South-West region. There is thus the 
problem of how this study can sufficiently explain why there is poor development 
situation in the oil bearing region of the South-South in the midst of oil wealth in 
comparative terms with the non-oil bearing region of the South-West. Secondly, 
there is the problem of how to expand the frontiers of the application of the resource 
curse theory in a case-specific method to know how well this captures the case 
under study (i.e. Nigeria). Third and finally, there is the puzzle of the suitability of the 
resource curse theory standing alone without considering role of the elites in public 
life, who pay a central role in the allocation of resources nationally and regionally 
(Duru, 2012; Roei et al, 2009). Consequently, this study, seeks to explore the intricate 
links between elite and resource curse theories and how the latter, accentuates the 
former. If failure to achieve the envisaged development from exploration of oil leads 
to poverty as resource curse thesis espouse, what’s role did the elite class play in 
this? 
 
In the light of the above, there is thus the challenge of how to: first explain the issue 
of poverty in the oil bearing region in the midst of abundant resources compared to 
what occurs in the non-oil bearing states of the South-West; second, explain the 
extent to which resources accruing to the oil bearing South-South zone made 
development or how we can see failure of same beyond the rubrics of resource-
curse debate. The ability to explain why the oil bearing region appear 
underdeveloped compared to non-oil bearing region in the face of oil wealth, is a 
problem that needs empirical and further theoretical explanation. Achieving this will 
enable me unravel the ‘resource endowment and development mix-match’ (inability 
of available resources to birth expected development) and the underdevelopment 
puzzle in the midst of abundant oil resources in both Nigeria and the selected 
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regions in particular. Subsequent sections of this chapter will briefly outline both the 
research questions and hypothesis adopted for the study. Before doing so, the 
following arguments are raised and addressed in this study to put issues raised, in 
perspectives. 
 
1.3 THE ARGUMENT 
Resource management if efficiently done can augment development expectations for 
endowed states. However, if development expectations are not realized, people 
often blame both known and assumed factors as responsible for failure of natural 
resources to engender development. A core argument that will guide this study 
therefore, is that internal socio-political dynamics shapes development in resource 
rich and dependent states beyond the rubrics of resource curse theoretical 
postulations that have tended to consider resource utilization and development 
discourse without consideration of other salient factors; i.e. focus on the state and 
not its constituent parts. I am consequently challenging this narrative and proposing 
that internal factors such as role of elites in resource management and development 
process, needs evaluation too if one has chosen to adopt resource curse thematic 
thrust for example, to underpin any resource related study. There is need to focus on 
peculiar albeit; intricate internal dynamics that work to bring effect of theories such 
as resource curse to bear in a resource rich but dependent country. This is more so 
to because resources and its exploration don’t bring curse, management of same 
does. Looking at resource curse in a ‘stand-alone’ form as has been the practice, 
misses the point. Who manages accruable resources? Is it equitably done? Where 
does elite involvement bring about the ‘curse’ that application of resource curse 
espouses when issue of resource utilization comes up? Application of resource 
curse theory like as is the case, won’t enable us balance the narrative since no 
known theory can capture all circumstances as events shaping each circumstance 
differs in both scope and depth. To be able to put this broad focus into perspective, 
relevant research questions are raised, followed by hypothesis adopted to analyse 
issues relevant to the study. 
 
1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Theories are hypothetical statements that help explain relatively known concepts in 
any piece of academic writing. Like an ideological block, writers lean on applicable 
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theory to underpin their writing with a view to giving it a perspective. For this study, 
two distinct but complementary theories are employed, to put underlying issues in 
this study in perspective. These are ‘resource curse’ and ‘elite’ theories. Though 
given detailed consideration in Chapter Two where relevant concepts are unpacked 
for analysis in the course of literature reviews, it is important to note that issues of 
resource management and the development inter-face, of necessity, compel writers 
to employ resource curse theory. Resource curse theory focuses on the negative 
externalities associated with the exploration and utilization of natural resources. It 
can be linked to the challenges associated with natural resource exploration that the 
resource curse briefly seen above. And as a theory in political science, it is 
associated with Mahdavi Hossein who in 1970, studied the patterns and problems of 
economic development in pre-revolutionary Iran, Yusufu-Bagaji etal (2011). 
 
Elite theory on the other hand, finds robust attention when examining the intricate 
nexus of resource politics in a largely culturally diffused country like Nigeria. First 
developed in sociology to explain social relations in the society; elite theory was 
brought into political science by two Italian sociologists, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) 
and Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941). The thrust of elite theory is simply that ‘there exist 
a select few that shape societal life at the expense of the mass public, Duru (2012) 
reiterated this when he noted that “there may exist in many societies a minority of the 
population which takes the major decisions in the society”. The need to effectively 
manage the inevitable acrimony in the socio-political setting in the society due to 
hierarchical differentiation can arguably be seen as the reason why the elite theory 
was developed to explain intricate class relations, especially when distribution of 
available but scarce resources are involved. 
 
The selling point of both theories for this study should be seen in their ability to help 
explain core message of the study: how and what shapes resource utilization in 
relation to development outcomes in a resource rich, dependent but culturally 
diffused state? While the resource curse theory would help situate the place of 
development in the management of oil resources in Nigeria, elite theory will help put 
it into perspective by focusing on the political dynamics of those elites that shape 
development in the face of accruable oil wealth. In sum, both theories would be 
extensively discussed in chapter two where this study expects to review literatures 
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and pay closer attention to the theories seen in the Nigerian context. This entails 
careful consideration and analysis of the political economies of Nigeria with special 
focus on the elite dominated oil politics and how same shape development. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
The central concern of this study is the seeming failure of the Nigerian state to 
translate oil wealth to positive development outcomes nationwide and development 
disparity at the regional level. The task then, is how to unravel the rationale behind 
the ‘lack amidst plenty’ in Nigeria. To guide this study, a central research questions 
are: Why does Nigeria lack equitable distribution of its oil wealth such that there is 
seeming regional development disparity? What role does political leadership, socio-
cultural influence and institutional arrangements play in shaping regional 
development in Nigeria in the face of resource wealth? 
 
The study has the following objectives. They are to:  
(1) Examine the effect of oil resources on Nigeria’s development and the 
South-South compared with the situation in the South-West, 
(2) Analyse the role of politics in the developmental experience of the South-
South compared with that of the South-West, 
(3) Assess the extent to which institutional frameworks aid or slow down the 
development process in Nigeria and the South-South, and 
(4) Provide insight into how to effectively and efficiently employ oil wealth to 
facilitate positive development outcomes in Nigeria nationally and 
regionally. 
 
Following from the above, the following hypotheses are adopted for the study. 
 
The main hypothesis driving this study is that the “oil industry has had an adverse 
impact on the development of Nigeria, and, in particular, the Niger Delta region in 
which it is concentrated”. The following supplementary hypotheses are equally 
adopted for the study.  
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They include: 
(1) Governance deficit/Leadership failure limits development efforts: 
        -Greater ethnic fragmentation leads to greater patronage at the expense of 
regional development; 
        -Corruption is more likely in oil rich regions because oil wealth encourages rent 
seeking 
(2) A lopsided Federal structure undermines equitable distribution of resources which 
leads to underdevelopment in politically less powerful regions. 
(3) Adverse environmental impact of the oil industry contributes to 
underdevelopment in the oil baring region. 
 
1.5.1 The Hypotheses Explained 
These hypotheses derived from the wider literature, mirror key concepts that can 
help explore central question guiding this study, and are chosen because of the need 
to explain the reported development disparities between the South-South and South-
West regions in Nigeria. The ability of each set of hypotheses to sufficiently explain 
the development position in both chosen regions as well as the role of the oil industry 
in the development of the regions is crucial to this study. Upon analysis of available 
data, it will be possible to assess the extent to which the hypothesis holds true or 
not. When this is done, the intention is that deeper insights into the reported 
development deficit in the South-South region in the face of oil wealth when 
compared to what obtains in the South-West would be gained. 
 
In essence, these hypotheses serve as explanatory variables needed to be taken 
into account when assessing the effects of the oil industry. Some of these are 
affected by and interact with the effects of the oil industry, others are more 
independent. For instance, these hypotheses which say that “Adverse environmental 
impact of the oil industry contributes to underdevelopment." and that “Corruption 
leads to and deepens underdevelopment”, would be explained in relation to the 
resource curse theory and impact of oil on development respectively. In doing this, 
attention would be paid to explaining how adverse environmental impact from oil 
production affected the agriculture and aquaculture of both regions. On the other 
hand, resource induced corruption and impact of same on development, would also 
receive desired attention. The latter is to be discussed closely linked to the political 
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economy of oil rents and its attendant consequences on development. This by 
extension will bring elite theory squarely into focus. Detailed analysis of how the 
hypotheses are tested and the data to test same, are treated in chapter four 
dedicated to methodology of the study. 
 
1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
As noted earlier, the thesis examines the inability of the Nigerian state to develop in 
the face of oil mineral wealth and extent to which the nation’s politics shape internal 
developmental trajectory. The focus is on the South-South and the South-West 
regions as a case study. This is to enable a comparative analysis of how oil wealth 
impacted development of both regions. To this end, basic economic indicators such 
as per capita income and human development index in both the South-South and the 
South West region of Nigeria are considered as well as the role political actors in 
both regions played that accentuated development or otherwise. Objectives one and 
two of this study listed above, supports this. 
 
The time frame for the study is from the year 2000 to 2011 with attention also paid to 
the earlier years of oil discovery in Nigeria. The choice of this time frame is due to 
the fact that the nation returned to democratic governance in 1999 and real sense of 
development, can better be analysed during this time as opposed to the military era. 
Though the Nigerian state is the target, two out of the six geo-political zones have 
been selected for this study; these are the South-South and South-West geo-political 
zones. The former bears the nation’s oil mineral resources. The study would take 
three states out of each region and these include Delta, Edo and Rivers States (SS) 
and Lagos, Ogun and Ondo (SW). As noted above, focus on these geo-political 
zones, will enable us know which region is economically well off in development 
terms in the face of oil wealth. A successful comparison of both regions also helps us 
know which region is better off with or without oil wealth. Below is the political map of 
the Niger Delta from where we have the South-South geo-political zone which forms 
the crux of our study. 
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Picture 1.1: MAP OF THE NIGER DELTA 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Niger Delta Master-plan (2000) 
 
1.7 METHODOLOGY: BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
Since every academic research has a method of doing it, this study is by no means an 
exception. To this end, detailed analysis of how this study was done in a dedicated 
chapter. Chapter four of this study titled ‘Methodology’, explained techniques deployed 
to systematically generate and evaluate data. 
 
1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Attempts to explain the paradox of development disparity among both regions in 
resource rich states like Nigeria, is yet to receive adequate attention. Scholars such 
as Ikelegbe (2005), Omeje (2006), Watts (2008), Obi (2010) and Yusufu-Bagaji et al. 
(2011) have used the resource curse thematic framework in an attempt to explain 
the Nigerian case. All these scholarly works were done with no attention paid to 
peculiar circumstance that the Nigerian situation represents. While all these scholars 
failed to pay attention to the peculiarities of the Nigerian state to explain the resource 
curse theory, none attempted a comparative analysis of the developmental 
challenges of regions in Nigeria or any other developing country in the face of 
resource abundance like this study intends to do. 
 
In addition, theory such as the resource curse adopted to underpin this study have 
tended to be used narrowly in their application. Such analysis leave gaps in several 
respects. For instance, while Mahler (2010) and Obi (2010) analysis though painted 
a prime picture of a nation plagued by the resource curse syndrome which Ikelegbe 
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(2005) linked to crisis in the oil rich Delta,  none paid attention to peculiarities of the 
Nigerian state let alone considering regional development challenges in the face of 
resource wealth. We can thus say that analysis of the Nigerian case in the face of 
the resource curse theory has largely been one sided. We have seen this from the 
overly descriptive and broad-brush approach of scholars to the resource curse 
problem in Nigeria without paying attention to internal regional political dynamics that 
accentuates recourse crisis in Nigeria (as will be elaborated upon in Chapters two 
and three). By contrast, this thesis is a focused enquiry on Nigeria, using two regions 
as case studies, from which scholars can derive considerable value. 
 
On the other hand, there is an obvious gap in the existing research in terms of 
considering the role of elites in resource curse contexts. The weak development 
situation of resource rich but dependent states in the face of resource curse needs a 
careful analysis so as to understand the place of elites. There is thus a need to 
understand the place of elites within the larger resource curse debate. Elite theory 
adopted for this study helps us better understand how resource-derived incomes are 
used or not to facilitate development. This is more so as available literary works does 
not consider the internal socio-political condition of countries that may well induce 
elite struggles for resource space. This study therefore,  analyse the circumstances 
that accentuate development disparity between the two aforementioned regions in 
Nigeria in the face of resource curse and elite theoretical perspectives. 
 
In practical terms, this study is significant in the following ways. First, it helps unravel 
the nexus between underdevelopment and associated crisis in the Niger Delta of 
Nigeria. The lack of development has been identified as a cause of unrest as seen in 
the Niger Delta region on account of oil resources (Obi, 2010). The quest in this 
respect is to seek a plausible explanation that places resource related crisis that 
affects development deficit in the Delta, Nigeria in this respect and the South-South 
region in particular, in perspective. Secondly, this study helps explain reported 
regional development disparity in the face of resource wealth in Nigeria. Thirdly, the 
study outlines a potential pathway of how to effectively engage oil resources in 
Nigeria. This will reduce the spending on security. Oil as major source of Nigeria’s 
revenue, equally serves as the major source of U.S.A oil needs. A troubled Nigeria 
due to lack of development, would increase the security spending of the U.S.A in the 
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West African sub-region. Finally, the study will enable us understand links between 
elite theory and resource curse as the former, arguably accentuates the latter. 
 
1.9 CHAPTER ORGANISATION FOR THE THESIS 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. This introductory chapter has set the 
scene for the thesis in terms of providing an overview of the complex nexus between 
oil, politics and regional development in Nigeria that this thesis examines.  Chapter 
two examines the political economy of Nigeria, paying attention to the issue of 
resource politics and how the interplay of elite politics shapes the development 
direction in Nigeria. The chapter examines the contestable concept of development 
in the Nigerian context by offering three perspectives before giving a synergized 
definition for the concept. The chapter holds that development ‘embraces the whole 
gamut of the process that leads to the enhancement of the living standard of any 
society with a view to making it achieve acceptable minimum standard that is able to 
sustain life, guarantee equality and freedom needed for the good life’. 
 
The third chapter reviews relevant literatures to the study and considers the 
theoretical frameworks adopted to underpin the study to pave way for eventual 
consideration of the Nigerian oil industry. Analysing development in the Nigerian 
context, the chapter evaluates the level of development in Nigeria and examines why 
the various development plans embarked upon in the country failed to achieve 
desired results. Explaining themes associated with the adopted theories for the 
study, the chapter establishes a link between elite theory and resource curse in 
relation to the evaluation of Nigerian oil politics.  The chapter observes that oil 
politics in Nigeria has had disruptive effect on the nation’s quest for development as 
well as contributing towards regional development disparities. Statistical data 
presented, showed how skewed revenue allocation policies shaped both national 
and regional development. All these were seen with the lens provided by elite theory 
that allows the chapter to further observe how the domineering role of the rent 
seeking elite class can result in corruption which can in turn, undermine efforts at 
achieving national development. 
 
Chapter four outlines the methodology of the study. It helps explain how the study 
was conducted especially how the central research question (RQ) of “Why does 
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Nigeria lack equitable distribution of its oil wealth such that there is seeming regional 
development disparity?” is carefully answered through the examination of distinct but 
related terms to the study. It outlines triangulation which entails use of both 
quantitative and qualitative as the main methods employed to carry out the study.  
These are suited for addressing the RQ because both help examine core issues of 
how oil wealth impacts national development seen through the eyes of the selected 
regions. The chapter also outlines the analytical approach which includes the use of 
simple percentage and statistical tool of chi-square. 
 
Chapter five considers regional development in Nigeria with focus on both South-
South and South-West regions. This is done in part, with the presentation of data 
derived from the research designs adopted. Comparison of both regions through the 
use of research instruments such as questionnaire, interviews and focus group 
discussions, the chapter was able to establish that development disparity exist 
between both regions. Using core economic indicators of ration of poverty and 
access to basic amenities, the chapter identified huge gap between both regions with 
the oil bearing SS worse off. 
 
Chapter six draws on the collected empirical data to focuses on core issues that can 
help test adopted hypotheses for the study. This is done by building on chapter five, 
in addressing key issues that help test adopted hypothesis for the study as well as 
the supporting ones. While building on the previous chapter where development 
situation of both regions was examined, this established factors such as environment 
based oil spill and gas seen from the surveys conducted, to be responsible for the 
development disparity at the regional levels. These were consequently examined 
through governance perspective in detail to establish the missing links between the 
aforementioned factors and how governance can help mitigate these. Consequently, 
governance is seen to be inadequate to cope with effective resource management 
needed to promote positive development outcomes. 
 
Chapter seven recapitulates and concludes the study and based on the argument 
raised from the onset, makes recommendations on how well oil wealth can be 
effectively distributed to achieve regional development. In so doing the chapter 
revisits the adopted objectives of the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The political economy of any nation examines the interaction between the state and 
the market within larger political systems. Todaro and Smith (2009:8) see political 
economy as an enquiry that “goes beyond traditional economics to study, among 
other things, the social and institutional processes through which certain groups of 
economic and political elites influence the allocation of scarce productive resources 
now and in the future, either for their own benefit exclusively or for that of the larger 
population as well”. Likewise Cohn, (2010:2) noted that International Political 
Economy (IPE) “is concerned with the interaction between the state, a sovereign 
territorial unit, and the market, a coordinating mechanism where buyers and sellers 
exchange goods and services at prices and output levels determined by supply and 
demand”.  
 
This chapter introduces Nigeria’s political economy, focusing on the dynamics of the 
Nigerian state by asking questions about how Nigeria’s oil resources are managed in 
relation to positive development outcomes. Bringing the central question of this study 
seen in chapter one to mind, the chapter focused on explaining why Nigeria appear 
to lack an equitable distribution of its oil wealth in the face of regional development 
challenges. It is made of three major sections. These include oil in Nigeria, oil politics 
in Nigeria and development as broadly seen, before narrowing the discussion down 
to the Nigerian context. The interface between oil politics and development is 
considered to shed light on the central theme of the study as well as related 
objectives that seeks to “analyse the role of politics in regional developmental 
experience…” The next section considers the oil industry from a political economy 
perspective. The following section focuses on the oil politics, deepening the analysis 
by dissecting the politics of revenue allocation and the extent to which this shapes 
the national and regional development. The last section explores the impact of oil 
politics on development in Nigeria. The argument is that disruptive politics, 
negatively affects both national and regional development. 
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2.2 OIL IN NIGERIA 
 
“Nigeria is recognized as a country with the most known 
reserves of petroleum and gas in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Petroleum has long become the most important aspect of 
the national economy, accounting for more than half of 
GDP, about 85 percent of government revenues, and 
over 90 percent of exports” Gboyega (2011:7). 
 
The history of oil in Nigeria can be traced to the colonial era when in 1887, colonial 
oil and mineral laws, were enacted (Obi, 2010). The law was later amended in 1907, 
1914, 1925, 1950 and 1958. The quest to find oil in Nigeria began in 1908 when 
Nigerian Bitumen Corporation, a German business concern, began exploring for oil 
in Western region, now South West region of the country. The exploratory activity 
was reported to have taken place around the Araromi area, (PENGASSAN, 2012). 
The effort turned out to be futile, but further exploration in 1937 and 1947 by Shell 
D’Arcy turned out to be more successful. Before the search paid off in 1956, oil was 
discovered in commercial quantities at Oloibiri, the present day Bayelsa State in 
South-South Nigeria, and exploitation began in 1958. 
 
The emergent oil industry received a boost from 1961 with the coming in of 
Multinational Oil Companies (MOCs). Among these front running multi-nationals 
were Mobil, Agip, Safrap (which later became Elf), Tenneco and Amoseas (which 
later became Texaco) and Chevron. These companies aided the oil exploration effort 
in Nigeria. Prior to their coming, Shell Petroleum was already on hand, as the main 
oil company operating in the country. The new comers had their chances of 
participating in the oil exploration business in Nigeria augmented when the 
concessionary right once enjoyed by Shell was extended to them (Udosen et al, 
2009). The government’s push to explore the enormous oil deposits in Nigeria, which 
Shell alone would not have been able to handle, necessitated the extension of the 
concessionary right to the new entrants. 
 
No one doubts the enormous oil wealth within the shores of Nigeria which industry 
watchers see as one of the world best. According to Schwartz (2009), “Nigeria is the 
world’s eight biggest exporter of oil with an installed production capacity of 3 million 
barrels per day”. Enormous resources were realized compared to agriculture which 
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once kept the nation’s economy afloat prior to the discovery of oil. Contrary to 
expectations, the Nigerian state left the control of the oil industry in the hands of 
multinational oil concerns, which then played a dominant role in the oil business of 
the country. According to Emeje (2006) the lack of technological wherewithal to run 
the industry was the reason why the nation left the oil industry in the hands of 
multinational oil concerns, with indigenous oil firms playing minimal role. 
 
However, the near total control by the MOCs stopped between 1967-1970 when the 
military government at this time came up with laws that paved way for indigenous 
participation. The oil in Navigable Waters Act of 1968, the Petroleum Act/Decree of 
1969, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) decree of 1978 and the Land Use Act of 
1978, vested the ownership of oil and gas on the Nigerian state. This was ostensibly 
to position the Nigerian state in a position to reap the benefit accruable from the 
exploration of oil as the largest oil producing country in Africa (Omeje 2006) and the 
eighth biggest oil exporter (Schwartz 2009). Leaving the oil industry in the hands of 
MOCs, would have denied the nation opportunity of reaping enormous resources 
from the sale and exploration of oil. The huge sum realized, according to Shaxson 
(2005), amounted to $350 billion in 35 years. It was thus a matter of core national 
interest, for the nation to take firm control of the oil industry so as to appropriate 
applicable benefits. The practical and perceptible impact of leaving the management 
of indigenous oil business in the hand of MOCs is clear disparity between oil wealth 
and development. 
 
2.2.1 The Nigerian Oil Industry 
The Niger Delta region of Nigeria bears the vast oil resources of the nation, (Omeje 
2006, Ikelegbe 2005, Shaxson 2005, Obi 2010, Mahler 2010, Higgins 2009 and 
Watts 2008). With proven total of 36 billion barrels of oil and 150 trillion natural gas 
reserve, (EIA, 2006), the Nigerian state is seen as a strategic oil producer globally. 
The huge oil deposits can be found in both on and off-shore belt of the Delta. Four 
government institutions govern the oil industry in Nigeria. These are the Nigerian 
National Oil Corporation (NNPC), The Ministry of Petroleum; Department of 
Petroleum Resources (DPR), and the president with his adviser (Gillies 2009). The 
exploration of oil in Nigeria is conducted by Multinational Oil Corporations in a joint 
venture agreement with the Nigerian government. Popular MNCs operating in the 
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Nigerian oil industry include Shell, ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, Agip and Total. As 
earlier noted, dominance of the oil industry by MNCs has been attributed to the 
dearth of technological know-how and lack of the requisite man-power to pilot the 
technology driven industry.  Minister of petroleum steer affairs of the petroleum 
industry and report directly to the president; thus underscoring the huge dose of 
political importance attached to the office of the petroleum minister. The Group 
Managing Director of the NNPC and the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
reports to the petroleum minister. The political system of the nation which leans 
heavily on ethnic interest as Ekeh (1975) noted, means the issue of who occupies 
the office as the petroleum minister is an important one. 
 
The joint venture agreement between the government and oil MNCs is done on 
60/40 percent basis in favour of the federal government and MNCs respectively. The 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation was established in 1977 following the 
merger of the then Nigerian National Oil Corporation and Federal Ministry of Mines 
and Steel (Udosen et al., 2009). This followed the decision of the country to join the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971. OPEC’s resolution 
which required member nations to be in firm control of their oil business by setting up 
national agency like the NNPC in Nigeria can be said to have prompted the 
formation of the NNPC. Nigeria began to play a key role in OPEC and had the oil 
industry managed by the hugely politically regulated Department of Petroleum 
Resources. Oil sales gave the nation fortune in the 1970s during the oil boom era.  
 
Indigenous oil firms do not play adequate role in the oil business in Nigeria. They 
only play support services role to MOCs since they lack the technological edge to 
compete which Dutse (2008), attributed to the poor technological position of the 
country. Seen from a different perspective, one would be forced to see failure of the 
country to tap from the direct foreign invest especially in terms of technology 
transfer. If there is no technology transferred due to oil exploration that is 
technologically driven, how then can we talk of dependent development? 
Technological transfer which comes with FDI that the oil industry attracts, help 
nations develops. This as expected is supposed to be the case in Nigeria because of 
the influx of MNOCs that play leading role in the nation’s oil dominated economy 
 24 
 
(Udosen et al, 2009). The near absence of indigenous oil firms in the oil industry, 
denies the Nigerian business class opportunity to fully participate in the oil business.  
 
To ensure active indigenous participation in the OGI, the Nigerian state adopted the 
Local Content Policy (LCP). LCP aim primarily at providing localised man-power that 
can work in the OGI by giving required training to local people in several aspect of 
operation in the OGI. This was done solely to pave way for local participants in the 
oil sector as a way of encouraging indigenous business interest in the oil industry. 
Though the policy was lauded, it however failed to yield needed result as training 
highly technical man-power to man sensitive aspect of operation in the OGI, takes 
time. The segment below looks at the place of Nigerians in the OGI.  
 
2.2.2 The Place of Nigerians in the Oil and Gas Industry (OGI) 
The Oil and Gas Industry (OGI) in any nation, play vital roles in the economic 
development of such nation. This is because of the huge financial benefits that 
accrue from the sales of the natural resources. Because the oil and gas industry is 
both capital and labour intensive, it is then expected that indigenous people, will play 
pronounced role in the management and running of such industry. Activities such as 
highly technical roles of engineering, fabrication and sales of products, needs direct 
involvement of nationals of the country concerned in most cases. This is however not 
the case in Nigeria as we will see shortly when the local content initiative of the 
federal government of Nigeria, is considered. Reputed to have played vital role in the 
nation’s economic strides since the discovering of oil in the 1960s, little is however 
said about indigenous participation in the OGI.  As briefly touched above, the OGI in 
Nigeria works in rather an unusual way. Operating based on joint venture agreement 
of 60/40 per cent between federal government and the oil producing companies, as 
earlier observed, the position of Nigerians in the oil and gas industry is non-
participatory. What then can be adduced for the non-participation of Nigerians in the 
oil and gas industry in Nigeria? 
 
As expected, huge sum spent on servicing the OGI in Nigeria like the accruable 
revenue from sale of the actual resources, do not find expression in the nation’s 
developmental effort. This has been attributed to lack of participation of Nigerians in 
the OGI. An estimated eight billion dollars (8$ billion) is spent annually serving the 
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OGI, a figure Business day (2008) projected would rise to fifteen billion dollars in few 
years. What this means is that the role of Nigerians in the OGI such as fabricating, 
engineering procurement, construction as well as Front End Engineering Designs 
(FEED), comes from outside of the country and the benefits flow out too. What this 
means is simply that there is low local content in the Nigerian OGI due to inability of 
Nigerians to participate in the OGI. This has been attributed to a lot of factors. 
Oladele (2001) identified deficient capitalization while Aneke (2002), singled out low 
technical capacity as reasons for low LC in the Nigerian OGI. On the other hand, 
Helen et al (2003) cited poor funding arrangement from banks and incoherent 
government policies as well as poor infrastructural facilities as factors.  
 
While technology is an important aspect, Oladele (2001) and Aneke (2002) however 
failed to situate the problem within the larger Nigerian context which is lack of 
government regulatory framework to drive the nation’s technological advancement. A 
pragmatic national policy on technological advancement followed by feasible steps, 
can help check inability if Nigerians to optimally participate in the OGI. That said, we 
can say that help vitiate Uwaifo and Uddin’s (2009:108) argument that linked lack of 
technological development in Nigeria to colonial legacy they alleged, discouraged its 
growth. If colonial government failed to give technological education, what did the 
government do since independence in 1960 to change the technological 
advancement narrative? One expects that years after colonialism, the Nigerian state 
would have evolved ways of driving the process that can birth technological 
advancement. Failure of indigenous oil firm to stand up to the stiff competition from 
foreign oil firms huge technological edge that fights for market space in the Nigerian 
OGI which the elite class exploits to their advantage, can then be explained within 
the premise of government’s failure to be proactive in evolving needed technology . 
 
In the light if the above, we can see the low LC in the Nigerian OGI within the larger 
spectrum of the Nigerian state, especially if seen from the stand point of how the 
nation fairs in the technological realm. Technology serves as the backbone of 
development of any nation. That again, explains why nations invest huge sums 
acquiring technology for development as well as deploying the same to solve 
practical national problem such as harnessing resources such as oil in our analysis. 
In a situation where the resources are in abundance but the technology to exploit 
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them lacking, out-sourcing needed technology, becomes inevitable. That captures 
the Nigerian situation: abundant resources but a dearth of technology. It also 
explains why till date, the government still favours the joint partnership arrangement 
with oil firms in the exploration of oil. We can thus identify the following as the 
reasons why there is low LC in the Nigerian OGI. First, a dearth of technology and 
technical expertise required to man the highly technical OGI. Deficient technological 
edge that bedevils the entire nation has a telling effect on the participation of 
Nigerians in the management and control of the OGI. 
 
It is thus an issue that needs internal effort to address and not externalizing it. As 
Onipede (2010:89) noted, “…it would be more rewarding if Nigerian policy makers 
realize the need to look inward, recognize the technological need of the nation, and 
use same [sic] to develop a high competitive manufacturing and industrial sector 
toward a higher productivity so as to relieve Nigeria the burden of 
underdevelopment”. As long as the government fails to address issues of internal 
technological development, accruable benefits of own technology, will continue to 
elude the nation. The development situation of the country though cannot be entirely 
tied to the low LC in the OGI, it can be said to have contributed to the developmental 
challenges of the country. As will be seen in subsequent sections, the lack of wide-
spread participation of Nigerians in the OGI creates ironic situation of urban rich and 
rural poor, one that captures where there are lucky few with access to oil money as 
rich; while majority of rural dwellers without access to same wealth, live in squalor. 
What then are the measures taken by the Nigerian state to address the low LC.  
 
The low level of participation of Nigerians in the OGI attracted the government’s 
attention when in 2010 the government drew up the Local Content Bill (LCB) with the 
sole aim of ‘domesticating the oil and gas industry through local value addition’.  
Signed into law on the 22nd April 2010 to replace earlier laws that failed to encourage 
local participation in Nigeria, the LCB sought to give development of a local content 
framework a boost. This, the law sought to do so by increasing indigenous 
participation in the OGI and prescribing minimum threshold for local services. 
Ultimate aim of the LCB was simply to promote employment of Nigerian staffs in the 
OGI so as to tame the capital flight seen to have resulted from out-sourcing of 
foreign expatriates engaged by multinationals oil firms at the expense of local 
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alternatives. With the LCB, the aim is to ensure that ‘value is added to the Nigerian 
economy through concerted effort at using Nigerian human, material resources and 
services in the OGI’ so as to transfer the associated benefit that hitherto went to 
foreigners, back to the economy for developmental purposes. To pull LCB through, 
the enabling Act established the Nigeria Content Monitoring Board (NCMB) to 
ensure compliance with the law. 
 
Although the idea of the LCB sounds good and capable of engendering greater local 
participation in the OGI by Nigerians, it is however not all that there is to solve 
problem of the continued underdevelopment of the country in the face of oil wealth. 
Other salient issues seen as hindrances to development need to be tackled to 
improve the Nigerian development situation. As Obi (2010) and Nwabuzor (2006) 
noted, corruption and official recklessness in the management of oil resources, 
needs focal attention to aptly appropriate the gains from natural resources for 
developmental purposes. Besides the LCB enactment, there appears to be no effort 
made to address the technological needs of the country. Technology plays pivotal 
roles in national development (Dutse, 2008). That explains why nations evolve and 
deploy needed man-power with the appropriate training, right environment and 
institutional framework and laws to involve its nationals in achieving technological 
edge that can aid national development. This has not been the case in Nigeria which 
has led to limited involvement of Nigerians in the OGI, a situation that the elite 
exploits in a manner that denies the nation needed development. This happens 
around structure of the economy often created to cater for both the elite and general 
public without access to oil wealth. The section below titled oil and dual economy in 
Nigeria, examine shade of oil induced economies in Nigeria.  
 
2.2.3 Oil and Dual Economy In Nigeria 
Globally, a solid economic foundation is a veritable instrument that engenders 
development. Effective coordination of the economy, can spur activities within larger 
society in a complimentary manner to kick-start processes that can facilitate 
development. Ability of each sector of an economy to complement each other helps 
drive internal economic activities that with time, engenders general development. 
That is why viable economy, equipped with all it takes to push the developmental 
effort forward is the quest of any nation. Developed nations such as United Kingdom, 
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United States of America, Canada, and China among others, placed a premium on 
the centrality of sound and viable economy to attain development. Continued 
reliance on the same sound economies, helped them maintain and improve their 
levels of development, no matter how disparate expectedly, level of development 
appears among them.  None of these economies achieved development with duality 
in their respective economic systems. Duality in an economy connotes simultaneous 
existence of two distinct kinds of economies marked by class differentials, one for 
the poor, and the other for the rich. This reflecting undue elite dominance of the 
systems for selfish purposes, signifies an economic disconnect that sometimes 
impede development.  
 
The development of a dual economy in resource rich but dependent state like 
Nigeria that relies on oil and associated accruable resources, is one that gives the 
rich access to oil wealth with the poor left to suffer from the associated impact of oil 
exploration as is the case of environmental impact of oil exploration in the Delta. In 
the Niger Delta which is the oil belt of the Nigerian state, the reality of duality of the 
economy, appears prevalent. While the elite class with access to oil wealth live in 
splendour, those at the resource base live apposite as they appear to live in squalor. 
This depicts a situation Ewhere (2013) would have us call ‘abnormality of wealth 
circulation’. This depicts situation oil bearing communities without access to oil 
wealth like the elite class, live at the same high economic life that the elite class with 
enough wealth, do. This depicts a situation I call the “urban rich and rural poor”. This 
is believed by the people to engender disparity between the rural poor and the urban 
rich since the oil wealth available to the elite class widened the gap between the rich 
and the poor. This has negative impact on the rural poor because while they earned 
little from their largely persistent farming, they are at the same time forced to live at 
the rate of the luxurious life the urban rich created in the city since they buy from 
same source. What comes to mind from the above is how nexus between elite and 
resource curse theories shapes resource based economies. 
 
2.2.4 Oil and Politics in Nigeria 
Here, we will look at the political economy of oil in Nigeria and its effect on the 
developmental effort of the country. This is done with a view to ascertaining key 
issues that shape the appropriation of oil wealth in the West African nation. Oil as a 
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natural resource of great economic value occupies prime attention in global politics. 
That explains why countries spend fortune on its exploration and the exploitation 
business generally so as to derive economic benefits often used to drive the 
development process which by extension, give nations political edge among comity 
of nations, (Morgenthau, 1978).  
 
Oil and Politics are inextricably linked in Nigeria as political leaders, are emotionally 
attached to the derivable wealth from its sale. People see the control of oil resource 
as the ultimate control of political power of the nation and as such, there is intense 
contestation for political power and by extension, the control of oil resources of the 
nation (Ikelegbe, 2005; Obi, 2010). Consequently, the issue of oil and politics in 
Nigeria is a vexatious one. As earlier noted, agricultural produce sustained the 
Nigerian economy prior to the discovery and exploration of oil. The coming of oil 
opened a new vista of the contestation for power which was already built around 
primordial inclinations. As Omoweh; (2005:50) observed, “the new found oil wealth in 
Nigeria introduced a new dimension into the country’s character of politics, 
particularly the intensification of the fierce struggle to capture and privatize the state 
at all cost and by all means by the political class”.  Subsequently, this played out to 
the detriment of the economy as “roving bandits with the smash and grab mentality” 
dominated Nigerian political landscape Lewis (2010:20). End result unfortunately, 
was poor planning and where there is one, lack of the political will to faithfully see it 
through, Henley et al (2012). 
 
From the above, one can say that oil and politics are to a very large extent, linked in 
Nigeria. The story of the struggle for allocation of oil resources and disputes over the 
revenue allocation formulae for the nation, attest to this claim. As the nation 
discovered oil and abandoned agriculture, attention shifted to the politics of oil which 
later pitched regions against themselves in the struggle for oil wealth. According to 
Nabbon; (2010), “the decision of the Nigerian state to abandon the original revenue 
sharing formula that existed at independence, contributed to the orgy of violence that 
engulfed the oil belt of the Delta”. The issue has always been attributed to the 
inequality that exist in the distributional politics that the Nigerian nation has come to 
be identified with. While agricultural produce such as cocoa, palm oil and groundnut 
held sway in the Nigerian economy prior to the discovery of oil, the revenue 
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allocation principle was based on derivation principle with 50% as the sharing 
benchmark.  
 
By this distributional principle, it means that regions where the resources are derived 
were allowed to retain 50% of their produce and send the remaining 50% to the 
center government. This lasted from 1960 to 1970s when major ethnic groups of 
Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba held sway. Changes were to be introduced later as the 
pendulum of economic survival swung from agricultural produce to oil. That marked 
the beginning of the era where politics interwoven with oil ensued (Otoghile and 
Eghweree, 2011) and the federal system became skewed to favour the center (Ikeji 
2011; Akpabio & Akpan 2010). This is believed to have happened at the behest of 
alleged vested political interest that see the usual 50% revenue sharing formula 
unfavourable to them since they no longer produce resources that sustain the nation. 
Instead, they favoured revenue sharing formula that relies on the principle of needs 
since they have the number to attract adequate resources at the expense of minority 
groups. 
 
The changes that occurred thereafter in the revenue sharing policy, the struggle for 
the control of the nation’s resources that followed took regional dimension. The 
major ethnic groups because of the near total control of the central government 
wanted same control extended to oil revenue. Minority groups, especially in the oil 
bearing Delta, objected this, thus leading to an intense struggle that many call ‘the 
national question of oil’. The struggle that ensued, according to Ikeji (2011), created 
a struggle fuelled by primordialism and created regional cleavages as regions 
championed their manifest interest instead of the nations’. Vested interest in oil 
revenue by the political elite with primordial links can thus be explained within the 
framework of rentierism as the resource curse theory suggests (see Chapter 3). 
Rentierism in this context connotes a situation where the elites derive their resources 
from oil rents that accrue to the Nigerian state. While this appears to be the case in 
Nigeria, it has a twist where the elite class pursue ethno-centric interests at the 
expense of national interest. Though interest driven, the elite class unite to acquire 
resources but differ slightly along ethnic and religious line in Nigeria, (Akpabio et al, 
2010). These differences along ethno-regional lines became pronounced in the area 
of revenue allocation at the center level. 
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The avoidable struggle and the attendant lack of equity in sharing oil revenue, led to 
accumulated grievances which according to Obi (2010), was a contributory factor to 
the oil based Delta crisis in Nigeria. Consequently, oil and politics mingled as self 
interest in political garb, pitched major ethnic groups against the oil bearing minority 
groups of the Delta. The end result, was what Gboyega et al, (2011:13) argued, 
created ‘regional inequality’ with the oil bearing minorities, at the receiving end. 
Minority politics and quest for both economic and political space, underpins the 
larger political economy which oil spawns in Nigeria. This in a sense tilts the 
pendulum of government patronage which in some sense, translates to regional 
development. If the place of minority group and development are to be linked, then 
an objectives listed in chapter one of this study which among others includes the 
‘quest to find out position of the oil bearing minority Delta in development terms in 
the face of oil wealth in Nigeria’, deserve inquisitive attention. 
 
To understand the weight oil and politics carries in the political economy of the 
Nigerian state, we will briefly consider the following sub-topic with a view to exploring 
in compact form, how ‘oil and politics interface’ shape the Nigerian political cum 
developmental process. Doing this would see us focus on contestation for oil wealth 
as the revenue allocation principles indicate and by extension, how the lopsided 
distributional politics seen to thrive on inequality, is believed to have birthed the Delta 
turmoil. Other issues would be oil and corruption as well as oil and the politics of 
development. All these would be done with a view to exploring the extent to which 
the intricate, politics mix with oil in Nigeria, to affect national development. 
 
2.2.5 Oil and the Politics of Revenue Allocation 
One thing that sign posts oil politics in Nigeria is what has come to be seen and 
known as the politics of revenue allocation. By this we simply mean the whole gamut 
of the processes that have to do with how oil revenues are shared in the Nigerian 
federal system. This has been laced with huge dose of politics and political struggle 
between and among the largely dominated ethic interest in Nigeria. According to Ikeji 
(2011), “the struggle for the control of the nation’s resources have also, to some 
extent been based on the regional cleavages”. The Nigerian state is made up of six 
geo-political zones dominated by three large ethnic groups with numerous minority 
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groups spread across the nation. Manifest but subtle political struggle for oil wealth, 
exist between the majority ethnic groups and the minority in the Niger Delta. This is 
amply reflected in the politics of revenue allocation which many see as unfairly 
skewed against minority groups but to the advantage of the major tribes. This 
became evident immediately oil was discovered where the revenue sharing formula 
earlier based on 50% derivation principle when the major tribes held sway in 
agricultural produce, changed to 25% between 1968-1980 and 1.5% between 1980-
1989 (Akpabio and Akpan, 2010) when oil was discovered. The politics that followed 
and later came to be known as the politics of revenue sharing formula as we earlier 
observed, is seen by many as direct political war between majority tribes and the 
minority tribes for the soul of the Nigerian oil.  This to a very large extent amplifies 
what has come to be seen as oil politics in Nigeria. 
 
Subtle and overt moves by regions to have fairer share in the revenue sharing 
regimes as well as the twist and the rancour that followed, crystallized the political 
angle of what we have come to seen as the politics of oil in Nigeria, (Ikelegbe 2005;  
Obi 2010; Ikeji 2011; Omeje' 2006; Yusuf-Bagaji et al 2011; Higgins, 2009). 
According to Otoghile and Eghweree (2011), the Nigerian federal system largely 
seen as flawed, comes readily to mind when the issue of oil politics in Nigeria is up 
for analysis. This is particularly of interest when seem from the prism of equity in the 
distribution of Nigerian oil resources as was the case in the days of agriculture where 
the major ethnic groups, dominated. It is thus a struggle to outdo the minority by 
espousing unfavourable revenue sharing formula from the center government 
dominated largely by the majority tribes of Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba. Efforts at 
amending the nation’s constitution recently, exposed the regional dimension of the 
competition for oil money. 
 
While governors of the oil rich South-South region wanted increased allocation, 
those of the North, wanted the status quo of 13% the South-South presently retains, 
to remain. As Agbo; (2013:19-20) noted, 
 
“The 1999 constitution provides for at least 13 per cent 
derivation to oil producing states. Due to the agitation of 
the oil bearing communities for more it was proposed in 
the ongoing constitution amendment process for 
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derivation to be increased to 20 per cent. This was 
rejected by 224 votes to 125. This is another interest of 
the South-South rejected by the North.”  
 
What comes to mind is the subtle but fierce regional struggle for oil resources with 
majority ethnic groups seen to be muzzling minorities with their numerical strength. 
By implication, development is thus removed from oil bearing communities since 
they bear the brunt of oil production. Though the oil bearing regions demand more 
pay and justifiably too as they would have us accept, the question many keep 
asking, is what became of the resources they receive since the 13 per cent 
derivation policy became effective? 
 
Table 6.6 in chapter six, captures transmutation of the revenue sharing formula over 
time in Nigeria and how it reflected absence of distributive justice. This is because as 
earlier observed, when it was agricultural, the operational sharing principle was that 
of derivation and the regions producing the resources, had 50% of whatever they 
produced. This became 1.5% in 1989. It took intense struggle by the oil bearing 
minority of the Delta for this to be reluctantly altered to the present 13%.  This shows 
the political rivalry of vested interest in the Nigerian oil wealth which again, reflects 
the commonsensical understanding of what politics means which is “struggle for 
power to administer the commonwealth”. 
 
Records from available revenue allocation formula in Nigeria between 1999 and 
2012, shows a gradual reduction in the percentage of sharing the revenue based on 
derivation principle. It became manifest when oil became the mainstay of the nation’s 
economy as earlier years showed robust revenue share for regions that produced 
the resources. Ironically, these regions were dominated by major ethnic groups. The 
table shown in the empirical Chapters, showed evidence of changes to the 
disadvantage of the minorities when they started producing revenue that sustained 
the nation. The politics and intrigue that follows, shows the deep seated politics 
associated with the exploration of oil in Nigeria. It is in line with this, that this study 
will in chapter six test adopted hypothetical statement that “lopsided Federal 
structure undermines equitable distribution of resources which leads to 
underdevelopment in politically less powerful regions”. 
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2.2.6 Oil, Politics and Development 
This section highlights points of ‘oil politics’ and development interplay in the 
Nigerian context. It builds on oil politics seen so far. In clear terms, the discovery of 
oil, the creation of the Nigerian oil industry and the politics that followed, appear to 
have plunged the nation into rent-seeking. This concept relates to the country’s 
undue reliance on oil rents at the expense of other equally important sectors of the 
economy that can drive the growth process. What this does normally, is to stifle 
growth since the oil rents are usually exposed to the vagaries of price instability, with 
other sectors weakened so as not to be able to support the growth process. This is 
what may be seen as signs of resource curse when available resources rather than 
add appreciable value to national development, distort relevant sectors that can drive 
the growth process. For this reason, the recourse course theory in the Nigerian 
context is something explored in this thesis (see chapter 3). Besides the economic 
dimension as seen above, rent-seeking nature of any nation can increase incidents 
of corruption (Ikeanyibe, 2011).  
 
A brief examination of the Nigerian situation appears to reveal instances where oil 
related corrupt practices exist. Rather than amass oil rents for national development, 
there appear to be elite dominance of the public life where they satisfy their interest 
to the detriment of others and national development. They distribute resources often 
unfairly, to meet narrowly defined rather than development objectives. This situation 
Ikelegbe (2014) notes, reflect the lack equity in the distribution of the resources that 
is seen to have fuelled oil related protest in the oil Delta. This shows how oil and the 
politics it creates, can disrupt the very development it is expected to engender 
(Yusuf-Bagaji et al; 2011 and Higgins; 2009). Theories adopted for this study, builds 
on this in subsequent sections.  
 
2.3 OIL POLITICS AND NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENT 
From what we have seen, oil and politics dynamics in Nigeria, has failed to mix 
effectively as there is the apparent lack of positive impact on the Nigerian state in 
terms of development. Evidence from the regions, shows disparate rate of 
development which internal political dynamics, can help explain. According to Gillies 
(2009), “oil-related corruption… harms the national interest by increasing the amount 
of wealth available through illicit mean”. This in the long run has telling effect on the 
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nation and her quest for development in several respects. An effective corruption 
fight would be able to checkmate corrupt self-enrichment. There is little evidence to 
show that this has been the case in Nigeria. Ineffective corruption control mechanism 
makes it possible for select few to hijack the economic system for self-enrichment. 
According to Henley et al (2012), this situation is the case in Nigeria while Shaxson 
(2007) and Nwabuzor (2008) attribute corruption to the negative externality of oil 
exploration in Nigeria. This in effect, manifests in underdevelopment in the Nigerian 
state in the face of oil exploration. The inevitable conclusion one can draw from this 
is that the dynamics of oil politics in Nigeria has not shaped the development of the 
country positively. 
 
2.3.1 Conceptualizing Development 
The concept of development is a highly contestable one as scholars disagree on 
what it means. While those with economic background see it as improved Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), others such as Sen (1999) view same as freedom. A 
careful analysis is therefore needed to be able to explain the concept. It is by so 
doing that we can locate the place of individual countries and Nigeria in particular in 
development discourse. To do this, this section begins by considering the concept of 
development viewed through the lens of available literatures. Consequently, three 
perceptions of development identified by scholars as follows as follows, will guide the 
analysis. 
 
(a) Development as historically constructed, 
(b) Development as economic improvement and  
(c) Development as holistic improvement. 
 
The section ends with a synergized definition for the concept that emphasized 
essence of development which is improved standard of living that goes beyond mere 
economic conjectures. 
 
2.3.2 Three Visions of ‘Development 
In this sub-section, an attempt is made to further elaborate the concept of 
development considering divergent views of scholars. Three different visions of the 
notion will be articulated and discussed: (1) those writers who have historically 
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grounded the notion; (2) those scholars who emphasize the economic dimension; 
and (3) definitions that try to capture development as an all-embracing phenomenon. 
The discussion will end with an attempt to synergize the definitions with a view to 
situating development in the Nigerian context. 
 
(A) Development As Historically Constructed  
Ideas postulated by modernization theory form the basis of this perception of 
development. Clark et al (2013:172) posited that modernization theory argues that 
“all societies pass through the same historical stages of economic development. The 
claim in the aftermath of World War II decolonization was that contemporary 
underdeveloped countries were merely at an earlier stage in this linear historical 
process of development than more developed countries.” This view links 
development to history. As already noted, there are competing definitions on what 
development means. To understand the historical dimension of the definition of 
development, views of scholars will be considered. First, Escobar (1995:5) argued 
that ‘development is historically constructed’ in line with modernization postulations. 
Painting a picture of North-South dynamics reminiscent of Said’s orientalism 
concept, Escobar hinted of the disadvantaged position of LDCs because of their 
colonial experience. To him, “development as a historically produced discourse 
entails an examination of why so many countries started to see themselves as 
underdeveloped in the early post- World War II period”, and so “how to develop 
became a fundamental problem for them, and how, finally, they embarked upon the 
task of un-underdeveloping themselves by subjecting their societies to increasingly 
systematic, detailed, and comprehensive interventions”.  Though the view of both 
scholars capture the historical dimension of development, they however fail to 
balance the argument, as they merely embrace North-South narratives reminiscent 
of Said’s (1979) orientalism. 
 
One expects that tracing development to history as both scholars seen above did, 
will not lead to trading of blame as to who should be held responsible for the 
development plight of LDCs. If blame is to be traded, variables such as whether or 
not LDCs harnessed opportunity that came with the industrial revolution should be 
critically examined. Determining this raises more questions than answers. If 
modernization theory encompasses DCs passing through phases to get to where 
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they are now, were the LDCs hampered in passing those stages too? Was there any 
central government regulation of this process? There is absolutely no point painting 
picture of North-South divide while locating history of development to historical past 
since that will lead to missing the point. Development may have a germane link to 
the past as history have, but locating the place of any country or group of countries 
within the developmental pyramid doubtlessly should go beyond historical 
consideration. That development as a concept has a historical trajectory, should be 
seen simply in that light and not radicalising the discourse with the emotive 
North/South development discourse. Doing that doubtlessly confuses the whole 
issue which if not carefully handled, will lead to a situation where salient question of 
what LDCs did with both their human and natural resources that fuelled the industrial 
revolution would be ignored. Ignoring such salient question would amount to patting 
‘unprepared Southern countries’ in the back for the missed opportunities after the 
industrial revolution and independence. This critical interrogation and examination of 
other version of development will form part of my critical contribution to such wider 
debates on the practice of development. 
 
(B) Development As Economic Improvement 
In this section I will consider the view of scholars that associated development with 
economic improvement. Offering an economic definition of development, Todaro and 
Smith (2009:14) argue that it expresses “the capacity of a national economy, whose 
initial economic condition has been more or less static for a long time, to generate 
and sustain an annual increase in its Gross National Income (GNI) at rates of 5% to 
7% or more”.  What this definition does is to simply judge states as developed if their 
economic performance improves over time. In a similar manner, Thirlwall (2003) has 
equated development to economic development when he remarks that it should be 
“thought of in terms of the expansion of entitlements and capabilities, which are not 
well captured by aggregate measures of output growth”.  Increased GNI espoused 
by Todaro and Smith as previously seen, expands ‘entitlement and capability’, which 
Thirlwall see as development. The economic conception of development dominates 
contemporary development literatures. It has enjoyed widespread publicity as 
development scholars see increases in per capita income and GDP of countries as 
sufficient indicators of development. 
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Taking a similar position that equated development with economic improvement, 
Kuznets (1973:255) argued that “development required high rates of growth of per 
capita Gross National Product (GNP), of population and of total factor of productivity 
(especially labour productivity)”. Though this definition portrays the economic 
dimension as a way of knowing what development entails, it is however problematic, 
because it fails to factor disparity in population and resource power of countries into 
the calculation. In most cases, GNP and GDP are relative as the very need for 
development among countries. For us to agree on what is ‘high rate of GNP’, an 
effort must therefore be made to set a benchmark to determine that which makes 
GNP high or low. Over the years, UNDP statistics that stipulates global average 
tends to be disparate, with no attention paid to peculiarity of countries in terms of 
political and economic factors capable of influencing development process. 
Moreover it tells us little about infrastructure; does GDP equate to roads, educations, 
healthcare etc.? 
 
If investment is crucial to economic development as Iyoha (2005) note, and 
assuming that development is achieved with improved economic conditions, what 
happens to individuals that have nothing other than their labour power? Does the 
improved economic lot of a few individuals translate to general development? What 
indicators can one say aptly reflects the economic fortune of individuals that translate 
into general development? Granted that country average is usually used to 
determine this, it is however doubtful how an acceptable figure is usually obtained. 
Use of GNP as Smith and Todaro (2011) among others did, does not aptly capture 
nations’ development position especially in developing countries with history of poor 
record keeping. As long as core issues that should be considered are ignored, one 
would doubt how well economic improvement can aptly define development. With 
the aforementioned as observed flaw associated with the economic perception of 
development, one is thus compelled to broaden the definitional scope of the concept; 
development. Consequently, I will be looking at the holistic view of development as 
done in the sub-section.  
 
(C) Development As Holistic Improvement 
“Development is a multi-dimensional process, one that changes the economy, polity 
and society of the country in which it occurs,” Kambhampati; (2004:12). Scholars 
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with this perception see development beyond mere improvement in the economic 
condition of a country. They are of the opinion that for development to be said to 
have occurred, there must be general improvement and measurable change in the 
life of an individual, group or a nation. Emblematic of this vision is Sen (1999) who 
sees development as “a process of expanding the freedoms that people enjoy”. 
Though an ambiguous word that can further be explained, the word ‘freedom’ 
reasonably point to the direction of holistic overhaul of all encumbrances that 
underdevelopment represents. Rist (2010:13) conceives of development as the 
ability to reproduce a society. He observes that “development consists of a set of 
practices, sometimes appearing to conflict with one another, which require - for the 
reproduction of society - the general transformation and destruction of the natural 
environment and social relations. Its aim is to increase the production of 
commodities (goods and services) geared, by way of exchange, to effective 
demand.” He shifted the definitional base of development beyond both historical 
contraction and economic conjectures as earlier seen.  
 
Meanwhile, Seers (1969) contends that ‘development cannot be said to have 
happened when variables such as unemployment, poverty and inequality increases’. 
What we can infer from the aforementioned literature, is simply the quest of these 
scholars to offer a more comprehensive definition for the concept of development. 
What we have seen from this view in defining development is the caution not to 
define development with an economistic strait-jacket. Sen’s (1999) freedom concept 
and Thomas’s (2008) position that “economic growth is identified as necessary for 
combating poverty, defined as the inability of the people to meet their basic material 
needs…”, as well as Seer’s (1969) view that sought end to limitations that an 
individual may face, expanded the development discourse beyond mere 
improvement in the economy of any nation. 
 
An improved economy may in fact benefit only a few individuals while burdening 
many with ‘unfreedoms’ as Sen would express it. Unfreedom he espoused, include 
factors that deny individuals basic freedom to survive. Famine and unpleasant 
political system that stifles economic growth and development by extension were 
some of the unfreedoms Sen (1999:15) listed as obstacles to development. In the 
light of this, we can say that the holistic conception of development represents an 
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expanded definition. This became imperative in the 1950s and 1960s when many 
LDCs achieved the prescribed target going by the narrow economic definition of 
development but had low living standard. Thirlwall (2003) summed this up when he 
observed that the essence of development is “to provide people with the basic 
necessity of life, for their sake, and to provide a degree of self-esteem and freedom 
for people, who are precluded by poverty’. 
 
The three views considered above painted the picture of development in different 
forms. One trend that runs through all the views is the fact that development entails 
improvement. From the researchers’ perspective and in definitional terms, we can 
see the concept of development as ‘embracing the whole gamut of processes that 
lead to the enhancement of the living standard of any society with a view to making it 
achieve acceptable minimum standard that is able to sustain life, guarantee equality 
and freedom needed for the good life’. The extent to which a nation can be said to 
have achieved this varies. However, to a very large extent, most LDCs can safely be 
said to lack development in generic terms. In Goulet’s (2006) view, no country is 
developed if it is unable to provide for itself and its population (self-sustenance), 
lacks self-worth/independence (self-esteem), and is encumbered by daily survival 
needs (unfree). Absence of the trio as Goulet noted, means achieving development 
for a nation. 
 
Goulet’s (2006) view though broad, can safely be said to be an amplification of Sen’s 
“development means freedom” conceptualization. This is especially so if seen from 
the fact that the three core development values espoused by Goulet reinforce each 
other. A lack of self-sustainability arguably leads to low self-esteem and lack of 
freedom. Unfreedoms, as Sen said, could be social, political and economic in most 
cases, bring poverty and inequality to the fore. The way out Sen (1999) suggests, is 
to expand ‘entitlement and capability’ of the individual to be able to square up with 
poverty and inequality. Entitlement brings the material resources that eventually 
leave the individual with the capability to break the yoke of lack and poverty which 
underdevelopment represents. If “economic development should be thought of in 
terms of the expansion of entitlements and capabilities, which are not well captured 
by aggregate measures of output growth”(Thirlwall 2003), then we should look 
beyond economic variables to determine which nation is developed or not. The quest 
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to establish this will prompt a carefully look at development as a concept and an 
academic field of inquiry which seeks to bridge the gap between lack and enhanced 
quality life. 
 
On the basis of the above, we can safely say that the lot of Nigeria and that of other 
LDCs in development terms is precarious. The basic criteria of self-sustainability, 
self-esteem and freedom using the lens provided by both Sen and Goulet, appear 
not reflected in the life of the people. This adds to the low per capita income and 
human development index in most LDCs thus confirming the position of 
underdevelopment as the prism provided by the restrictive economic definition of the 
concept, development.. These nations can hardly produce all they consume as huge 
sum is spent annually importing staple food such as rice. What happens in that case 
is that development is far removed from them as freedom which comes with 
development as Sen would have us see it, is still elusive. The people grapple with a 
lot of unfreedoms; reminiscent of underdevelopment. These range from social, 
political to economic which make attaining the quality life which development 
represents, difficult for the average Nigerian and those in other LDCs. Subsequent 
empirical analysis in this thesis will unmask how development can be considered in 
practical terms in the context of Nigeria. 
 
2.4 DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA 
The slippery nature of the concept of development makes it difficult to say where it 
exists or not. However, taking the holistic view of development as a basis, one can 
say that development exist in relative terms in countries around the globe on a 
continuum from Developed Countries (DCs) to Less Developed Countries (LDCs), 
term used to describe third world countries. According to Horowitz (1972:17); a third 
world country “is non-American, ex-colonial, and thoroughly dedicated to becoming 
industrialized, whatever the economic costs” as opposed to a first world country. 
Third world countries among other things are seen as having low growth rate, high 
rate of unemployment and largely traditional societies compared to what obtains in 
modern societies seen in developed countries Kambhampati; (2004:14). To this end, 
many tend to see Nigeria as one of the LDCs whose developmental strides, appear 
to show inability to measure up with prevailing global standard. Those with this view, 
rely on existing realities and what economic indicators reveal. Consequently, attempt 
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would be made to ascertain the place of Nigeria in development terms in this section. 
Two conceptions of development which includes improved economy and holistic 
improvement in the life of an individual, group or a nation, will be relied upon. 
 
Taking Sen’s (1999) postulation  that sees ‘development as freedom’ to begin, we 
can then see improved living standard which translates to improved health care due 
to proper sanitation and hygiene, infrastructural facilities, high per capita income and 
gross national product in the life of a nation as development. Such improvements, 
eradicates ‘unfreedom’ sing Sen’s word. While absence of development comes with 
its own challenges, the best known method of achieving development from available 
literatures remains the application of economic principles such as monetary policies 
to drive the development process. Applying economic principles helps drive the 
growth and development process. Economic growth according to Lipsey (1986), is 
“the positive trend in the nation’s total output over long term”.  When this is achieved, 
there would be ‘sustained increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for a long time’ 
Lipsey further noted. From this brief exposé, we can see the central role economic 
growth play in shaping the development strides of a nation. As Dolan et al (1999) 
holds, “economic growth is most frequently expressed in terms of increase in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), a measure of the economy’s total output of goods and 
services”. What we can see from this, is the centrality of economic sector of any 
nation in driving the productive capacity to drive the development process.  
 
Improved productive capacity of the state engenders growth which provides wealth 
for individuals, the state and private concerns as well. When there is wealth in the 
hands of the individual, basic needs that constitutes ‘unfreedoms’ according to Sen 
can be surmounted since individuals can afford the desired life-style while being in a 
position to pay tax to the government. Private companies on the other hand, equally 
have enough to invest and provide job opportunities for the people. The multiplier 
effect would be an enlarged capacity to invest and generate wealth which invariably 
benefits the government since there would be enough funds to be invested in critical 
infrastructural facilities to uplift living standard of the people. In all, the economic 
condition of any nation is central to driving the growth and development process. 
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While development should be seen beyond the core economic postulations as the 
three versions of development earlier seen made clear, it is important we understand 
the place of the economy in the development process. Efficient economic policies 
are believed to aid development process. That’s why the structure of the economy is 
important because it helps shape the economic fortune of any nation, and thus by 
extension, determines the developmental strides. For example, state-centric 
economies such as China with central planning mechanism are deemed to have 
achieved rapid development (Iyoha, 2005). Nigeria operates mixed economic system 
with reliance on the exploration of oil. According to Sanusi; (2010), “the Nigerian 
economy...is characterized by structural dualism” which can be seen as coexistence 
of two sectors such as oil and agriculture. What then can we say of the development 
situation in Nigeria? What were the efforts made to achieve suitable development 
pace in the face of oil resources? Section 2.4.1 considers development plans in 
Nigeria. This is done to examine role of the elites in enacting policies and how same 
shape the development process in Nigeria. 
 
2.4.1 Development Plans in Nigeria 
Development plans evolve from economic planning in a country. It entails “deliberate 
government attempt to coordinate economic decision making over the long run and 
to influence, direct, and in some cases even control the level and growth of a 
nation’s principle economic variables (income, consumption, employment, 
investment, saving, export, import, etc.), (Todaro and Smith 2009). According to 
Todaro and Smith (2009), development planning is an “essential and pivotal means 
of guiding and accelerating economic growth in almost all developing countries”. In 
similar vein, Ikeanyibe (2009:198) observed that development planning “involves 
predetermining a nation’s visions, missions, policies and programmes in all facets of 
life such as social, human, political, environmental, technological factors etc. and the 
means of achieving them.” From the former, one can say that development plans are 
initiated and pursued by countries in response to challenges of underdevelopment 
that plague them at any point in their evolutionary history. Consequently, 
development plans can simply be seen as ‘a well calculated steps in form of 
pragmatic economic policies and frameworks that can help a nation achieve desired 
improvement in the ways of doing things with a view to bringing about improved way 
of life generally’. 
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Development planning in Nigeria dates back to the colonial era when in 1946, the ten 
(10) year welfare and development plan initiated by the British colonial administration 
was embraced. This plan billed to merely distribute the colonial welfare funds, 
achieved very little (Ikelegbe, 2003; Abidde, 2012; Henley et al., 2012). Non-
participation of Nigerians in the planning process has been offered as an explanation 
for the poor showing of these plans. Other subsequent development plans were the 
five year colonial development plans (1955 – 1960), First National Development Plan 
(1962 – 1968), and the Second National Development Plan (1970 –1974). Others 
included the third National Development Plan (1975–1980) and the Fourth National 
Development Plan (1981 – 1985), all geared toward arresting underdevelopment in 
the nation. As revealed in appendix b table 4 below, all these plans failed to achieve 
desired result for sundry reasons listed against each plan. 
 
More recent steps taken to bring about development of the nation through 
development planning can be seen in measures meant to realize the United Nation’s 
(UN) inspired Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Nigeria. That initiative is 
what the Nigerian government referred to as National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy, (NEEDS) established in 2004. The NEEDS document and 
initiative, placed primacy on agricultural evolution to break the nucleus of alleged 
economic stagnation said to be  crippling the nation in the face of enormous oil 
wealth. According to the Nigerian National Planning Commission (2004), “The goal 
of NEEDS is to mobilize the resources of Nigeria to make a fundamental break with 
the failures of the past and bequeath a united and prosperous nation to generations 
to come; (Need Document).  NEEDS was promped by the failure of previous efforts 
aimed at achieving development through planning At the state and local government 
levels, NEEDS is replicated as State’s Economic Empowerment and Development 
Strategy, (SEEDS) and Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy 
(LEEDS) respectively. 
 
While development plans in Nigeria reveal that they were well intentioned, they 
however failed to achieve pre-conceived aims (Ikelegbe 2003; Abidde 2012; Henley 
et al., 2012). Apart from the five years colonial development plan and the First 
National Development plans that achieved 4% and 5% annual growth rate 
respectively, the other plans failed to achieve meaningful result. The NEEDs initiative 
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is designed to help the nation achieve appreciable development between 2000-2015 
in line with the United Nations initiated Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Extents to which this will differ from previous development plans that failed in Nigeria 
remain unclear. Plan failure in Nigeria according to Imhanlahimhin;(2000:93), is due 
to “restriction of planning to the economic aspects of life at the expense of other 
aspects such as political, social and cultural with particular reference to human 
development”. Comparing development planning in Nigeria to what occurs in 
Indonesia, Henley et al (2012:S54) observe: 
 
“vision of development was not inspired by a concern with 
providing mass industrial employment for the poor - nor 
even, apparently, by a faith in the ‘spill over’ or ‘growth 
pole’ effects of industrial development on those parts of 
the economy which did benefit the poor. Instead, the 
issues which interested the Nigerian technocrats most 
were more technical and elitist in character: value added, 
skill acquisition, technology transfer, indigenous 
ownership, and regional equity”.   
 
Issue of lack of public participation raised by the scholars, can be likened to that of 
one-sided planning Imhanlahimhin raised. This in essence means that from the 
planning process, the people are alienated from the developmental process because 
of the elitist posture. However, the position of Henley et al (2012) fails to capture the 
internal dynamics in Nigeria. Issues of literacy level and general political apathy 
hamper robust planning process in Nigeria, (Imhanlahimhin, 2000).The question this 
poses is that of what led to the inconsistent planning attitude? How can this be 
explained within the framework of elite and resource curse theorization (see chapters 
three).  
 
Comparatively, Nigeria’s development drive has failed to achieve desired result 
compared with other countries such as Indonesia and New Zealand because the 
various plans, failed to achieve desired results as the table below shows. 
 
Renowned as African giant, and the largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa before 
the emergence of South African as an emerging market, Nigeria has made little 
progress alleviating poverty irrespective of the enormous wealth and the various 
instituted developmental initiatives. This precarious situation reflects in the living 
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condition of the people as the 1999 United Nations Human Development Report 
declared that 48% Nigerians are living below poverty lines and remain vulnerable to 
exploitation. The report titled “Poverty Alleviation Policy” (P1) states thus: “With a 
per capita income of about $300 and a human development index of 0.4, Nigeria is a 
poor country despite the abundance of human, material and natural resources …” 
Other factors responsible for failure of the planning regimes in the country includes a 
mismatch of policy and national policy priority as well as the problem of corruption in 
the system that thwarts effort made at breaking the yoke of underdevelopment 
through development planning (Ikelegbe, 2003). This issue was also mentioned by 
Henley et al; (2012) when they observed that the idea of centralized planning system 
which breeds “roving bandits” who plan to fulfill their selfish interest at the expense of 
national interest. Citing corruption as responsible for plan failure in Nigeria, Henley et 
al; (2012) failed to identify variables responsible. That is where this study will among 
other things identify internal dynamics that engender plan failure in Nigeria. 
Chronicles the various plans and how they fared can be found in appendix of this 
study.  It shows the Nigerian development planning experience. 
 
2.4.2 Why Development Plans Failed In Nigeria 
A development plan in Nigeria or anywhere in the world can be termed failed when 
intended outcomes are not achieved. The various development plans in Nigeria seen 
above, are deemed failed in several respects as intended goals were either not 
achieved or partially achieved. While assessing performance of development plans 
in Nigeria, Okojie (2002: 366), observed, “at the end of the rolling plans, from 1990 to 
1999, Nigerians were not better off than they were during the years of fixed medium-
term planning”. Analysis of the various plans against their targets, also reveal extent 
to which individual development plans, met or failed to meet targets. Meanwhile, the 
following factors are said to be responsible for development plan failure in Nigeria. 
 
Firstly, there is a lack of inclusive planning mechanisms. People often support plans 
they are part of since they have a strong sense of belonging. That is why it is vital for 
adequate consultations to be made whenever plans are to be made to accommodate 
diverse societal interest. Adequate consultation before coming up with a plan, make 
it possible to achieve broad-based plans with unlikelihood of failure due to the wide 
consultation and inputs from those concerned. However, when the planning process 
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fails to meet the all these processes as it is the case in Nigeria (Imhanlahimhin 
2000:49), chances are high that it would fail. If people are excluded from the process 
of planning, they will feel detached from it. This has a way of affecting the 
implementation and making feedback needed to correct anomalies associated with 
it, difficult. When this is the case, such plan fails naturally as was the case with the 
first national development plan of 1962-1968.  
 
Secondly, development plans fail in Nigeria due to lack of political will to implement 
them. As Henley et al (2012) observed this led to the failure of development plans in 
Nigeria to achieve set goals. Evidence of lack of needed political will to implement 
plans occurs due largely to the weak bureaucratic institutions which were ill-prepared 
to shoulder the responsibility of executing the plans to achieve set goals, (Teriba, 
2014). As Lewis (2010) observed, “Nigeria has politicized and turbulent bureaucracy. 
Nigeria’s social divisions, and the absence of an organizational framework of elite 
accommodation, have consistently posed hindrances to economic performance”. 
The effect of this is that, it makes it difficult to grapple with the onerous task of plan 
implementation. The first, second and fourth development plans, are particularly 
pertinent in this respect. The plan implementation mechanisms suffer from serious 
political influence that leaves the implementation process short-changed as was the 
case of the second national development plan of 1970-1974. The political class with 
‘smash and grab’ mentality, are also corruptly self-serving according to Henley et al 
(2012) and Ikelegbe (2013), in that they pursue their own interests at the expense of 
national interest. The ultimate result is a system that circumvents well thought-out 
plans expected to birth development. 
 
Thirdly, development planning in Nigeria, fails due to a skewed planning scope. By 
this we mean the failure of the various development plans to focus on key sectors of 
the economy such as agriculture or other vital sectors that that can drive the 
development process. While mirroring development planning of Indonesia in the light 
of what is observed in Nigeria, Henley et al, (2012) observed that plans in the latter 
gave attention to agriculture as against what happened in Nigeria where agriculture 
and other sectors capable of driving the industrialization process needed for 
development, were neglected. The plans all centred on achieving industrial 
breakthrough but were very silent on the role of agriculture. History of development 
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in the Western countries, started with recorded breakthrough in the agricultural 
sector that served as the feeder-pillar to the productive sector.  In the case of 
Nigeria, this has not been the case, as the agro-sector remains dysfunctional due to 
neglect that led to its failure to support other sectors of the economy. The inter-
sectoral loop that benefits the economy can be said to be totally missing and as 
such, unrealistic plans as they turned out to be, fail to achieve the desired result. 
Ideally, the agricultural produce feeds the manufacturing, transport and service 
industries which trigger economic activities that can engender development. This 
sadly, is not the case as the nation lack funds for investment needed to complement 
development plans in Nigeria. Inevitable result, is plan failure as in Nigeria as seen 
from the foregoing. 
 
Finally, development plans failed to achieve set goals in Nigeria because of frequent 
plan and regime change. Available record shows that the fortune of development 
planning in Nigeria nose-dived due to regime change. This can be seen from the 
departure of the Nigerian state from the already established periodic planning culture 
of five years interval in 1988 by the Babangida administration. Budget based 
development measures that failed to achieve tangible result, was thus adopted. The 
1986 structural adjustment programme expected to lay the foundation for meaningful 
economic progress, failed to achieve this. In its stead, the rolling-plan mechanism 
was introduced (Ikeanyibe; 2009). The rolling-plan meant to “reduce inflation, 
achieve exchange rate stability, maintain infrastructure, achieve agricultural self-
sufficiency and reduce the burden of structural adjustment on the most vulnerable 
groups”, (Ihonvbere (1991), failed to achieve the set targets. This has been attributed 
to the frequent change of both policy and government. From the Shagari initiated 
fourth development plan of 1984 to the rolling plan of 1986-88 by Babangida 
administration and the later ‘vision 2010’ idea espoused by late military president 
Sani Abacha, development plans were seriously eroded due to frequent regime 
change. This many (e.g. Imhanlahimhin, 2000, Ikeanyibe, 2009 and Henley et al, 
2012) argued, is not to be sufficient reason for development plan failure, however, it 
can be said to have tremendous impact on the plans vis-à-vis, its implementation 
and eventual success or otherwise. 
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Conclusively, from the foregoing, Nigerian development fails to measure up with 
global average and as such, the nation is seen as LDC. The absence of 
development equally manifests in varying degree at the various regions that makes 
up the nation. From what we observed, the South-South region has the most 
pervasive underdevelopment compared to what can be observed in other zones in 
the country and the South-West in particular. Efforts at arresting underdevelopment, 
failed to yield expected results due to aforementioned reasons. In essence, these 
factors especially frail and centralized institutional framework, contributed to the 
delayed development of the nation because no nation can truly develop aside an 
articulated plan to achieve specific economic goal at a particular time. Plan 
jettisoning, led to truncation of national development quest. As Dode; (2010) 
cautioned, diversification of the economy is inevitable if the nation would make sense 
of the various development plans that appear to have defied logical permutations. 
 
Despite this, projections by analysts suggest a nation that would do well 
economically so as to pave way for development. Atojoko (2013) while associating 
the nation to a group of emerging markets that includes Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria 
and Turkey, coined "MINT” saw Nigeria as an up-coming market capable of playing 
key continental role. To him, the nation is doing well economically, with high return 
on investment projected.  However Ekpo (2013) was pessimistic about the purported 
growth recorded in the economy. He while assessing possibility of the nation making 
economic impact using the instrumentality of sound economic and development 
planning, cautioned that "the transformation agenda" of the present regime must be 
sincerely pursued to achieve results. His position appears to contradict that of 
Atojoko which painted a positive picture of the economy. What both scholars failed to 
point out in clear terms, is the fact that mere economic growth, does not necessarily 
translate to development. The Nigerian case amplifies this fact as growth in the 
economy, does not improve the wellbeing of the average man on the street. The 
standard of living still remains appalling going by official data which shows that more 
than 59% live below the poverty line, (FOS, 2013:112). If development plans and the 
processes involved in it are altruistically carried out, the story would probably be 
different. 
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2.5 CENTRALIZATION OF RENTS AND REGIONAL INEQUALITIES 
Oil resources and derivable rents are centrally collected in Nigeria. The Nigerian 
state operates a federal system seen by many as lopsided. Federating units are 
merely handed down monthly allocation from resources derived from oil rents. As 
Ndegwa (2002) noted, “The office of the president has retained strong federal 
powers, with limited oversight by the judiciary and national legislature”. What one 
can deduce, is the primordial interest (Eke, 1975), noted dominates the polity. 
Consequently, unhealthy rivalry ensues and resources disproportionately distributed 
which ends up producing regional inequality. Regional inequality varies in scope and 
magnitude. In the oil bearing region of the south-south, the story is seen as 
unpleasant. There appear to be a lot of hardship steering the region in the face 
compared to what obtains in the South-West region. Extent of disparity and 
inequality becomes notable when seen through the lens of how well they fair in basic 
economic spheres. 
 
TABLE 2.1: Nigerian Poverty Profile on Regional basis 
 
Source: Extract from National Bureau of Statistics (2010) 
 
As can be seen from table 2.1 above, there is regional inequality among the zones. 
Figures captured against each zones, represents number of people that experience 
each indicator. That of the south-south and south-west zones is of interest in this 
study. As the table reveals, the rate of poverty is higher in the South-South at 35.5%. 
Though the South-South region fair better relative to other regions in the country, 
when compared to South-West with lower poverty rate at 25.4%. What this means is 
that heightened development hopes of the oil bearing region appear not to have 
been achieved since still live below the poverty lines. This becomes obvious if other 
Geo-political 
zone 
Poor 
% 
Absolute poverty 
% 
Relative poverty 
% 
Dollar per day % 
North-Central 14.5 12.5 13.1 13.5 
North-East 21.2 19.1 20.3 19.2 
North-West 23.4 26 25.2 23.2 
South-East 16.3 16.7 16.2 16.3 
South-South 14.4 15.1 14.2 15.3 
South-West 10.2 10.6 11 12.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 
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core indicators such as unemployment level and infant mortality rate in the region 
are considered. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
From the analysis done so far in this chapter, we have been able to unravel some of 
the complexity surrounding the concept of development. Though slippery and 
inherently contested, I began by offering three particular perspectives, before 
outlining a synergized notion as a researcher where I see development as 
‘embracing the whole gamut of the process that leads to the enhancement of the 
living standard of any society with a view to making it achieve acceptable minimum 
standard that is able to sustain life, guarantee equality and freedom needed for the 
good life’. The essence of development, which gained post-war political significance 
through Truman’s famous “point four” articulation (Rist, 2010: 71), is to better the lot 
of disadvantaged people. To this end, my thesis will make use of two conceptual 
frameworks that are of particular importance to understanding the political economy 
of Nigeria: (1) resource curse and rentier state theory, which addresses resource 
management; and (2) elite theory, which focuses on the how activities of the elite 
class and how same fuel resource curse (see chapter 3). 
 
The next chapter addresses key concepts relevant to this study. Made up of two 
major sections, it focuses on development and oil politics in Nigeria. A critique of the 
approaches to development and how same is conceived and politically implemented 
in Nigeria was my pre-occupation in the first section. Consequently, design and 
results from official development plans formulated since independence, were also 
assessed against developmental outcomes. The second section which looked at the 
theories adopted for this studies, snowballed into the third. It introduced the 
organization of the Nigerian oil industry and how it can be better understood through 
a political economy lens, leaning on the thematic thrust of both elite and resource 
curse theories. The final section closely linked to the oil politics in Nigeria, dissected 
the politics of revenue allocation in the oil business and the extent to which this does 
or does not relate to larger development goals. Statistical evidence and historical 
accounts where appropriate, will be used to enhance the explanation throughout. 
The chapter ends with a summary of the key issues discussed as well as signposts 
of what is to come in chapter three where theories adopted for the study as well as 
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related concepts, are discussed. For example, using both theories as analytical 
framework, the chapter was able to establish the nexus between elite and resource 
curse theories, noting that the former is capable of orchestrating the latter as 
opposed to popular views that resources births resource curse. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter focused on the political economy of Nigeria in relation to oil 
politics and development. The chapter had as a central argument, that the 
management of oil resources in Nigeria encourages rent seeking which is believed to 
be corruptly done to the detriment of needed development. 
 
The concept of rentier state can be said to be deeply rooted in resource curse theory 
associated with Hossein Mahdavi. His 1970 study of the patterns and problems of 
economic development in pre-revolutionary Iran (Yusufu-Bagaji et al, 2011), is 
believed to have given this theory primacy of academic attention. Though broad 
interpretation of the theory goes deeper in academic discourse, many believe that 
the thrust of the theory is that resource rich and dependent countries have 
development challenges because of the difficulties associated with the exploration of 
their natural resources. Resource rents are benefits derived from resource 
exploration after tax. Resource rich states that depend on resource rents are rentier 
states. The inevitable struggle for control of resource rents, are seen to be usually 
intense due to vested interest where the elite class; struggle to achieve favourable 
resource space. 
 
Taking the argument beyond resource management and how it shapes 
development, this third chapter will among other things, focus on themes and 
concepts associated with the theories adopted for the study. All these, are expected 
to serve as analytical framework that will help place the study in perspective. As 
noted above, rent seeking, which is associated with resource curse theory, gives 
prime attention to natural resources. To understand the interplay of resource 
management and development in Nigeria, resource curse and elite theories are 
outlined as theoretical approaches employed in this research. This is to enable us 
shed light on issues relevant to this study as linkages are made between these 
concepts and internal dynamics that shape the development processes in Nigeria. 
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Consequently, the next section focuses on resource curse and rent seeking and how 
the narratives have been framed. The argument is that application resource curse 
theory in the study of resource based economies has been largely done without 
consideration of external variables such as intricate dynamics that shape political 
economies of nations that eventually affect resource management. 
 
3.1 RESOURCE CURSE THEORY AND THE RENTIER STATE 
 
“…rentier state theory and the resource curse thesis are two 
theoretical approaches that focus on the topic of resource 
abundance”, Mahler (2010:7). 
 
From the quote above, we understand that both concepts are intricately linked to 
availability of natural resources and management of same. When resources are 
properly managed, it brings about needed development, but when the reverse is the 
case, resource curse could be the end result. This is believed to occur when there is 
sole dependence on such resource to the detriment of other growth enhancing 
sectors. When this is the case, there could be economic inefficiency and the 
obstruction of socio-economic benefits derived from natural resources according to 
Beck (2007). 
 
In this study, the discourse of resource curse and associated rent seeking, is done 
paying attention to the issue of resource utilization. It is expected that resource rich 
states, would efficiently manage their resources to achieve positive development 
outcomes. Examples of nations that effectively utilized natural resources to achieve 
positive development outcomes include, but not limited to the following: Britain and 
France achieved economic prosperity by exploiting the natural resources, 
(Pendergast et al 2011), while Germany, Australia, Norway, Canada, Britain and the 
United States of America achieved industrialization through exploration of coal and 
iron ore, both natural resources (Sachs and Warner, 1995). It is however important 
to note that the availability of natural resources does not always translate into 
prosperity in resource rich states; much depends on how the resources and the 
proceeds generated from its exploitation are managed.. South Africa and Venezuela 
have relatively low living standard despite abundant resources while Switzerland, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan with fewer natural resources, have 
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high per capita income (Pendergast et al, 2011, Sachs and Warner, 1995). Effective 
management of a resource is therefore needed to achieve positive development. For 
example, if accruable rents from exploiting resources are concentrated in the hands 
of dominant elite class rather than being invested in productive sector that can create 
jobs and enhance the developmental process as happens where the resource curse 
is observed, only few will benefit. Besides amplifying rent seeking which the next 
sub-section considers, it stretches import of elite dominance in the resource curse 
thematic discourse, an area this study seeks to explore beyond traditional application 
of the theory. 
 
Resource curse also known as Dutch disease is “an economic phenomenon in which 
a sharp increase in the output and revenue of one product in an economy, such as 
oil in this case, has adverse repercussions in other sectors of the economy” (World 
Bank, 1995: 10). According to Davies (1995:1768) and Karl (2005:23), the name is 
derived from the Netherlands' experience when its tradable sectors, particularly 
agriculture, shrank in the 1970s in response to the increase in the North Sea natural 
gas production from the Groningen fields. Barbier; (2003) and Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh; (2004) equally noted existence of Dutch Disease in resource rich states as 
the Financial Times Lexicon observed that: 
 
“Dutch disease is the negative impact on an economy of 
anything that gives rise to a sharp inflow of foreign currency, 
such as the discovery of large oil reserves. The currency inflow 
leads to appreciation, making the country’s other products less 
price competitive on the export market. It also leads to higher 
levels of cheap imports and can lead to deindustrialisation as 
industries apart from resource exploitation, are moved to 
cheaper location.”  
 
What can be inferred from the above is that resource curse enables a boom of the 
mineral sector; thereby causing an increase in prices that pushes up real wages and 
appreciates the real exchange rate. This in turn lowers competitiveness and 
production of the non-resource exports sector' (Karl, 2005:23; see also Collier, 
2007:39). Consequently, there would be over-dependence on oil revenues while 
other sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing capable of bringing about 
economic diversification needed to drive the development process, are neglected 
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especially as they are less price competitive because of the lower price 
competitiveness in the export markets. 
 
In the case of Nigeria and other resources rich nations, the discovery of oil is 
believed to have led to near abandonment of other critical sectors as accruable 
“rents’ from oil, gas and mineral production” is argued to increase inflows of foreign 
currency which limits ability of local industries. Consequently, they are unable to 
compete and thus fail to contribute to national growth since there would be 
inappropriately investment to offset depreciation of natural resources (Barbier, 
2003:263). In similar vein, Pendergast et al (2011) argued that “resource rents are 
not channelled into productive investments, but are dissipated through corruption, 
bureaucratic inefficiency and policies aimed at rent-seeking interest groups”. Both 
scholars’ views capture what is believed to be happening in resource rich and 
dependent states. Quest for resource rents often lead to adoption of inappropriate 
policies that neglect key sectors such as investment in human capital and education 
(Gylfason; 2001). This effects growth because the “two central effects of 
dependence on economic rents are economic inefficiency and, as a consequence, 
the obstruction of socio-economic development (Beck, 2007:46).  
 
As noted above, resources are innocuous, resource curse and associated rent 
seeking occurs when management of accruable benefits are poorly done. It is 
therefore important to note that the quest to control oil resources, often times by the 
elite class, can lead to struggle for resource space that if not properly managed, can 
lead to resource linked crisis. No economy can make progress when there is 
violence. Struggle for resource rents is believe to fuel crisis (Collier and Hoeffler; 
(2004), Lujala et al; (2005), Fearon; (2005), De Soysa; (2000), Reno; (1993), Ellis; 
(1998), and Keen; (2003). This means that countries that are able to achieve 
appreciable development with accruable resource benefits are spared the effects of 
resource curse. This can however not be said about some resource rich state that 
experiences financial shortfalls and had to borrow to augment developmental needs 
as was the case in Nigeria prior to the 2005 debt treatment by the World Bank 
(Manzano and Rigobon, 2001). Implication of this is that, proper management of 
resource goes a long way in determining how safe a nation is from resource curse 
scourge.  
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Related to observed failure to manage resource benefits noted above as inducing 
resource curse, is failure by resource rich states to harness available resources as 
there is an overreliance on oil as it is in this case. Consequently, there would be 
imbalance in sectoral contribution to economic growth and development. When this 
is the case, distorted economic fortune that eventually manifests in the politics of a 
nation due to intricate political economy, arises (Weinthal and Luong 2006). 
Discussed political economy of Nigeria in chapter two, reveal how resource 
Management shape both development and national politics. 
 
3.2 RESOURCE CURSE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Here, focus would be on how resource curse affects economic and overall 
development. In essence, this sub-section considers areas where practical effects of 
resource curse can be felt in the economy. This affects development. Resource 
curse literature has a strong line of argument on the adverse effect of resource 
abundance on developing economies.  Some of the noted impact of resource curse 
on the economy and development by extension can be seen as follows.  
 
(i) Resource curse exposes resource rich states to uncertain economic 
consequences as price volatility comes with the unintended consequence 
that could stunt economic growth, (Weinthal and Luong, 2006, Gylfason, 
2001a as well as Leit and Weidman, 1999). 
(ii) Resource curse make the economy vulnerable to shocks that undermine 
developmental initiatives that act as growth stimulants such as investment 
and enlarged productive capacities, etc. (Yusufu-Bagaji et al, 2011, 
Ikelegbe, 2005). 
(iii) Resource curse weakens  a state’s capacity to internally harness other 
resources besides the chosen one such as oil in this case, (De Soysa 
2000, Reno, 1993, Ellis, 1998, Keen, 2003) 
(iv) Resource curse which births resource rent, fuels corruption with 
unpleasant consequences such as inefficiency in government (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004, Lujala et al, 2005, Fearon, 2005). 
(v) Resource curse can lead to the development of petro-clients with links to 
government that enrich selves at the expense of developmental needs. 
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Consequently, there is unproductive public expenditure which Auty (1990), 
Gelb and Associates (1988) and McMahon (1997) called white elephant 
projects. Due to alleged inflated cost, such projects that drain public purse, 
only benefit petro-clients, (Ascher, 1999, Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian, 
2003)  and stunt economic growth, (Khan, 1994). Example of such white 
elephant project in Nigeria is the Ajeokuta steel company due to self-
centered interest of petro-clients served, rather than that of the state. 
 
If we mirror Nigeria in the face of what resource curse means, Shaxson’s (2007) 
position can be said to be instructive. According to him and as earlier noted, 
resource curse describes the tendency of mineral rich and dependent states not only 
to fail to harness their resources for national development, but to face the negative 
externalities such resources may give rise to. He explained in his paper titled “Oil, 
Corruption and Resource curse”, that most resource rich states that suffer resource 
curse, ‘experiences low living standard’. Available data to be seen in the empirical 
chapters indicates that there is lack of development in commensurate terms in 
Nigeria. Prevailing situations appear to show notable lack in the face of oil 
exploration and sale of oil resources amidst tensed agitation for resource space by 
the elite class. A 2007 International Monetary Funds (IMF) study shows a disparity 
between Nigeria’s oil wealth and the standard of living despite the $350 billion the 
nation realized from the sales of oil between 1970 and 2000. Available evidence 
from the federal office of statistics shows that the living standard was 36% in 1970 
but this depleted to 70% in 2000 Kale; (2012). This pushed up the number of people 
living below poverty line and unemployed despite oil rents. 
 
While prevailing situation appears to show possibility of Nigeria becoming a victim of 
the resource curse with attendant effect on the nation’s developmental drive, it is 
difficult to ascertain extent to which the resource curse framework adequately 
explain the development situation in Nigeria. Blanket application of resource theory 
to explain the Nigerian situation, will make us miss the point that the theory can be 
applied to every clime without looking at underlying factors. Of necessity, focus 
should be on factors such as the internal political and internal socio-political 
dynamics of the country to know how these add up to the discourse. Doing this will 
enable us to improve the overall analytical utility of the resource curse that many 
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apply without considering role of internal dynamics such as elitism as this study is 
doing. It is by doing so that one can attempt to explain how much development 
impact Nigeria made with the 50, 696 trillion naira from sales of oil between 1958 
and 2011 (Ndujihe, 2012).  
 
While discussions in the existing literature suggest the presence of the resource 
curse in Nigeria, it is however not enough to conclude that this is solely responsible 
for the nation’s development challenges. There is thus the need to consider case 
specific and peculiar institutional and political factors in Nigeria that can help explain 
the resource curse conceptual framework. This can also be extended to the analysis 
of resource-based and dependent economies to give the resource curse thematic 
postulations in academic discourse, a balanced analysis. This means expanding the 
resource curse theory beyond the strait-jacket analysis where no attention is paid to 
internal institutional and political dynamics as well as national peculiarities. This to 
me has been misleading as several factors such as elite dominance besides what 
the traditional analysis covers, can and do accentuate resource curse. There is 
therefore the need to see resource curse in a different light by considering ancillary 
factors unlike what similar or related studies have done. 
 
This study will pay attention to the resource curse theory mirrored in the Nigerian 
context. The resource curse theory resource curse conceptual framework appears to 
have failed to incorporate peculiar internal variables into its analysis. This to a large 
extent, suggest failure of the theory to capture the Nigerian situation as no resource 
curse discourse should be done in isolation from factors that accentuates it. In 
similar vein, the regional comparison dimension of this study makes it compelling to 
see beyond theoretical application of the theory without considering internal 
dynamics peculiar to Nigeria. Such is the Nigerian federal system and political 
system allegedly tied to primordial sentiment. Can we say this encourages 
prebendalism and lead to conflict over national oil resources as Mustapha, (2010) 
observed? Understanding the role of both in the resource curse debate, will enable 
us properly situate the Nigerian situation around resource curse concepts. To do 
this, comparative study of two regions in Nigeria is done to ascertain the extent to 
which oil wealth translates to positive regional development outcomes. In the 
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meantime, the concept of rent seeking earlier noted to be associated with resource 
curse theory, is briefly examined below. 
 
3.2.1 Rent Seeking 
A rentier state depends on economic rents from available and exploited resources. 
Such can either be used to pursue developmental purposes or otherwise. When 
development purposes are achieved, it doesn’t bring about negative externality 
otherwise called resource curse that signals “negative relationship between natural 
resources and well-being” (Pendergast et al, 2011). When this is the case, such 
resource becomes a curse rather than an elixir that can boost growth and 
development. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004), and Sachs and Warner (1995) were 
able to establish a negative relationship between natural resources and economic 
growth while Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian; (2003) holds a contrary view. While the 
later argued that resource curse leads to crisis, the former holds that natural 
resources are actually capable of engendering development in the long run. Both 
scholars and others that align with their line of arguments, accepted the impact of 
resources on the life of an endowed state, either positive or negatively as resource 
curse thematic thrust, holds. 
 
The concepts of rent seeking and rentier state are interchangeably used to denote 
corruption by economists and political scientists. The concept of rent seeking is 
associated with Gordon Tullock who in 1967, coined the concept but was made 
popular in 1994 by Anne Krueger (Szeftel, 1999). Rentier state/rent seeking are 
economic concepts derived from rent. Rent is the earnings in excess of all relevant 
cost. Mauro (1997:2) defines rent as the extra amount paid to somebody or for 
something useful whose supply is limited either by nature or through human 
ingenuity”. While a rentier state may settle for collection of resource rents at the 
expense of other sectors that can drive the development process, rent seeking talks 
about individuals or groups that seek private gains so as to acquire access to or 
control over opportunities for earning rents. Though many see it as capable of 
inducing corruption, rent seeking is often not seen as naturally illegal like corruption   
(Nwabuzor, 2008). 
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While rent seeking attitude pushes a rentier state into settling for economic rent 
derivable from the natural resources at its disposal and at the expense of other key 
sectors capable of driving development, the economy would be the risk of becoming 
mono cultural. This makes it possible for benefits to be in the hands as few hands to 
dominate the economy. When this happens, investment can suffer as there is a risk 
of wasteful spending. Investment and economic diversification are key ingredients for 
economic growth (Thirlwall, 2003). To this end, the next section will examine how 
interest and rent seeking come in the way of development. 
 
3.2.2 Rent Seeking and Development: Interest Tangle? 
Here, effort is made to interrogate the place of elite interest in the resource curse 
discourse and how this shapes the development process. This would be done by 
chronicling issue of elite interest within the context of the resource curse debate. Oil 
exploration and management of accruable benefit; attract discourse of how derivable 
resources are managed. In situations where elite dominance is rife, rent seeking is 
inevitable. It is in this sense that the concept of rent seeking and how it affects 
development would be carefully considered in this section. As a political economy 
concept associated with resources management, rent seeking is associated with 
Gordon Tullock (1967) and Anne Krueger (1994). Rent in economic terms, means 
income generated from the sale of resources with economic value, believed to be 
earnings in excess of all relevant cost. Mauro (1997:2) for instance, conceived of 
rent as “the extra amount paid … to somebody or for something useful whose supply 
is limited either by nature or through human ingenuity”. Rent seeking can be 
described as the ease with which people with rent seeking disposition, seek to 
control the source of rent to the state. That explains why most people see the 
concept of rent seeking as a subtle description of corruption or tendency of some or 
group of people to corruptly enrich selves. 
 
Though rent seeking and corruption elicit almost same feeling, there is a slight 
difference. Corruption is seen largely by many as an illegal means by which 
individuals or groups enrich themselves. Rent seeking on the other hand is not 
necessarily illegal, though it can wield similar effect on development as corruption as 
they both represent attempts to obtain and create monopoly of rents. Two distinct 
types of rent seeking exist according to literature. These are natural and artificial rent 
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seeking. As the names imply, the latter derives from the unique talents of their 
producers while artificial rents derive from the result of manipulated shortages. 
Artificial rent-seeking manifest the moment it is able to manipulate the government to 
interfere with the market so as to create rooms for select few to realize rents. This 
makes the state vulnerable to use and exploitation by public officials whose target, is 
often to accumulate rents. In an oil-based economy like Nigeria with weak 
institutional frameworks, activities of rent-seekers can, fret away the economic gains 
that can be used to achieve desired development outcomes. This happens in most 
cases when illegitimate money, finds its way into wrong hands at the expense of the 
health of the nation, economy and development. Unscrupulous political and elite 
class, bureaucrats and government officials across ethic and political divide have in 
the past, capitalized on the inherent loopholes in the Nigerian oil led economy, to 
milk the state of resources via rent-seeking (Omeje, 2006; Obi, 2010). As Szeftel 
(1998:225) noted, “Throughout the world bureaucrats and people in authority are 
indefatigably manoeuvring to position themselves in a tiny monopoly where they can 
be bribed for issuing a license approving expenditure or allowing shipping across a 
border”. 
 
As Dia (1996) mentioned, sources of rent includes tradable regulatory system, 
financing capital projects, support for corruption in bureaucracy, privatization and 
subsidies with high pay offs for rulers, price distortion and foreign exchange 
restriction. In the Nigerian oil-led economy context, the allocation of oil blocks and 
licenses equally provide veritable platform for rent-seekers to exploit and this has 
negative implications on developmental outcomes. It is important to note that high 
level of rent seeking in most cases hinges on oil mineral deposits. For example in 
Nigeria, the high value for oil and its control under the state leads to rent diversion 
for corrupt enrichment purpose by the governing elite. This manifest in award of oil 
related contracts many believe, are often not executed since the institutional 
frameworks of checks, appear weak. That can explain why Peterman, Guzman and 
Tilton (2007) held that “within resource rich countries the character of the institutions 
may underlie the proliferation of corruption”. What we can infer from the above, is the 
possibility of institutional frailty to encourage corruption since such can be exploited. 
Rent-seeking induced corruption, inevitably, results in waste of resources which can 
lead to economic inefficiency. The practical impact of rent-seeking which thrives 
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primarily when citizens view the state as being used for private gains by rent-
seekers, and consequently considers it illegitimate and as such, starves the state of 
the needed support. With support withdrawn partially, slow progress would then be 
made and governments’ intervention in the economy to birth positive development 
outcomes will thus be thwarted. 
 
The scope and magnitude of rent-seeking and its inevitable impact on development, 
is debatable. Beside manifesting and negatively impacting national economy and 
development by extension, it also manifests as transnational corruption with respect 
to patronage of international dimension. One can then say that in different climes 
where resources hold sway, rent-seeking would possibly manifest in varying 
degrees. In developing nations, it has been seen to be pervasive to the extent of 
fretting away developmental initiatives. Painting a picture of rent-seeking induced 
corruption as reflected in the choice of spending, Moody-Stuart (1993:31) had noted 
that “rent seeking third world leaders prefer contracts relating to armamemts, military 
and telecommunications where secrecy makes it difficult to question purchasing 
decision”. With secrecy, corruption grows and ineptitude mounts. What suffers is 
social services and actual delivery on developmental expectations. The Nigeria 
situation appears to reflect the picture portrayed above, (Ikelegbe, 2013). This is 
shown in decayed infrastructural facilities and volume of misplaced priorities that 
serve interest of the political class that allocation of oil blocks to the rich symbolizes, 
See Odjugo (2013) and Obi, 2010).  
 
From what we have briefly seen above, its clear rent-seeking thrives as long as there 
is an interest to serve. This in most cases, is the interest of select few that often 
times, negate popular interest. In developed countries, this popular interest could be 
enhanced social services while in developing nations, its desired development that is 
still largely absent. This brings us to the issue of rent-seeking and the interest-tangle. 
Whose interest do rent-seekers seek to gratify? Do they negate popular desire of the 
people which is development? How is this reflected across climes? Interest of select 
few in oil rich Nigeria is believed to largely negate development goals. From the 
award of contract to actual disbursement of accruable oil rents, little attention is 
usually paid to national developmental yearnings, (Ikeanyibe, 2013). Where terse 
mention is made of the need to execute awarded contracts capable of helping cause 
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of development, conflict of interest thwarts such effort. It is therefore important that 
the issue of interest that fuels elitism which concomitantly manifest in resource curse 
should be carefully considered while issues of resource management and 
development in resource rich and dependent states is being tabled.  As would be 
seen in subsequent sections where intricate interest nucleus among the elite class 
would come under focus, rent-seeking has acute interest tangle that never favours 
development except privatization of public goods by rent-seekers and they resist 
attempt at reforms that will alter the status quo. As Coolidge and Ackerman 
(1997:35) observed, “Embedded wealth sharing practice resists reforms.  This if not 
checked, breeds brazen corruption. 
 
3.2.3 Resource Space and Corruption 
Natural resources attract attention. The quest to control accruable benefit from its 
exploitation, can pitch elites in a struggle against one another. Such overt or subtle 
struggle for resource space, is what I call struggle for resource space. To aptly 
understand this sub-topic, clear understanding of the concept of corruption generally 
and in the Nigerian context, would be vital. Consequently, we will carefully consider 
the concept of corruption in the Nigerian context, zeroing-in on both corruption in the 
oil sector and administrative corruption in Nigeria. 
 
3.2.3.1 Conceptualizing Corruption 
If there is one concept that attracts wide interpretations in the social sciences, it is 
corruption. Scholars hardly agree on what this concept means. However, for the 
sake of this study, we will see corruption as ‘illicit deals, actions or inactions taken by 
an individual or group, with the sole intention of enriching self/selves at the expense 
of both the people and the good they represents’. Its directly negate conventional 
practices capable of bringing about good of the people. That explains why as earlier 
observed, many people link rent-seeking to corruption. 
 
Slippery as the concept appears, coining a definition for it has been a difficult task 
because as noted above, scholars lack consensual agreement on what corruption is. 
This again, drives from the multiplicity of activities and behavioural tendencies that 
constitutes a corrupt act. An attempt to pin down the concept was made by 
Owohunwa (2007) who traced the concept to the Latin word, “corrupt” which means 
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“to destroy”. If this is anything to go by, it means literarily, that corruption amplifies 
decay or that capable of polluting a society and denying it desired good that can 
either be development of social cohesion. Based on the above, one can then 
understand why Thorndike-Barnhart dictionary see corruption as “the act of making, 
or the process of becoming evil or wicked.  It is synonymous with rot, and decay” 
while Chuta (2004) saw it as “putrefaction, tainting of purity or falling away from 
standard of integrity or rectitude defined by law, upheld by social norms or 
conscience or recognized by general conscience of mankind”.  Implicit in both views, 
is the undeniable fact that corruption, obviates from accepted societal practice. That 
implies that corruption taints an ideal society and pollutes its structure and as 
Odekunle (1986) observed, corruption exists in every country of the world, 
developed or developing, though varies in nature, magnitude, consequences and 
extent to which it is managed. Azenabor (2007) echoed this much when he held that 
corruption is “an immoral or dishonest action or way of offering and accepting bribes 
(in cash or kinds) or using the power of one’s office or position for personal 
enrichment”.  
 
Seen as apparently manifest in many societies, corruption is amply seen in the 
misuse of public resources by public officials for private gain. In this sense, 
Huntington (1968:55-71) sees corruption as “behaviour that deviates from accepted 
norms in order to serve private ends.” while Atlas (1990) sees it as “the abuse of 
trust for the sake of private benefits”. While these captured what can reasonably be 
said to constitute corruption, they however failed to say what makes up private gains 
and what public interest entails. One other salient flaw of the above definitions, is the 
insinuation; unintended perhaps, that corruption is exclusive preserve of those in 
public concerns. What happens to those in private firms? Can we say abuse of set 
official roles or deviation from established codes, a monopoly of public officials? 
There is need to balance the argument because corruption and what it takes to be 
corrupt, respects neither person nor tribe or where he/she works. Though what is 
regarded as corruption is contestable, we can however, for the purpose of this 
thesis, reduce this to mean: an act of illegality that negates established codes to 
serve interest of few rather than the generality of the people. Illegality as the key 
word can again, be subjected to conceptual clarification. In one sense, illegality can 
be seen as a self-serving violation of established rules while in another sense; it can 
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be seen as compromise of private virtue needed to judiciously discharge public 
responsibilities. Taking illegality as the measuring stick of what constitutes 
corruption; attention can then be shifted to consideration of the extent to which 
corruption wrought destruction to public good? 
 
To understand this, it’s important we note the types of corruption that exist according 
to literatures. If what Toyo (2006) holds that corruption is characterized as acts such 
as fraud, embezzlement, falsification, perversion designed to gain some benefits for 
self or favourites, bribery and nepotism. What then are some of the ways corruption 
manifest? According to Nwabuzor (2003) corrupt practices can be grouped into 
materialistic and non-materialistic corruption which can further be seen within the 
ambit of organized and chaotic corruption. By materialistic corruption, Nwabuzor 
meant “unjust and fraudulent enjoyment of material benefits due to excessive 
hedonistic pursuit” while non-materialistic corruption focuses on gratification with 
non-material benefits due to moral torpidity or stagnation. Both forms of corruption 
can manifest in everyday public life and creates social consequences capable of 
undermining effective functionality of the state and undermining developmental 
effort. A slim line of difference exists between the material and non-material 
corruption as Nwabuzor espouses. The later actually accentuate the former because 
it takes the initiative (non-material) for development of the real corruptive acts with 
proofs (material corruption). To this end, one can say that though Nwabuzor has 
attempted to classify corruption, his efforts are far from successful. What he did is 
simply to separate the intention and initiative to engage in corruption from the 
accruable benefit from that initiative. Both actually can and should go together if the 
concept is empirically considered to avoid logical gaps in applying the concept. 
 
What we can aptly see as classes of corruption, can be seen in organized and 
chaotic corruption. According to Cynado and Ezeogidi (2013), “organized corruption 
represents the high level corruption while the chaotic corruption represents the low 
level corruption”. We can then say the classificatory scheme, pinpoints an organized 
system that corruptly recognize who to bribe, how much to be offered with 
participants confident of what they will receive as favour in return. Criminal gangs 
and syndicates who are often times professional crime and identity thieves, 
perpetuates this kind of corruption. It thrives in strict secrecy which makes it difficult 
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to uncover. Chaotic corruption on the other hand, exist where there is no clarity on 
whom to bribe and what to be offered; cash or materials. This has high uncertainty 
rate than the former though both have same consequences of a damning impact on 
a nation’s economic fortune, development and image by extension. Both classes of 
corruption like we earlier noted, manifest in all societies, developed and developing. 
What differs however is the severity of its often negative impact on both development 
and image of the society concerned. To drive home the concept of corruption in this 
study, effort would be made in subsequent sections to mirror the Nigerian state in the 
face of corruption. Specifically, the concept would be seen in the oil and 
administrative sectors of the Nigerian state so as to ascertain extent to which it 
impacts the developmental quest of the nation. This study while considering internal 
regional dynamics that impedes development in chapter five will pay closer attention 
to the concept of corruption in details.   
 
3.3 CORRUPTION IN THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT 
Like most countries, corruption exists in the Nigerian state. What can safely be seen 
as both organized and material corruption pervades the Nigerian state? With 
unenviable record of most corrupt country in the world, the Nigerian state is seen as 
corrupt in several respects. Consequently, steps taken to achieve development 
outcomes with available resources, yield little results amidst abundant oil resources. 
What and where then do corrupt practices manifest in the Nigerian state? A cursory 
look would be done zeroing-in on two crucial areas of the Nigerian public life where 
corruption is believed to manifest daily. These are the oil sector and the public 
administrative life of the Nigerian state. 
 
3.3.1 Corruption in the Oil Sector 
One place where corruption is believed to manifests in Nigeria is the oil sector. 
Nigerian economy runs virtually on oil resources amidst alleged vested interest 
mostly from dominant elite class, corruption is seen to pervade the nation’s oil 
sector. Where there is unmitigated interest, rent-seeking which we noted as 
synonymous with corruption, inevitably leads to corruption. What then is the 
magnitude of corruption in the Nigerian oil sector?  Before considering avenues 
where corrupt practices is seen to take place in the Nigerian oil sector, it’s important 
we note that for corrupt purposes, 70% of the oil wealth in Nigeria between 2003 and 
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2005 were stolen. This according to the Nigerian anti-corruption agency, Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (quoted in Nodland and Hjellestad, 
2007:7), represents huge revenue leakages in the economy due to inherent 
economic loopholes. The question one is left to ask is, what are these loopholes and 
who exploits what for whose benefit? 
 
To understand loopholes that make alleged corrupt self-enrichment in the Nigerian 
oil sector possible, focus would be on possible areas where corruption happens. 
These are the awards of operational licenses and that of oil related contracts. Both 
will be briefly examined below. 
 
According to Gillies (2009), award of oil operational licenses, especially in the 
upstream sector, is the first area where corrupt practices manifest in the Nigerian oil 
industry. This is said to occur at the point where oil licenses are given by the 
government. It is believed that the way oil licenses are issued, make it possible for 
private concerns and individuals to own and manage oil wells. In most cases, some 
of the oil licenses that confer ownership of oil wells on those concerned, are believed 
to be allocated to cronies with both political and ethnic links. This was believed to be 
rife during the military era but never abated at the inception of civilian regime. This in 
part, can be explained by the long tenure of oil operational licenses before 
expiration. However, ownership of oil well besides being seen by many as fraught 
with corruption is a highly contested one.  
 
Alabo-George (2012) saw the issue as vexious which she observed, permeate that 
of revenue distribution in Nigeria. Though the corrupt dimension was absent in her 
submission, she however observed the lopsided ownership of oil well along regional 
lines. According to her, “the Northern and Western part of the nation monopolize 
ownership of oil wells in an unfair and non-transparent manner”. It is however 
believed by many that award of oil operational licenses, are shrouded in secrecy with 
financial inducement for those saddled with the task of awarding it. They are 
notoriously seen as allegedly corrupt and compromised. Agagu (2013) in a piece 
argued that flaws associated with the federal structure in Nigeria, reflects in the 
award of oil related licenses. He identified this as institutional decay which he 
observed, results in failure of public policy framework. No nation can achieve 
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meaningful developmental goals if it runs a defective and largely fragile system with 
huge primordial patronage seen to lack accountability especially when oil licenses 
are given in a non-transparent manner. 
 
Secondly and related to the first, is the award of oil related contracts. This differs 
from the previous in that the former gives approval for individuals or groups, to own 
and operate an oil well. Award of oil related contracts, is one area many believe is 
prone to corruption. This is seen to be the case because of the nature of the system 
where elite dominance is seen largely as interest driven. Consequently, the quest for 
fair share of the oil wealth is believe to orchestrate artificial pressures seen to be 
responsible for corrupting compromises. In Nigeria, the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporations (NNPC) and National Petroleum Investment Management Services 
(NAPIMS), awards contracts to individuals and oil servicing companies. This many 
believe, are done in ways that ensures corrupt enrichment.. When this is the case, 
merit is usually not followed in the awards and this are often seen as causes of 
discontents such as seen in the restive oil belt of the Delta. According to Smith 
(2008), corruption causes ‘popular discontent’ in Nigeria. Though the extent to which 
this discontent occurs may need further clarification, one can see the dominant role 
of rent-seeking elite class as a factor that can encourage compromise in the awards 
of oil related contracts. 
 
From the above, one can understand that avenues exists in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry that makes corruption possible. While points highlighted above gives hints of 
the real situation of things, it never said why those saddled with the responsibility of 
awarding oil license and oil related contracts, place personal interest above national 
interest. This study as noted in chapter one, seeks to go beyond the rubrics of 
pinpointed factors to considering internal dynamics so as to be able to understand 
issues at hand. It is by so doing that we can understand place of established 
institutions as well as individuals manning same to achieve set goals. Knowing this 
will enable one understands corruption dynamics and how same is believed to stifle 
administrative capacity to chart development course. That brings the issue of 
institutional corruption discussed in the next sub-section. 
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3.3.2 Administrative Corruption in Nigeria 
While it’s debatable whether corruption in the real sense of the concept is different 
from administrative corruption, for purpose of clarity, effort would be made here to 
focus on corruptive practices believed to daily take place in the Nigerian public life 
outside the core oil industry. Public and administrative life of the country at the 
national, state and local government, are seen by many as prone to corrupting 
influence. Politically exposed individuals, those either elected or appointed into 
public offices, are often seen embezzling public funds. As Mbah (2007:19) noted, 
public office holders do things with utter impunity and can afford to steal public funds 
for personal use to the detriment of all and at the expense of desired development.  
 
Such was the case of Olabode George, former chairman of Nigeria Port Authority 
(NPA), who was convicted but treated lightly because of what the Human Right 
Report (HRW, 2011) see as compromised legal system. This in a sense encourages 
corrupt or would be corrupt public officials, to see nothing wrong in outrightly stealing 
since there are systemic faults that they can exploit to walk free like Olabode. 
Detailed account of known cases of administrative corruption, are presented in the 
empirical sections of this study.  Meanwhile, section 3.3.3 focuses on how corruption 
induced impunity among the elite class; a manifestation of resource curse, 
encourage of discourages both national and regional development in the face of 
resource abundance in Nigeria.  
 
3.3.3 Corruption, Impunity and Development: The Nexus 
Careful analysis of the Nigerian situation appears to reveal a system that has done 
little to curb corruption. To some, this is attributable to system fragility seen making 
the corruption fight difficult. Consequently, funds lost to corruption, appear to make 
achieving development difficult. It is possible that as corruption grows, good money 
in wrong hands nurture culture of impunity, one where people disregard laid down 
rules. The situation in the Nigerian political space has been likened to this by Ibaba 
(2011) when he observed that people wilfully break the law because of legal 
loopholes that will absolve them of punishment. When this is the case, individuals or 
groups become ‘untouchable’ since they appear protected either by default 
deliberately designed systemic failure. The kidnap of a serving state governor in 
Nigeria in 2007 has been seen as an act of impunity in the Nigerian political space. 
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Where impunity reigns, corruption is bound to soar, making it difficult for 
development to occur. 
 
Describing the nexus between culture of impunity and corruption, , Nollmeyer (2005) 
had observed that the latter tells of “an atmosphere characterized by tension, lack of 
clear standards, sense of accountability, legal restraints, oversight, discipline and 
fear of punishment with serious violations as well as seeming general indifference to 
infractions”.  The situation in Nigeria appears to reflect what is depicted above which 
can be said to be responsible for alleged surge in corruption cases in the country. 
This inevitably retards development. What then are the factors responsible for the 
emergence of the culture of impunity and how does this impact development? 
 
Seeming emergence of the culture of impunity in Nigeria has been attributed to a 
number of factors. First, is the alleged alteration of societal values that make erosion 
of values possible as manipulation of sound moral and societal norms suffer neglect. 
Secondly, is the existence of multiple cultures that tend to contradict one another. In 
Nigeria for example, there are multiple cultures that though appear similar and seem 
to agree on several grounds, but have inherent differences. Seeming inability to 
manage these differences, are alleged to be exploited by the elite class to 
circumvent laid down rules. By this, we mean the possibility of the elite class 
deploying sectional support to derail national interest. This was the case during the 
trial and eventual conviction of Olabode George for corruption in 2011 where 
majority of his Yoruba ethnic group, were said to have supported him for stealing 
from the Nigerian Port Authority while he served as its board chairman. This can 
never be said to be in tandem with the Nigerian interest. In the light of this, it is 
possible to say that sectional interest shields corrupt public figures while the nation 
suffers and expected development by extension.  
 
In the light of what we have considered thus far, we can say that corruption induced 
culture of impunity, appear to starve the Nigerian nation of resources needed for 
development. Clear links can then be said to exist between corruption and impunity 
while the duo, shapes development. The empirical sections of this study show how 
the interplay of ethnicity fuels and entrench corruption with impunity that denies the 
nation and regions, needed development. Impunity and the culture it breeds besides 
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brazen corruption, is believe to encourage violence, lawlessness, enthronement of 
mediocrity. All these are believed to erode societal values and contribute to 
retardation of developmental strides irrespective of how much resources deployed. 
Many believe that this is the Nigerian story where available oil resources appear to 
have failed to find expression in development terms. 
 
3.4 ELITE THEORY 
 
"There are endless assertions about the political 
dominance of the "rich," the "landlord class," the 
"economic oligarchy" and for the Latin American 
countries; there is a mass of polemical prose about the 
various kinds of exploitive alliances the wealthy have 
contracted..." Menges (1968:1) 
 
Elite theory as a theoretical framework is considered for this study. Man as a socio-
political being, tends to dominate especially in the realm of decision making. In 
modern political societies, the clear divide along class, also manifest especially for 
the public. The role and effect of elites in societies, developed or developing, is 
undeniable. Consequently, the elite/masses divide known in both political science 
and sociology became an issue that attracted attention in an attempt to situate class 
relationship in society. In response to this, elite theory which we have chosen to 
underpin this study was developed in the field of sociology to "explain the behaviour 
of men in social setting" Duru (2012). This was to be extended to politics later as two 
Italian sociologists, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) and Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), 
developed elite theory as a framework of analysis in political science. 
 
Other scholars of note that wrote on the elite theory, includes Robert Michels (1962), 
James Burnham (1943) and Wright Mills (1956). While they all pointed out the 
domination of the masses by the elite which Pareto sees as psychological, Burnham 
on his part pointed out the economic dimension of this domination while Mills 
focused on the institutional dimension of elite domination. The thrust of the 
arguments is that there exists a select few that shape societal life at the expense of 
the mass public. As Duru (2012) noted, the central message of elite theory is simply 
that “there may exist in many societies a minority of the population which takes the 
major decisions in the society”. The need to effectively manage the inevitable 
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rancour in the socio-political setting in the society due to hierarchical differentiation, 
can arguably be seen as the reason why the elite theory was developed first in 
sociology to explain class differentiation and who shapes societal decision making 
process. 
 
Constituting the minority but powerful and influential members of the society, the elite 
in any society, “occupy powerful positions in the society with greater access to 
resources” (Ikelegbe, 2005). While some elites occupy strategic positions, others 
who do not act behind the scene to shape and tilt actions and decisions of the 
occupants of privileged positions in their favour. In the same vein, the choice of 
which policy to pursue or not, comes largely from the elite group whose interest, they 
will always protect with their vantage position and social ranking. What comes to 
mind as far as analysis of elite theory is concerned, is simply the fact that it helps 
deepen societal understanding of the dynamics of social and political life of any 
society, developed or developing. The contestable concept of power comes to the 
fore in this respect because who has the “power” and ability to “dominate” societal 
affairs so as to shape societal decision making mechanism, clearly mark out the elite 
from the masses. While the latter has wealth, intellect and organization, the former 
merely follows. It is in this sense that consideration of distinct character of the elites, 
would help drive home, cardinal postulation of this theory as a theoretical framework 
of analysis, (Roei et al, 2009). 
 
Though they manifest in slightly different mode and shape in all lands, elite class or 
the elite, possess same character. One clear attribute that can be spotted, is the fact 
that the elite class are apart from been few in number and dominating the socio-
political life of any nation, they have a consciousness that reinforces their 
domination. Acting as a boost to the domination by the elites, is the huge influence 
they wield to sway public good in their favour at the expense of the masses that 
lacks all it takes to determine what happens in the public realm, (Ikelegbe, 2005). 
Consequently, the elite-masse divide in the society, become pronounced and with 
time just as the gap between the rich and the poor, widens with time. Seen largely as 
conservative and non-innovative, the elite class seeks to defend the status and resist 
radical change in the society. As a result, they concede to popular demands that do 
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not necessarily favour their interest. All these happen because the relationship that 
exists between the elite and the masses is often times skewed in favour of the latter. 
 
With history traced to colonial days, the Nigerian elite is said to have benefited from 
the colonial education and socio-political system. This according to Obi (2004) and 
Osoba (1996), made them possess hybrid traits that allow them combine both 
indigenous and western values. This is seen as unique characteristics even if 
colonial background of the elite class, appear noticeable years after political 
independence as the Nigerian elite appear dependent on state resources for 
sustenance. This is believe to work through wealth accumulation from government 
patronage via contract awards and juicy appointments seen to be done based on 
ethnic consideration rather than merit based. When this is the case, ‘unfit kinsmen 
and political associates are favoured since the Nigerian elite is not monolithic (Obi, 
2004) and they are ethnic bound (Otite, 2007). 
 
Consequently, the Nigerian masses see the elite as corrupt, irresponsible, 
unprincipled, unreliable and useless (Ihonvbere, 2004). Wealth available to the ruling 
elites expected to be custodians of the commonwealth, are often times perceived 
stolen by the ruling class/elites. Popular perception is that ruling elite are illegitimate 
and acquires their wealth legitimately too, Omeje (2006). In the light of this, a 
broader concept of corruption covered in chapter five where regional development in 
Nigeria is given attention, is adequately covered. No one can discuss the Nigerian 
elite without considering corruption because of the kind of government system in 
place. As captured in chapter two where the political economy of Nigeria was 
considered, governance in Nigeria has huge dose of patronage politics many believe 
makes looting of the national treasury possible. While it is difficult to say extent to 
which this affect development, one can safely say that outright diversion of funds 
meant for developmental process, can stifle the process. The empirical chapters 
contain records accused and convicted public officials believed to have embezzled 
public funds to the detriment of development. 
 
Drawing strength from the above, we can say that elite theory as an approach 
employed in this research topic is carefully chosen because it touches the very core 
of the discussion on Nigerian oil politics. Elite theory in political science comes alive 
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more in the area of public policy determination, process, and formulation procedure 
and implementation method, (Kifordu, 2011). Here, placing premium on the will of 
few individuals in the society called elites with huge power base to influence 
decisions in their favour to the detriment of the masses leaves none in doubt as to 
what and who controls socio-political power pendulum in a resource rich and 
dependent country like Nigeria. The choice of this theory in our topic of research “Oil, 
Politics and regional development in Nigeria” is better appreciated when considered 
against the backdrop of the fact that it is the elites that determines how the social, 
political and economic life of any nation is organized. Expectedly, they equally shape 
the development process based on how resources are distributed, equitably or 
otherwise. When resources are equitably distributed, development comes in most 
cases but when the reverse is the case, disparate development occurs as many 
believe, is the case in Nigeria in the face of oil exploration. The question of what role 
the elite play in precise terms and its attendant effect on development, resonates 
throughout this study as carefully selected themes such as resource curse and rent 
seeking in this chapter as well as The Nigerian Elite and resource space in chapter 
six. 
 
With the picture of the elite world painted above, justification for the use of this theory 
for this study can partly be found in the following. First, it is the elites that determine 
how available resources are explored and utilized either for development or for 
selfish gains. To this end, they shape who gets what, when and how; reminiscent of 
Lasswell’s definition of politics. Secondly and closely related to the first, they equally 
determine the pace of development with the choice of decisions they make on issues 
that border on public good. In most cases, the choice of decision the elite class 
makes, favours their core interest which is self-entrenchment via enrichment to 
remain relevant. Third and finally, they decide general policy framework of a country 
often times in their favour. In a culturally diffused society such as Nigeria with huge 
primordial attachment, (Eke, 1979, Otite, 2007), policy choice favoured by the elites, 
are often times disproportionately done to satiate sectional interest to the detriment 
of expected national development. 
 
What the above portrays is the intricate character of the elite class around which the 
thematic thrust of the theory is built. Higley (2010) for instance, defined an elites as 
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“persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal 
organizations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly and 
substantially” while Heinrich and Higley (2010:9) saw elitism as “pejorative terms 
used to denigrate persons and groups who think they are better or profess to know 
more than others or who possess privileges regarded as unwarranted. Import of the 
above, is the class consciousness of the elite class that see them protect their 
interest at the expense of the general public. This they do most times, by blocking 
access to the ‘class they belong’, thus engendering liberal society that modern 
democracies, espouse. When Femia (2001:67) holds, that “elite-dominated 
“democracy” is the most that is possible”, he merely underscore the dominant role 
the elite class plays in any democratic setting. It is then a question of pluralism 
versus elitism and whose interest is served. Interests of the elite class are in most 
cases served because of the organized capacity they have to push through, their 
demands and favoured interest. This leads to exercising control over the society 
because of the vantage position they occupy due to unity of purpose.  It is in the light 
of this that the nature and character of the Nigerian elite discussed below. 
 
3.4.1 The Nigerian Elite 
From all we have seen above, one can say that common interest binds elite class. 
This presupposes that the elite group would be monolithic since they are expected to 
pursue single interest. This is however not the case in the Nigerian situation as Obi 
(2004) noted. Rather than pursuing single interest as elite groups in other climes do, 
ethnic based interest, serves as the elixir that pushes the Nigerian elite into action. 
According to Otite (2007), they are ethnic bound; which means they are linked to 
their kin in the rural or urban grassroots, promoting primordial interest at the expense 
of national interest. Similar mind-sets are seen exported to national politics as the 
elite class during electioneering process tend to lean towards ethnicity to select 
people into position of authority rather than allowing merit and ability to deliver be the 
guiding principle. 
 
This bring issues of identity and survival in a multi-cultural society like Nigeria where 
patronage politics often times tilted towards ethnic interest, is said to be rife; to mind. 
The Nigerian elites are deemed capable of mobilizing and manipulating ethnic 
sentiment to serve their interest that often times runs contrary to both national and 
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regional development. This is believed to be consequences of alleged corruption and 
malignant culture of impunity earlier discussed. That is believed to prompt elites from 
a particular region to align politically with their kinsmen irrespective of their capability. 
Cited example in this sense, include trial of Mr Demiji Bankole, former House of 
Representatives speaker for corruption related offences. This took both ethnic and 
religious twist as the accused relied on both ethnic and religious support to wave off 
the accusation. This besides shrouding the main issue of corruption in religion and 
ethnicity, attempted to overshadow the crime he allegedly committed. This manifests 
a peculiar trait of the Nigerian elite class as they tend to abandon their collective 
interest and embrace sectional interest. Deploying ethnic support to score a point; 
often political by the elite class, breeds inefficiency and retard growth and 
development (Otite 2007:78). The debate whether or not former President Goodluck 
Jonathan should seek re-election in 2015, shows the ethnic/regional cleavage that 
permeates rank and file of the Nigerian elite class seen as peculiar in nature as they 
are believe to unite getting all they need form the commonwealth; but disagree along 
ethnic and religious lines.  
 
In addition to having ethnic rather than national allegiance, the Nigerian elites are 
fragmented according to Ihonvbere (2004). In similar vein, Joireman (2003) and 
Lewis (2004) noted that the Nigerian elites are and divided along regional, ethnic and 
religious lines. We can describe the Nigerian elites as driven by sectional interest, 
ideologically fluid as opposed to ideological rigidity that characterizes elitism in other 
climes. They are also seen as incompetent and insensitive to the plight of the people 
since they are seen as corrupt. Case of abandoned regional development projects 
by the very elites that uses regional support as bargaining chips for power according 
to Eghweree and Otoghile, (2012), is huge. Ironically, funds meant for projects, are 
said to be used to maintain retinue of ethnic based supporters often used to struggle 
for political positions at the national level. Political appointment as this, provides a 
leeway to favourable resource space in the federal system that Ikeji, (2011) and 
Agbo, (2013:20) sees as defective. Role of the elites in the Nigerian context, help 
shed light on the interplay of internal dynamics to shape resource curse. That 
explained why both theories have been jointly used to put the Nigerian situation in 
perspectives. The next section, chronicles both theories and how they fall into the 
discourse. 
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3.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
While the above conceptual clarification say nothing about theories, it is important 
we understand that since the notion of development is slippery, embracing 
theoretical tools to situate issues associated with development and put same in 
context, is inevitable. Consequently and in line with examination of concepts as this 
chapter did, related theoretical concepts are examined as part of the overall 
theoretical design for this study.  
 
Theories as foundational blocks of academic writings help provide empirical 
underpinning for a written piece. It provides differing view to explain a phenomenon. 
According to Silver (1983),  theory is “a unique way for perception of reality, 
expressing someone’s prominent insight about a nature’s aspect in addition to a 
fresh and new understanding about a world aspect” while Leedy and Ormrod 
(2005:4) held that theory is “ an organized body of concepts and principles intended 
to explain a particular phenomenon”. To clearly understand the concept of 
development in relation to this study, we will make use of the resource curse thesis” 
and elite theory. Subsequent paragraph will focus on the former.  
 
From consideration of relevant themes related to this study in the review of 
literatures, it can be observed that a lot of factors militate against development in 
Nigeria. From poorly managed economy to corruption induced culture of impunity, 
there arose an elite class that pursued sectional rather than national interest.  To 
clearly understand the issue under focus here, two theories, resource curse and elite 
theories, have been adopted to explain why the country remain in a parlous 
development condition in the face of abundant oil wealth, with variations at the 
regional levels. Both theories adopted already touched above, would be briefly seen 
how both can aptly underpin this study. 
 
3.5.1 SYNTHESIS OF THE TWO THEORIES 
Combination of both theories, resource curse and elite, for this study, was done 
intentionally because of the relevance of both theories to the study.  Both having to 
do with natural resources and management of same respectively, are adopted to 
proffer explanations to the lingering underdevelopment in Nigeria despite oil wealth 
an as reflected in regional development disparity. 
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Resource curse on one hand, laid bare the intricacies of resource abundance and 
inevitable struggle for its control. That struggle, we observed, turns blessing that 
should come with natural resources into curse. In the Nigerian context, this was 
worsened with rent-seeking by the elite class with ethnic interest at the center of it. 
On the other hand, nowhere analysis of resource abundance, management and 
struggle for its control can ever be done without mention of the elite class.  It is in this 
regards that the elite theory was selected; to clearly explain the intricate dynamics of 
elite struggle for resources space and how that panned out for the Nigerian 
developmental quest. 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
So far, the chapter was able to explore concepts relevant to the study. It made it 
clear, how both adopted theories are suits the study. While resource curse dwells on 
how national resources can be used to either develop (blessing) or under-develop 
(curse due to avoidable struggle for resource space), elite theory focuses on the 
dynamics of inter-personal relationships that shapes the state institution and how 
decisions are made that determine who get what resources, how development is 
shaped and how the general well-being of the state is determined. The synthesis 
thus is that, both theories complement each other as resource curse help us better 
understand the character of the elite class that turns blessing that should come from 
resources to curse due to unbridled quest to monopolize accruable gains from the 
resources. This slows down quest to achieve development.  Though available 
literatures say so much about both theories, none spared a thought on how resource 
curse, would help better explain the character of the elite class. This study would 
explicate the intricate nexus between both theories to aid general understanding of 
both theories. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
As seen in Chapter One, the main aim of this study is to ascertain extent to which oil 
wealth and its management, engender both national and regional development in 
Nigeria. This chapter presents the methodological framework employed to pursue 
this aim and its associated objectives which chapter one, two and three outlined. 
This chapter is made up of five main related sections. Firstly, the chapter starts by 
presenting basic social science research philosophies and then explains why this 
thesis is informed by a critical realist perspective. A look at research philosophy is 
vital in choosing a methodology since it guides research strategy and how theories 
are applied. Secondly, the methodological framework which employed a mixed 
method approach in this thesis is outlined and justified. In particular, varied survey 
methods such as elite interviews, focus group discussion and use of both structured 
and unstructured questionnaires, as well as the use of official data, were 
incorporated to obtain relevant information for the study. The third major section, 
outlines data analysis and validation strategies employed to strengthen the research 
findings. The fourth section addressed ethical issues in respect of this research. 
 
The Philosophical Framework of the Research 
For one to discuss research design, consideration of research philosophy from both 
ontological and epistemological perspectives is vital. In research, epistemological 
issues have to do with the question of how knowledge is obtained. According to 
Matthews and Ross, (2010),”epistemology is the theory of knowledge and how we 
know things”. Bryman (2012:27) summed up epistemological issues as concerning  
 
“…the question of what is (or should be) regarded as 
acceptable knowledge in a discipline. A particularly central 
issue in this context is the question of whether the social world 
can and should be studied according to the same principles, 
procedures, and ethos as the natural sciences”. 
 
From the above, it is clear that epistemological issues have to do with the questions 
of what is known to us in the world or that which should be known or be considered 
as knowledge. According to Marsh and Furlong, (2002:19), epistemology reflects a 
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researcher’s view of the world and how he/she identifies real or objective relations 
between social phenomena. This leads us to the issue of ontology which Smith 
(2003:155) - quoted in Matthews and Ross (2010:17) - described as “the science of 
what is, of the kinds and structures of objects, properties, events, processes and 
relations in every area of reality”. On his part, Bryman (2001) observed that ontology 
has to do with the nature of what we know. While epistemology talks about source of 
knowledge and ontology deals the nature of what we know, it is important to note 
that both are not mutually exclusive. As Russel (2005) noted, one’s ontological 
position might reflect one’s epistemological stance, but it does not necessarily 
determine it. 
 
4.1 PARADIGM OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 
In any research piece, there is always the need to look at the philosophical 
underpinnings since it impacts both the research questions and how they are 
formulated. It also influences how the study is conducted and how conclusions are 
drawn (Bryman, 2001:19; Marsh and Smith, 2001:529). It is instructive to know that 
one’s interpretative stand on what we know about the world is inextricably linked to 
the research tools or methods employed to carry out a research. How effective a 
given research method is from a philosophical perspective, depends ultimately on 
the epistemological considerations and, as a result, no method is self-validating 
(Hughes, 1990:11). That makes it inevitable for one to consider the philosophy of 
social science which:  
 
“…cannot be an optional activity, indulged in by those reluctant 
to get on with the real empirical work. It is the indispensable 
starting-point for all social science” (Trigg, 2001: 252).  
 
According to Marsh and Furlong, (2002), there are three main epistemologies of 
social science. These include neo-positivism, critical realism and interpretivism. 
While positivism and interpretivism are antithetical, critical realism can be located 
somewhere between them. Brief description of these epistemological strands, their 
related ontologies and my own critical realist epistemological position are outlined in 
the following paragraphs. 
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4.1.1 Positivism 
This concerns the application of the scientific method to the study of both science 
based phenomenon and a social phenomenon. Positivism is an epistemological 
position that advocates the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the 
study of social reality and beyond (Bryman, 2012). Though it is associated with the 
natural sciences, scholars find it difficult pin it down for precise analysis since it can 
be used in varied ways in the course of research (Bryman, 2012). Positivism is seen 
to be that position that affirms the importance of imitating natural science. As a 
philosophical epistemology that stems from the natural sciences, positivism has 
been a major influence in the social sciences. This influence is said to be weakening 
though (Hughes, 1990:16; Trigg, 2001). Positivism has links with foundationalist or 
objectivist ontology that sees existence of the social world independent of what we 
know of it. Consequently, it seeks to help us discover causal relationships in a value 
free and objective way through developing explanatory and predictive models (Marsh 
and Smith, 2001, Marsh and Furlong, 2002).  
 
From the positivists’ point of view, the only valid knowledge is that verifiable by the 
senses, as they claim that such knowledge is inductively gained collecting facts that 
provides foundations for general laws. With this belief in objectivity in research, 
researchers are expected to adopt methods such as direct observation that will 
enhance objectivity. This fuels beliefs of positivist that there are clear distinctions 
between empirical and normative statements, with the former belonging to the 
domain of the scientists and the latter belonging to disciplines such as theology and 
philosophy (Marsh and Furlong, 2002:20). According to the positive perspective, a 
social scientist should approach research in a value free and objective manner.  A 
positivist would always see a theory as tool for generating hypotheses testable by 
direct observation. It thus allows for the explanation and the assessment of laws in a 
deductive process (Bryman, 2001:20, Marsh and Furlong, 2002:12). 
 
4.1.2 Interpretivism 
Unlike positivism that believes in application of scientific method to carry out 
research studies, interpretivism believes that social phenomenon cannot be 
subjected to a straight-jacket application of scientific method. Emergence of 
interpretivism can be linked to: 
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“…a longstanding debate within the social sciences with regard 
to the usefulness of natural science research positions to the 
study of the social world, and a significant part of that debate 
revolves around the use of the positivist approach to studying 
social phenomena. Many social scientists believe that social 
research must include understandings and explanations of 
social phenomena which are not necessarily observable by the 
senses but can be interpreted by a fellow human being, the 
social researcher”, (Matthews and Ross, 2010:28).  
 
It is thus seem as “an alternative to the positivist orthodoxy” (Bryman, 2012), 
believed to have dominated the body of research for some time. It views the subject 
matter of the social sciences as fundamentally different from the natural sciences. It 
recognizes complexities inherent in social interactions that are difficult to examine 
using the lens provided by natural sciences that positivism represents. 
Consequently, interpretivists believe that social systems should be researched with 
approaches that can pay attention to distinctive social dynamism in any study, 
(Bryman, 2001:12). That explains why interpretivists refuse to accept the positivist 
position that our social world exists independently of our knowledge of it; they 
instead hold that social engagement shapes the social world.  
 
Interpretivism consequently advised that focus of social research should be on the 
identification and interpretation of social processes and traditions that give rise to 
meanings to achieve objective research. Objective research, which positivists 
believe is possible, is to an interpretivist not possible because researchers 
themselves work within discourses and traditions that shape their work. That 
explains the difference between both positivists and interpretivist as the latter believe 
that there is no objective truth outside that birthed by social interactions. The 
interpretivist approach to social research has come to be seen as qualitative method 
because of its detailed description of data collection and ability to uncover subjective 
meanings within a specific context to give rise to empathetic understanding that can 
enable one ‘stand in the other’s shoes’ (Matthews and Ross, 2010: 28). 
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4.1.3 Critical Realism  
Unlike most positivists, I do not believe in objectivist/foundationalist ontology 
because I consider that the social world does not exist independently of our 
knowledge of it. We cannot undermine the impact of social interactions that shapes 
events in the social world in the guise of objectivism that positivism espouses. Effort 
must thus be made to understand causal relationships as we observe phenomenon, 
I believe causal relations hold across time and space and they can be directly 
observed. I do not subscribe to the positivist notion that expects social science to be 
value free since normative and empirical questions play vital role in social research. I 
therefore lean towards the epistemological position of critical realistist. 
 
As a critical realist, I believe that there are deep underlying structural relationships in 
the social realm such as institutions and organisations that shapes events between 
social phenomena essential for explanation of a particular behaviour; that can be 
directly observed contrary to what  is posited(Benton and Craib, 2001:125, Marsh 
and Smith, 2001:530). I do believe that these structures are capable of determining 
outcomes since these structures are not capable of constraining and facilitating the 
behaviour of individuals that are part of the institution in the first place. 
 
4.2 METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MY 
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
 
4.2.1 Critical Realism and the Use of Theory 
One objective of this thesis is the examination of the effect of oil resources on 
Nigeria’s development through the lens provided by comparison of regional 
development trajectories (see chapters one and two). Leaning on the platform 
provided by critical realism, there is a challenge of how to probe unseen behaviours 
and interactions needed to have a balanced view to achieve an objective study. As a 
critical realist and as Bryman (2001:13), noted; I believe that theory can be used to 
as a tool to help distinguish between those social phenomena that are directly 
observable and those that are not. Marsh and Smith (2001:532) had this to say 
about the role of theories when they observe that:  
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“The role of theory in realism is to contextualise observable 
behaviour by using theory to infer the underlying structure of a 
particular social situation; theory provides a useful way of 
constructing a narrative that helps us identify and explain the 
underlying structural relationships.”  
 
As noted above, my critical realist view draws strength from the fact that researchers 
are not independent of the social world since people have different social 
constructions of their environment. To make sense of these complex interpretations 
of social life, a multi-theoretical analytical framework was therefore applied to my 
empirical data (Bryman, 2001:12; and Marsh and Smith, 2001:531). By applying rival 
theoretical perspectives to explain behaviour and outcomes, one is able to capture 
different constructions of reality. As outlined in chapter three, the theoretical 
framework of this thesis draws upon two seemingly unrelated theories of resource 
curse and elite theory which are used to explore the negative externalities of 
resource exploitation in resource rich and dependent states. Both theories are 
applied to draw attention to the often under considered role of elites in resource 
management which often leads to struggle for resource space in a manner that leads 
to resource curse. Both theories are therefore employed to underpin this study to 
strengthen existing academic debate on the subject and possibly balance the 
resource curse narrative. With this, we will be able to locate resource curse within 
the larger spectrum of existential realities where roles of the elite class in resource 
management, has come to be identified as salient factors accentuating resource 
curse.  The nexus between resource curse and elite theory; especially the causal 
links between both, is provides fresh perspective to the resource based economic 
discourse. 
 
4.2.2 Critical Realism and Methodological Approaches  
Critical realist research philosophy also has a bearing on the choice of methods used 
and the type of data collected. Critical realism seeks to account for historical and 
contextual perspectives in an empirically grounded manner and to reveal causal 
relationships, some of which may be unobservable. This means that one can use 
both qualitative and quantitative data (Marsh and Furlong, 2002:21). Quantitative 
data will only be applicable to directly observable relationships (ibid). In contrast, 
qualitative data can be applied to directly observable relationships and can also be 
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used to indirectly identify unobservable interactions. This study therefore, employs 
both qualitative and quantitative data in a mixed methodological approach. Both 
quantitative and qualitative data are drawn upon to map out trends and general 
patterns of the Nigerian oil industry and resource management since 2011 and how 
these shape development trajectories nationally and at the regional levels (see 
chapters 5 and 6). 
 
Furthermore, a qualitative approach is used to provide insights into the observable 
and unobservable organisational processes that might be restricting the 
understanding of oil politics and development in Nigeria. Qualitative methods are 
also useful in collecting individual responses on the issue under investigation. The 
next section considers methods used to collect the qualitative and quantitative data 
for this research. 
 
4.3 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
The following methodological framework was operationalized in order to gain insights 
into how oil politics shapes development in Nigeria (in terms of its quality and 
quantity), especially at the regional levels. In the main, it draws on the methods of 
political science. 
 
In general, there are several sources available for the social scientist to generate 
research data from. These include interviews; focus group discussion and use of 
questionnaires. All these sources have social relevance but offer a different insight 
into the research area, as they provide data from different perspectives. To access 
varied data sources available for research, political scientists can use both primary 
and secondary data. Use of primary data entails deploying empirical observations 
usually collected by the researcher specifically for the purpose of the research, e.g. 
interview data. On the other hand, use of secondary source of data, entails the 
researcher using already published information that is relevant to his/her study. This 
means the researcher uses data that he/she is not directly involved in collecting 
(Bryman, 2001:196). Secondary data are usually obtained from published sources, 
either in book or electronic forms in databases of various organisations, institutions 
and government bodies. One advantage secondary data offers is that it’s capable of 
reducing time and cost of data collection. It might offer the prospect of longitudinal 
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analysis (i.e. it provides a historical aspect to the research); and it may help with data 
triangulation (discussed below). The disadvantage of the secondary data source 
however, is the possibility of the researcher not being familiar with the data provided. 
If this happens, the researcher will have little control over the quality of the data. 
Consequently, there may be absence of key variables since the data may have been 
collected for a purpose different from what the researcher would adopt it for 
(Bryman, 2001:200). Table 4.1 below shows the primary and secondary data 
sources used in this thesis. 
 
Table 4.1: Primary and secondary data sources used in this research 
Primary Sources Secondary Sources 
 Elite Interviews with opinion 
leaders in selected regions 
 Focused group discussion on 
regional basis 
 Use of structured and 
questionnaires in study areas.  
 A content analysis of relevant 
government documents (2000-
2011) 
 Reports from Central bank of 
Nigeria 
 Federal office of Statistic 
documents 
 Information from 
Afrobarometer data base 
 Relevant literatures from non-
governmental groups such as 
ANEEJ, ERA and CEPED. 
 
Source: Researchers’ compilation 
 
The remaining part of this section focus on detailed analysis of each method in 
relation to this study. 
 
4.3.1 Elite Interviews 
In political science, some central questions are best answered by those 
knowledgeable enough about the subject under focus. That explains why it is vital to 
engage such people armed with vital information needed for a study (Manheim and 
Rich, 1981:133). As noted in chapters one and two, studies conducted on the 
resource management and development in Nigeria are yet to pay attention to the 
issue of regional development discourse in a comparative manner. There is thus the 
need to engage those practically on ground in the selected regions for this study to 
be able to get salient issues that available literature does not cover. Therefore, elite 
interviewing was employed to attempt to tap the perspectives of officials and 
specialists in both oil and development discourse in Nigeria. With resource curse and 
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elite theories adopted in chapter three, it is thus necessary to interview individuals 
whose day-to-day activities involve or have involved dealing with management of the 
Nigerian oil industry and how this is managed to achieve development at both 
national and regional levels. A dearth of documentary evidence on regional 
development trajectory in Nigeria, partly informed the need to engage in elite 
interview. With this brief introduction, the next subsection considers interview in 
broad terms and how it is done in relation to this study. 
 
4.3.1.1 Interview Generally In Research 
Interviews in research can broadly be seen as a method of collecting data in 
qualitative research, (Gill et al, 2008). As a tried and tested data collecting method, 
interviews entail a meeting between two or more persons (interviewer and 
interviewee) where questions relevant to the topic of research are asked. Two broad 
types of interview exist, namely individual and group interview, (Gill et al, 2008). 
Three main techniques exist to conduct an interview to generate needed data. This 
includes the structured, the unstructured and the semi-structured approach. 
 
Structured interviews are essentially; verbally administered questionnaire, (Gill et al, 
2008). They entail using list of detailed and predefined set of questions where the 
order and schedule of administration are strictly maintained, leaving no room for 
variation and no scope for follow-up questions to responses that warrant further 
elaboration, (Gill et al, 2008). The controlled nature of structured interview, allows 
one to directly compare data between interviews. It is often used to capture 
quantitative data. As a result, the data from this type of approach arguably fits most 
comfortably with a positivist epistemology (Russel, 2005). One flaw associated with 
this interview type, is its rigidity. By their very nature, they only allow for limited 
participant responses and are, therefore, of less use if ‘depth’ is required (Gill et al, 
2008).  
 
On the other hand, an unstructured interview does not reﬂect any preconceived 
theories or ideas and is performed with little or no organisation, (Gill et al, 2008). 
Such an interview may simply open with probing questions such as ‘Can you tell me 
about your experience” that seeks to know the interviewee’s experience about the 
subject matter. Subsequent questions normally build on responses to the initial 
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question. Known to be time consuming, unstructured interviews can be difﬁcult to 
manage, and to participate in since it lacks predetermined interview questions that 
provide guidance on what to talk about. Many participants could find this confusing 
and unhelpful. An unstructured interview is however significant if one needs ‘depth’ 
while exploring topics where little is known or new perspective to what is known is 
the target.  
 
By contrast to the interview types seen above, semi-structured interviews contain a 
list of key questions that help the interviewer deﬁne the areas he/she want explored. 
However, they are also flexible and as such, allow the interviewer or interviewee to 
diverge in order to pursue an idea or response in more detail (Gill et al, 2008). This 
interview format is often used to guide participants on what to talk about and they 
find this helpful. The ﬂexibility of this approach, particularly compared to structured 
interviews, also allows for the discovery or elaboration of information that is 
important to participants but may not have previously been thought of as pertinent by 
the research team. This with semi-structured interviews inbuilt flexibility enables 
participants probe and elaborate on issues while still maintaining a degree of 
comparability needed to make sense out of generated data (May, 2001:123). This 
makes it possible for a greater rapport between the interviewer and the interviewee 
to be established. Consequently, derivable information from the interview session(s), 
are likely to be more substantial, rich in detail and surprising (i.e. unexpected 
information may be revealed) than the structured approach, but in a more 
manageable format than the unstructured approach (ibid).  
 
This thesis adopted the semi-structured approach as it was deemed to be the most 
appropriate strategy to carry out elite interview. The reasons for the selection of this 
strategy are outlined below. First, however, the differences between elite and non-
elite interviewing need to be distinguished.  
 
4.3.1.2 What is an elite interview? 
What distinguishes an elite interview from non-elite interview can be said to be the 
relationship between the interviewee and the interviewer. Non-elite interviews involve 
that with a member of the public that is not an expert or expected to have expert 
knowledge in the research area. Here, the interviewer dictates the pace because 
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he/she has more knowledge in the subject area. On the other hand, elite interview is 
the direct opposite of non-elite interview (Burnham, et al., 2004:205). Here, the 
interview is done with individuals knowledgeable enough about the subject matter. 
Though the question of whom elite is, is difficult to answer, it can be seen as “a 
person with knowledge, which, for the purpose of a given research project, require 
that they be given individualised treatment in an interview.” (Manheim and Rich, 
1981:133). In similar vein, Dexter (1970:5) regards elites as “people in important or 
exposed positions who may require very important person interviewing treatment on 
the topics which relate to their importance or exposure.” Unlike non-elite interview 
where the interviewer is more knowledgeable, the interviewee is often more 
knowledgeable in the elite interview because of the relatively informed and exposed 
nature in relation to the subject under focus. On a scale of balance, power 
relationship between the interviewer and an elite, favours the elite as accessing the 
latter is often difficult. Challenges faced trying to access elites for this research is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
 
With tilted balance of power in their favour and depth of knowledge on the subject 
matter, elites are mostly likely to dominate the discourse (Richards, 1996:201). To 
get the best out of the interview exercise, it is thus vital that the interviewer should be 
well equipped with adequate knowledge about the subject matter to adequately 
engage the elite. To this end, the researcher is expected to have done appreciable 
work on his/her research project to allow the interviewer enough time to develop an 
in-depth understanding of the subject matter before embarking on the interviews 
(Manheim and Rich, 1981:134). In the case of this thesis, the interviews took place in 
the second year of the research. This gave me ample time to acquaint myself with 
the issues surrounding oil politics and development in Nigeria, whilst having 
sufficient time to interpret the data and to write this thesis. 
 
According to Dexter (1970:56), elite’ interview favour discussion rather than rigorous 
questioning since meaning that such an approach does not support steady flow of 
questions associated with structured interviews. To this end, one can say that 
structured interview approach is inappropriate for elite interview because of its 
rigidity that limits expected usefulness. However, using only unstructured approach 
would make it difficult to condense and summarise generated data while 
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complicating the ability to compare response between interviewees. To this end, it 
conflicts with my mixed method critical realist research philosophy. The  ability to 
compare interview responses helps establish extent of conformity with prevailing 
circumstances shaping oil resource management and the development processes in 
Nigeria. To avoid these seeming flaws with unstructured and structured interview 
process, a semi-structured approach was selected as the most appropriate interview 
strategy since it allows for comparison between the data sources whilst also 
providing the opportunity for gaining insights into the interviewees’ socially 
constructed realities (Russel, 2005). As Seldon and Pappworth (1983:75) noted, “in 
absence of better method it is advisable to adopt a formula that combines the 
comprehensiveness and comparability of a set of questions with the flexibility of an 
open ended informal approach.” The application of the semi-structured approach in 
this research is discussed below. 
 
4.3.1.3 Selecting and Approaching the Interviewees 
Selecting interviewees was not much of a challenge as those selected were chosen 
because of the position they occupy in the society and their depth of knowledge 
about the subject under study. This study selected three categories of interviewees. 
These are community and opinion leaders, Nigerian oil and gas industry officials and 
members of the academic community and development scholars, all of whom have 
experience of the development processes and oil business nationally and regionally 
(see Table 4.2). Efforts made at interviewing ex-Niger Delta protesters and top 
ranking officials of government proved abortive due to insecurity in the oil bearing 
region at that time of the field work and official bureaucracy that prevented 
government officials from granting requested interviews.  
 
Table 4.2: List of interviewees 
 
Affiliation  Number of 
Interviews 
Taped or Notes 
 
ACADEMIA AND DEVELOPMENT SCHOLARS 
University Professor 1. University 
of Benin 
1 Taped 
,University Professor 2, 
University of Lagos  
1 Notes (telephone interview) 
University Lecturer, University of 1 Taped 
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Benin 
University Lecturer, University of 
Ibadan 
1 Notes (telephone interview) 
NGO 1 staff (ERA, Benin)  1 Taped 
Public Servant (NDDC) 1 Taped 
Rev Father (SS)  1 Notes (telephone interview) 
University Lecturer, University of 
Benin 
1 Taped 
NGO 2 staff(ANEEJ), Benin  1 Taped 
An Environmentalist 1 Taped 
 
OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY OFFICIALS  
NNPC 1 Taped 
IDSL 1 Taped 
Ministry of Petroleum resources 2 Notes (telephone interview) 
PPMC 1 Notes (telephone interview) 
 
OPINION, COMMUNITY AND YOUTH LEADERS 
Traditional ruler (SS) 1 Taped 
Community leader, SW) 1 Taped 
Civil Servant,( SS) 1 Notes 
Women leader, (SS) 1 Taped 
Youth Leader, (SS) 1 Taped 
Opinion leader, (SS) 1 Taped 
Youth leader, (SW) 1 Taped 
Development scholar,(SW) 1 Taped 
 (Social Critic, SS) 1 Notes 
 (Community leader (SW) 1 Taped  
Development expert, (SS)  2 Notes 
Retired banker, (SW) 1 Tape 
Public Servant, (SW) I Notes (Telephone interview) 
Tycoon, (SS) 1 Taped  
Trader, (SS) 2 1 Taped, 1 Notes (telephone 
interview) 
Youth leader, (SS)  1 Tape 
                  INFORMANTS 
A1 (Idjere village, SS) 2 Tape 
B1 (Owo town, SW) 1 Notes  
A2 (Obiaruku, SS) 1 Tape and notes 
B2 (Aja town, SW) 2 Notes 
 
Source: Author 
 
As writers on elite interview note, there are challenges associated with gaining 
access to elites (Dexter, 1970; Richards, 1996; Phillips, 1998). In this study, my 
initial fears of possible challenges gaining access to elites, turned out to be 
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exaggerated. I started with those I know personally. They in turn introduced to others 
better placed to deal with my questions. Consequently, further interviewees were 
selected deploying the snowball technique. Interviewees were asked for the contact 
details of other people who they thought might be useful for me to talk to. This 
technique helped me identify potential interviewees and opened doors to more 
people who could contribute to the research, possibly making the overall sample 
more representative. Furthermore, it revealed evidence in itself through identifying 
networks, alliances or communication patterns (Manheim and Rich, 1981:136).  
 
The interviewees were initially contacted through e-mails and telephone calls. Upon 
contact, the potential interviewees were given a summary of the research and told 
how important their input was and given an indication of the likely areas of 
questioning (Lilleker, 2003:209). Furthermore, they were given reassurances that I 
would deal with any information they provided in a sensitive and confidential manner, 
and were offered an outline of the research findings in the future as an incentive to 
participate. 
 
4.3.1.4 Field Work Phases 
The field work was conducted in the three states each out of the two regions 
selected for this study. These are the South-West and South-South regions where 
three states each were chosen for the study (see chapter one for details). The field 
work came in phases. These include conducting elite interview followed by focus 
group discussion and finally the administration of questionnaires to the general 
public.  
 
The first phase of elite interviewing took place between March and June, 2013. It 
involved interviews with elites knowledgeable enough to speak on the subject of the 
study. They were seen as vital to the study because of their importance, experience 
and exposure to one or a combination of the following: understanding of the Nigerian 
oil and gas industry, development experience and community relationships that 
shaped development at both national and regional levels. I was thus able to exploit 
their vast wealth of insider knowledge, (Phillips, 1998:13). These experiences 
reflected in the second and third phase of the field work exercise as it shaped the 
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questions that were asked to elicit cogent responses beneficial to the study (See list 
of both interview and FGD questions in the appendix section) .  
 
While some interviews were done over the phone, others were done in either offices, 
residences of interviewees and public cafes on two occasions. Most of the interviews 
conducted by phone were somewhat limited in their scope due to a lack of funds. 
This contrasts one-on-one interviews that provided ample time for fruitful and 
rewarding discussion. The second phase occurred between August 2013 and 
January, 2014 while the third came up between February 2014 and June 2014.   
 
4.3.1.5 Interview Preparation  
Prior to the interview proper, I did my best to acquaint myself with the issue of oil 
politics and resource management and how these shapes both national and regional 
development in Nigeria. This was to place me in a better stead to assure my 
interviewee that I have good knowledge of the issue under focus. It is far more 
beneficial for an interviewer to be familiar with the subject under focus so as to be 
able to cope and get the best out of every interview session, (Heclo and Wildavsky, 
1981:ixii) In addition, adequate knowledge of the subject, earned me the respect of 
the interviewees. This helped assure the interviewee they were talking with a fellow 
with adequate knowledge, thus tilting the tone of the interview to my favour 
(Richards, 1996:202). The preparation required me to know latest and updated 
information about oil politics and regional development in Nigeria as well as position 
papers on development discourse in Nigeria. To add to this, a comprehensive review 
of relevant literatures to the study was undertaken before contacting interviewees. 
This gave me an opportunity to map out developments on the subject over time. 
  
4.3.1.6 Conduct of the Interview 
Prior to the interview, a summary of what the research entails was sent out to the 
interviewees to enable them collect both their thoughts and find appropriate 
documents. A list of questions I intended to ask them was deliberately not sent to 
prevent interviewees from giving prepared answers. Doing that would have led to the 
preparation of guarded or self-censured answers capable of making them less open 
and spontaneous (Seldon and Pappworth, 1983:64). 
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To start each interview session, interviewees were made to understand nature of the 
research and the general areas that I wished to discuss. In addition, interviewees 
were asked how much time they were prepared to give while their consent to either 
tape the interview or take notes was sought. They were also asked to confirm 
whether they wanted to be provided with a transcript of the interview, which could 
also include a few additional questions that may have arisen while looking at the 
transcript (Richards, 1996:202). Also, issues of attributing remarkable statement in 
the course of the interview to them were, discussed with their position on it noted. 
 
Each interview lasted for about thirty minutes to an hour on the average. As the 
semi-structured approach was employed, the interview was guided, but not dictated, 
by an aide-mémoire, which outlined the issues that I wished to explore. The aide- 
mémoires were based on more detailed sets of questions which can be seen in 
Appendix A. The order and schedule of the interviews were not fixed giving the 
interviewees the scope and freedom to discuss the areas that they thought were 
important. 
 
4.3.1.7 Recording the Interview or Taking Notes 
In most research interviews, the use of tape or voice recorders is common. In this 
study, I had initial challenge on the choice of whether or not to use a tape recorder 
for the interview because of the controversy its use has thrown up in the past. Tape 
recorders as an interview tool can inhibit a respondent’s answers as they may be 
worried about a mistake or fear that vital point they made may be edited out. To this 
end, some interviewees object to its use in preference of note taking. Also, 
transcription of recorded views in an interview can be time consuming since it’s a 
lengthy process. Moreover, unforeseen challenges may arise; tapes can run out of 
memory space; batteries can go flat; and acoustics can be poor and as such, result 
in poor recordings. 
 
Despite challenges associated with tape/voice recorder in an interview, its use 
enabled me to concentrate on what the interviewee was saying rather than struggling 
to take notes to grab all he/she is saying. Consequently, taping helped me achieve a 
verbatim transcript of the interview, (Richards 1996:202), making it difficult to miss 
anything or misrepresent same. The ability to get accurate account of all that the 
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interviewee said makes it easier to be able to quote them accurately, (Seldon and 
Pappworth, 1983:71). Furthermore, taping allows a more natural dialogue to happen 
since I am able to achieve eye contact and rhythm with the interviewees. This 
enhances the rapport built and enable me observe body language and other 
subtleties that could possible pass an inaudible message. To this end, attempts were 
made to tape the interviews where possible except where permission to record was 
not granted by the interviewee. Other instances where tapes were not used were in 
situations where the acoustics and background noise made recording the interview 
sessions impractical. 
 
Added to tape recording the interviews, notes were equally taken to support the 
tapes as sole reliance on the latter can be very disastrous, (Manheim and Rich, 
1981:137). Exclusive dependence on a recorder that could break or go wrong, can 
lead to waste of precious research time. One other advantage of note taking during 
an interview is it provides the interviewer an opportunity to subtly control the 
interview and to be seen serious by the interviewee. This is likely to be the case 
when the latter sees the former frantically jotting all that is said. Failure to be actively 
involved in writing all that is said, could give the informant opportunity to conclude 
that the research lacks interest (Dexter, 1970:57, Seldon and Pappworth, 1983:145; 
Ostander, 1995:145). Therefore, in each interview, the respondent’s words and 
mannerisms were recorded. In particular, a record was kept of key words, 
expressions, names, numbers and dates. Where a recording was agreed upon, 
notes were taken in less detail so that I could concentrate more on what the 
respondent was saying. 
 
4.3.1.8 Interview Analysis 
According to Bryman and Burgess (194:217) “research design, data collection and 
analysis are simultaneous and continuous processes”. This means all three 
processes can seamlessly occur at the same time. However, there are “few well 
established and widely accepted rules for the analysis of qualitative data” (Bryman, 
2001:388). The next paragraph discusses how the interview data was analysed and 
warranted. 
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I wasted no time transcribing interview tapes and integrating them with notes taken. 
In places where only notes were taken, conscious efforts were made to flesh out vital 
points noted while the interview was still fresh in my mind. Immediate transcription of 
the interview data was done to enable me remember both the mood and atmosphere 
of the interview. This gave me the opportunity to add my own comments and 
perceptions about: the interview process and its setting; the reliability of what was 
said; and the rapport established between the interviewee; and I and as such, I was 
able to sum up each interview. 
 
After the transcriptions of the interview, generated data were typed into excel 
spread-sheets where available information was grouped on the basis of how well 
they address the research question and hypothesis. The data were consequently 
then assigned into one or more of four categories centred on the four key objectives 
of this research namely: oil politics, resource distribution; institutional frameworks 
and regional developmental efforts. To make the data more accessible, the 
aforementioned categories were further subdivided to birth subsections that help 
address key arguments taken on in each chapter; especially the empirical chapters. 
This made it possible for me to organise and easily manage the interview data and 
as such, able to extract information and analyse the results. To ensure that my initial 
categorisation was consistent with the development of this thesis and with any new 
information, the interviews and the categorises were revisited continuously during 
the research  
 
4.3.1.9 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Elite Interview 
This section outlines some general issues associated with elite interviews. These 
issues have to do with that of how interviewees can be trusted to give reliable and 
unbiased information. Others are inevitable limitations on the part of the researcher 
as well as complications caused by the power relationships between the interviewer 
as well as some general problems associated with all types of interviewing. These 
are summarized as follows. 
 
(A) Disadvantages of Elite Interview 
i) The possibility of interviewees supplying unreliable information due to factors not 
limited to the following: failure of the interviewee’s memory (Manheim and Rich, 
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1981, Seldon and Pappworth, 1983, Richards, 1996); the fact that interviewee’s 
have been known to change their minds through the course of an interview 
(Richards, 1996); the deliberate falsification of the information provided to protect 
interests (Manheim and Rich, 1981:200; Richards, 1996:134); and the 
interviewee supplying superficial or oversimplified information and gossip (Seldon 
and Pappworth, 1983:20-21). Furthermore, in spite of being elite, an interviewee 
might not understand all of the questions being asked or may deliberately 
misinterpret them, (Russel, 2005).  
 
ii) On the part of the interviewer, if he/she is differential to the interviewee, 
limitations may arise. This is capable of affecting his/her boldness to ask 
questions and be assertive to subtly compel interviewees to deliver (Richards, 
1996:201).  
 
iii) Related to the above, if an awkward power relationship exists between the 
interviewer and the interviewees, there are likely to be difficulties. For instance, 
the unfavourable power relations tilted to favour the interviewee can be used to 
abruptly terminate the interview especially in a setting where elites are used to 
being in control (Cochrane, 1998:2124). Thus, in selling ones respectability to 
secure access to elite, there is a risk that the interviewer might surrender to the 
agenda of the interviewee (Phillips, 1998:9). Moreover, when attempting to 
establish the credibility of the research to elite, the interviewer may seek to 
manipulate the interviewee by using tricks to gain their confidence, but there is 
the danger that one is in fact manipulating oneself (Cochrane, 1998:2125). 
 
iv) Other factors that may influence the data are: the time of the day and the 
environment in which the interviews are held (Seldon and Pappworth, 1983:31); 
people being poor communicators in interviews; misinterpretation of what the 
interviewee says; and difficulties of authenticating oral evidence, interviews and 
transcripts (ibid: 32-33). 
 
In the course of the interviews conducted for this study, I experienced some of these 
problems. In some few of the interviews held with community leaders, the data 
supplied appeared to be unreliable. Interviewees appear imprecise on issues while 
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contradicting accounts can be noted. I perceive these interviewees as trying to justify 
their held position by pushing them out as reflective of existential realities. This 
ended up blurring the real issues, thus misleading the interviewer on issues that 
need clarification. This difficulty compromised my approach as it leads to questions 
over the validity of the data that they provided. At times, I found myself being too 
deferential to the interviewees especially early on in the process. However, as my 
experienced increased, so did my assertiveness. Also, in negotiating access to the 
interviewees, I had to demonstrate my respectability to convince them to participate 
in this research. On two occasions, this led to a situation where strict conditions were 
laid down by the interviewees on what data could be used and on allowing 
attribution. Finally, five of the interviews were not conducted in private rooms, and at 
times the interviewees seemed reluctant to disclose more sensitive information. In 
order to limit the effect of these problems, triangulation and data validation 
techniques were employed and are outlined later in this chapter. With weaknesses 
associated with elite interview briefly seen above, focus in the following section 
would be on consideration of some of its merits in social research. 
 
(B) Advantages of Elite Interview 
i) One benefit of elite interview, is that it gives deeper insights into the subject that is 
been researched into as elites help to interpret document so as to confirm 
documents. Active participation of elites also aid the researcher in distinguishing 
what is important from what is secondary so as to fill knowledge gaps and flesh out 
information that documentary accounts embellish, (Seldon and Pappworth, 1983:37, 
Seldon and Richards, 1988:4, Richards, 1996:200).  
ii) Elites add colour that human details entails, to studies which would otherwise be 
little more than the regurgitation of secondary sources of data. 
iii) Elites make it easier to research organisational relationships and new 
developments in public policy making process. This is because they help reveal 
the processes that are actually occurring; determine what drives and how 
decisions are reached. They also help describe how organisations are run with 
insight into how influence is exerted to shape policy direction, (Seldon and 
Pappworth, 1983:42) as well as help explain outcome of events within the public 
domain, (Richards, 1996:200). This helps reveal hidden factors that shape 
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decisions. Thus, they are essential for illuminating the intricate political dimension 
to the oil politics and regional development discourse in Nigeria.  
iv) Finally, elites provide access to other individuals who may be important for the 
both the research and further researches as it paves way for further information 
collection from the respondent after the interview.   
 
I personally experienced some of these advantages of elite interview in the course of 
my research. I find the interviews helpful in the interpretation of oil related documents 
as it relates to development. This proved helpful as it helped filled gaps on 
information found in documentary material relating to the oil-development debate in 
Nigeria. They added colour to the research by linking it to amazing personalities that 
provided interesting accounts hitherto not seen or written about. It is thus safe to 
admit that elite interviews provided rich detail on the political economy of oil in 
Nigeria and how it shapes both national and regional development in Nigeria. These 
added to new documents brought forth by the interviewees in the form of advice 
based on their personal experiences in public life that proved helpful in the course of 
the study. 
 
In sum, the method of elite interviewing allowed me to see deeper than published 
documents on the subject matter of my study. Seldon and Pappworth, (1983:43) 
termed this “peering beneath the surface” (Seldon and Pappworth, 1983:43). This 
doubtlessly enabled me to understand issues shaping the oil politics and the 
development discourse in Nigeria. 
 
4.4 FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION 
In addition to the elite interviews, this study equally undertook a focus group 
discussion (FGD) to generate relevant data. Closely linked to interviews, FGD can 
be said to be a structured group discussion on a chosen topic to generate relevant 
data for research purposes. According to David and Sutton (2011), a focus group 
interview is “a group interview rather than the more stereotypical one-to-one 
interview”. Bryman (2012:501) notes that it entails “a method of interviewing that 
involves more than one, usually at least four, interviewees”, while Gill et al, (2008: 
291) observed that FGD helps generate information on collective views, and the 
meanings that lie behind those views. Here, the discussion is guided, monitored and 
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recorded by a researcher often called facilitator or moderator. Consequently, FGD 
can be seen as an advanced form of interview that involves a group of persons 
where issues of relevance are discussed to generate data for research purposes. 
Though seen as a group interview, it is different from the conventional interview 
system where two parties participate, thus it involves very different dynamics. 
 
FGD as a data generating method enables the moderator to weigh participants view 
on the issues they are confronted with and as such, be able to provide a fairly 
unstructured setting for the extraction of their views and perspectives. Though 
initially deployed to carry out market surveys, FGD is today employed to carry out 
social research, (Bryman, 2012:502; and Gill et al, 2008:291). FGD is used primarily 
in social research for the following reasons. 
 
(i) It allows the researchers to understand feelings of the people and why 
they have such feelings. This is because of the opportunity it gives to 
probe each other’s reasons for holding a certain view.  
(ii) FGD makes it possible to get a wide variety of views in relation to a 
particular issue. 
(iii) It enables the researcher to bring vital issues of research interest to the 
fore as she/he moderates the discussion unlike one-on-one interviews with 
unequal relations often tilted in favour of interviewees. 
(iv) It offers the researcher opportunity to study the ways in which individuals 
collectively make sense of a phenomenon and construct meanings around 
it (Bryman, 2012:504). 
 
This study benefited immensely from many of the benefits of FGD listed above. I was 
able to understand how and why the people feel about issues of equitable resource 
distribution and development in Nigeria. I was equally able to get historical hindsight 
into how resource distribution played out all along and how the people felt about the 
alleged twist and turns over time in the resource distribution formula (see chapter 
two). One practical benefit regarding historical insight into issues under focus is 
when the people had to vote on issue of leadership and governance between 1960 
and 1991 raised in chapter six (see table 6.12). 
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While all these are benefits associated with FGD, challenges do exist too. These 
include: 
 
(i) Possibility of being misled by participants that may want to vent unrelated 
anger at the expense of issue under focus. 
(ii) Possibility of losing control of the discussion especially if the group is fairly 
large and ill-informed about the topic.  
(iii) Possibility of getting misleading information that’s difficult to qualify and as 
such, unrewarding. 
(iv) Focus groups give depth and insight, but cannot produce useful numerical 
results, (Gill et all, 2008 and Morgan, 1998). 
 
In some instances, some of the sessions went out of my immediate control 
especially when sensitive issues were under focus. This had to do with the 
willingness of participants to air their views which encroached into scheduled time for 
that session. Systematically moderating time by limiting response time, enable me 
overcome this. In similar scenarios, some responses appeared misleading as they 
came contrary to known facts about issues under focus. Such seemingly misleading 
pieces of information were validated against available secondary data equally used 
for this study. Despite these flaws associated with FDG, it was undertaken to 
generate data for this study.  
 
4.4.1 Conducting Focus Groups: Group Composition and Size 
Embarking on a FGD has no standard composition of participants. What counts 
according to Gill et all (2008) is the ability to get “an impactful group mix”. To this 
end, it is vital that the researcher achieves a good mix of ages, gender and social 
ranks of participants who interact well. This leaves the researcher with the option of 
either working with an existing group which is easier to do or recruiting a new one to 
facilitate the discussion on chosen topic. 
 
I worked with existing groups in the course of the FGD done for this study. 
Participants that included community leaders, youth and women groups, non-
governmental organizations, civil society groups, development scholars and opinion 
leaders, were drawn from communities/cities exposed to oil exploration in the study 
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area mentioned in chapter one. Ethical consideration forbids me from listing these 
here. A total of twelve (12) FGD sessions were successfully carried out in the 
selected areas. Roughly 4-9 participants were in attendance in all except two that 
had 12 in attendance. The FDG was used as a pre-test to the questionnaires that 
were later distributed (see the section below).  
 
4.4.2 Preparing an interview schedule 
Two principles suggested by Stewart and Shamdasani (1990) guided me in 
preparing the interview schedule for the FGD. These are the principles of asking 
questions from general to more speciﬁc questions, and that of question order being 
relative to vital research objectives. Both principles do conflict though and when this 
happens, a trade-off of one is inevitable. For instance, in two of the FGD conducted, 
discussion evolved in a manner that made it difficult for me to to achieve 
predetermined research objectives as less focused discussions ensued. Discussions 
were however fruitful in some instances with several of the sessions taped, except 
three where it taping was objected to. Notes were however taken. Like happened to 
the interview data, the discussions were transcribed immediately after each session 
with relevant point linked to the research question(s) they addressed. The next 
section considers questionnaire administration. 
 
4.5 USE OF QUESTIONAIRE 
Questionnaires are ‘tools’ for collecting and recording information about a particular 
issue of interest in a research. It is usually made up of list of questions with 
instructions on how it should be answered as well as space provided for such 
answers. They are used on a significant portion of a population. Matthews and Ross 
(2008) defined a questionnaire as “a set of questions which can be answered by the 
research participants in a set of ways”. In most cases, questionnaires are designed 
to gather already structured data since they include a set of answers that respondent 
are expected to choose answers from. When this is the case, it is called structured or 
closed questionnaire. On the other hand, questionnaires may also come with open 
questions that make it flexible enough for respondents to answer questions posed to 
them in their own way. This is what Bryman (2012) called unstructured 
questionnaire.  As a data gathering technique, questionnaires come with clear 
objectives that are often times tailored to suit that of the larger research. The 
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researcher is expected to determine how the questions are drawn to generate 
relevant and impactful data for his/her study. This study used both structured and 
unstructured questionnaire type. It was subdivided into sections one and two with the 
former structured questions being used to get comparable response from 
respondents while the latter less structured questions were used to give 
respondents’ freedom to air their views. 
 
As data generating technique in qualitative research, the use of questionnaires is 
believed to be beneficial in many ways. Besides been able to reach large number of 
people, the use of questionnaire generates anonymous responses that mean the 
respondent has less fear of responding honestly. Responses from questionnaires 
are equally easy to standardise and analyse since they are oftentimes structured to 
achieve a particular goal by the researcher.  While these among others are some of 
the merits of questionnaire, it is vital to note that low response rate may arise which 
could affect the research. Responses may also be inaccurate, thus unimpactful. I 
was fortunate to get meaningful responses that impacted this study immensely since 
they were standardised to elicit relevant data for the study. 
 
4.5.1 Questionnaire Administration, Collection and Collation 
Questionnaires for the target sample size of 3000 respondents from the study area 
were administered using simple random sampling technique, (See appendix). 
According to Ogbeide (1997:35), the simple random sampling technique “is a type of 
sampling technique in which the elements or units of the population have an equal 
probability or chance of being selected”. In similar vein, David and Sutton (2011) see 
simple random sampling as “a selection based on a mathematical formula that will 
consistently give all units an equal chance of being selected”. I adopted this 
technique because it is fair and unbiased since no item or part of the sampling frame 
has any advantage over any other in pursuing representation in the sample. 
Consequently, five hundred questionnaires were randomly administered in each of 
these six states in the study area. Out of this, two thousand, five hundred and thirty 
one were retrieved with one hundred and five (105) invalids. Because it was 
randomly distributed, gender balance was taken care of while age was addressed 
with the decision to distribute only to adults irrespective of ethnic background 
provided they are residents in the study areas. 
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4.5.2 Executing the task 
The task of administering 3000 questionnaire was enormous as time and resources 
are required to get it done. To this end, I sought helping in distribution and retrieval 
of questionnaires. In total, twelve (12) research assistants were engaged, two in 
each state. Questionnaires were dropped off, completed by respondents, and 
collected thereafter. This was the case in the twenty (20) communities in each state 
where roughly twenty five (25) questionnaires were distributed, meaning that each 
state had the potential of generating 500 respondents. The actual number of 
retrieved questionnaires is shown in table 4.3 below  
 
Engaging research assistant in this manner paid off, except one that failed to retrieve 
all the distributed questionnaires, thus leading to a shortfall in the volume of data 
expected from those sampled with the questionnaire. Consequently, additional 
information was sourced from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that are 
focused on the resource management and development in Nigeria. In this respect, 
the Environmental Right Action (ERA) and Centre for the Protection of the 
Environment and Development, (CEPED) were contacted in the course of the 
survey. Information relating to the development index and role of politicians in the 
developmental challenges of selected regions/states, formed bulk of information 
collected from them. This was validated with the data collected from administered 
questionnaires as well as a dataset from the Afrobarometer on Nigeria. (See 
www.afrobarometer.com/nigeria). As previously noted, table 4.3 below, clearly 
outlined the questionnaire distribution pattern with respect to sex of respondents as 
well as the degree of response vis-à-vis retrieval. 
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Table 4.3: Questionnaire Distribution Out-Lay and Outcome 
 
SOURCE: Field Survey 2013 
 
4.5.3 Data Presentation and Analysis   
Like the information obtained from both interview and FGD, data from retrieved 
questionnaires were analysed using Excel spread sheets to place responses into 
quantifiable groups. I then employed simple percentage and charts to illustrate the 
results. In addition, subsequent paragraphs will briefly describe how collated data 
are analysed. Before we delve into details, it’s important we note that analysis of 
relevant data for this study would be a going concern. By this, I mean relevant data, 
would be analysed at each point (at the point of treating them) to draw out its 
relevance to the study with reference made to the related hypothesis among the 
ones adopted for this study. In the meantime, the method adopted to analyse data 
for this study is discussed below. 
 
Analysis of data for this study depends on data type. However, use of multivariate 
analytical tools available in SPSS, are employed. In specifics, primary data obtained 
from the survey conducted as well as the ones obtained from the Afrobarometer, are 
 
S/n 
 
State 
 
People 
sampled 
 
Category of 
respondents by 
sex 
 
No 
retriev
ed 
 
No of 
valid 
 
No of 
invalid
s 
 
Unretrieved 
questionnair
es 
 
Sub-
total 
1. Delta 
 men 267      
479 
500 Women 212 479 464 15 21 
2. 
 
Edo 
 men 239      
417 
500 Women 178 417 390 27 83 
3. Lagos 
 men 279      
421 500 Women 142 421 411 10 79 
4. Ogun 
 men 251      
399 500 Women 148 399 380 19 101 
5. Ondo 
 men 223      
403 500 Women 180 403 381 22 97 
6. Rivers 
 men 220      
412 500 women 192 412 400 12 88 
Total  3000  2,531 2,531 2,426 105 469 2, 531 
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analysed using statistical tools use of Anova and chi-square to establish both degree 
of significance and that of relationship that exists between the dependent and 
independent variables. To make the work easy and straight forward, key variables of 
relevance in the Afrobarometer, would been re-configured. For example, to aptly 
measure degree of poverty, variables that directly address issue of poverty, would be 
grouped together and given a new code/name to reflect poverty. Similar thing would 
equally be done to variable such as ethnicity and educational development. The 
recodes, makes it easy for comparison across both zones so as to establish 
significant differences.  
 
Another analytical tool used is simple percentage (%) that help mirrored number of 
people that responded to questions thrown at them on the subject matter of the 
study. consequently, associated hypothesis are measured on the basis of expressed 
percentage rather than lumping all together in an analysis chapter, (See chapters 
five and six). The use of simple percentage (%) was embraced because of its 
simplistic and descriptive nature in giving meaning to complex mass of data. We use 
the formula shown below, to compute percentage (%).  
 
% = PC/N X 100/1  
Where  
% = arithmetic sign of simple percentage      
  PC = Percentage of compliance 
    N = Total number of subjects (respondents) 
  100 = Common percentage base 
 
On the other hand, the chi-square (x2) as a non-parametric statistical technique often 
used to analyse contingency tables in which two nominal-scale variables can be 
cross-tabulated to know observed frequencies. According to Ogbeide, (1996), Chi-
square test relationship between two categorical variables.  
 
To use the chi-square (x2) to test an association between variables, certain steps are 
followed systematically. These include: 
 
(i) Statements of hypothesis (H0 and H1} 
(ii) Tabulation of data  
(iii) Calculation of expected frequencies  
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(iv) Computation of chi-square   
(v) Degree of freedom  
(vi) Research Decision  
(vii) Research Result 
(viii) Interpretation of chi-square result 
 
Chi-square (x2) can be computed using the formula given below.   
 n 
X2 =   (fo – fe)2 
        i-1 fe 
Where: 
(i) X2 = Symbolizes chi-square  
(ii) Fo = Frequencies observed  
(iii) Fe = Frequencies expected  
(iv) = Sigma sign meaning sum up (Ogbeide 1997) 
 
4.6 TRIANGULATION AND DATA VALIDITY  
 
Triangulation 
Triangulation entails combining multiple research methods to carry out a particular 
study. Denzin (1978:291) defined the concept as "the combination of methodologies 
in the study of the same phenomenon.” The essence of triangulation is simply enable 
a researcher overcome weakness associated with a particular/single research method. 
Triangulation occurs at multiple levels in research. As Hussein, (2009), noted, it 
occurs at either at the data collection level (data triangulation), method or theoretical 
levels (method or theoretical triangulation respectively).  Other forms of triangulation 
he noted include investigator triangulation. The use of any of these depends on the 
nature of the particular research and envisaged outcome. When this is the case, a 
researcher(s) can then confirm information he/she/they may obtain from one source 
with what the other would give. 
 
Since qualitative research relies on elite interviewing, it is vital that one utilize as 
many alternative primary sources as possible to augment shortfalls earlier noted to 
be associated with this method. As Davies (2001:77) noted, “alternative primary 
sources are not always available and in a number of cases, interview data may be 
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the only form of data available, or interview data coupled to information from 
secondary sources.” This thesis, therefore, combined primary sources (interviews, 
FGD, questionnaires and documentary sources) with “published secondary-sourced 
information used in cautious reserve” (Davies, 2001: 78), as illustrated by Figure 4.1. 
Thus, an attempt was made to cross-reference between and within the data sources. 
Triangulation between interviews was aided by the fact that the interviewees came 
from three different groups and thus have contrasting perspectives.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A minimum of two independent interview sources has been recommended to be 
sought before an item can be dealt with in real confidence, (Davies, 2001:78). Doing 
this enable one improve reliability of information obtained and as such, validate 
them. However, Davies’ recommendation was not practicable considering nature of 
the study area. It made it not feasible to interview two people in the same locality 
since spread is required to get representative views as much as possible. The use of 
both FGD and questionnaire, helped achieve the spread though. All information 
obtained, were synchronized to ascertain conformity. This helped to boost reliability 
of the data and as such, validated the data obtained. 
 
It is vital to note that elite interview and the focus group discussion that preceded the 
administration of the questionnaires strengthened the reliability of the questionnaires. 
Answering carefully prepared questions, respondents knowledgeable in the study 
 
Interview/FG                                    Questionnaire  
   Documents 
Secondary     
Sources 
Adapted/modified from: Davis (2001: 78) 
Figure 4.1: Triangulation sources 
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area spoke eloquently on the issue under study. Fruitful discussion during the 
interview shaped the focus group discussion, which again was used to dictate the 
issues raised in the questionnaires. Both the in-depth interview and focus group 
discussion can be likened to a pilot study where questionnaires were administered to 
respondents prior to deployment. This aided the validity of the instruments as there 
was an inbuilt mechanism to cross-check facts presented at any point. 
 
4.6.1 Other Validation Strategies 
In addition to triangulation, other strategies exist that can be deployed to validate 
research data. Critical realists usually adopt a critical posture towards interviews and 
documents since they believe that interpretation of social phenomena create 
observations, theories and thus knowledge of the world that are capable of giving 
incorrect account of the effects of behaviour and structures. In this study, I employed 
the strategies to augment the integrity of the research and to validate the data 
produced as a detached critic. 
 
As previously noted, elite interviewing has its share of challenges that affect data 
derivable from it. Consequently, while interpreting data generated from it, I realized 
that it represented a subjective account of the interviewees’ memories or 
impressions (Seldon, 1988:14). Interviewees could wilfully falsify their accounts to it 
make sound good since interviews never establish truths but often “an 
unsophisticated positivist manner.” (Richards, 1996:200). Interviews were employed 
in this study to determine motives, drivers and perceptions of the actors involved in 
the management of oil wealth and development processes in Nigeria. To this end, 
information interviewees supplied were treated as construction of their social world 
and not as factual accounts and as such, I considered what the respondents said 
and the reasons behind this, rather than accepting what they said as absolute truth. 
In all, adequate background checks on the happenings in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry and preparation, helped me to identify and recognise statements that 
appear misleading since my awareness of the vocabulary that interviewees may 
likely use was heightened. Adequate preparation helped me interpret remarks 
(Manheim and Rich, 1981:134; Phillips, 1998:16) and also helped improve my 
questioning ability and make same less deferential and naive. 
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My role in the interview is thus important and needs consideration to determine how 
it affected information derived from interviewees. Due to the high calibre of 
individuals involved in the interviews, I was initially nervous. This affected my ability 
to build trust and needed rapport to shape events as they unfold. Though some of 
the interviewees were equally nervous as thoughts of what to expect possibly 
enveloped them, my stability and ability to shape things matters a lot. In this light, I 
did a self-reflection while interpreting derived data from the interview. This enabled 
me to summarise findings at the end of the interviews especially on how I felt and my 
relationship with the interviewee. 
 
The final issue on data validity has to do with the possibility if my misinterpreting 
interviewees’ comments either in the FGD or one-to-one elite settings. This appears 
real in cases where only notes were taken. I was able to overcome this by taking 
notes alongside the taping of interviews and this acted as a validation process since 
it helped highlight possible differences between the recording and notes taken. 
Observed differences made it clear that accurate notes taking alongside recording 
was not possible as recorded interviews can either be misinterpreted or 
misrepresented. Therefore, requested, a record of the verbatim transcript or the 
fleshed out notes were sent to concerned interviewee to enable them respond if they 
felt misinterpreted or had something new to add or remove due to new development 
or change of mind as the case maybe. This provided an opportunity for me to ask 
follow up questions on issues I felt needed clarification, (Burnham et al., 2004:216). 
Two of the interviewees that requested for the transcripts, were satisfied with the 
records. 
 
4.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The issue of ethics in social research has to do with behaviour of the researcher in 
relation to other humans he/she may encounter in the course of his/her research. 
Ethical consideration is common in social research since it entails involvement of 
human beings and the use of information that can infringe on their privacy. That is 
why it is important that once a researcher establishes that his/her study entails 
human involvement, they should give due consideration to ethical concerns, 
especially when the research outcome may impact the research participants. 
According to Matthews and Ross, (2010), the ability of the researcher to pay 
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attention to the potential impact of his research on participants by considering ethical 
issues, “sign-posts honesty and care of the researcher”,  
 
Ethical considerations for this thesis were given priority because of the need to 
protect interest of participants in the study. I consequently sought and obtained 
ethical approval from relevant authorities in both University of Exeter, United 
kingdom and Nigeria to embark on the survey exercise for this study (see attached 
ethics certificate in the appendix section). As expected in ethical issues, , 
participants in the interviews were made to understand that the information supplied 
might be used in academic publications. This was done primarily to protect my 
integrity as a researcher (Ostander, 1995:139-140). Prior information of what the 
information may be used for, enabled interviewees decide to either participate or 
want their contribution attributed to them or simply for their contribution to be used 
anonymously.. Most of those spoken to, wished to remain anonymous while two had 
no issue ascribing their inputs to them. Some officials assured of a more honest 
answers if their name or department were to remain anonymous. This played out in 
the writing-up phase as ‘unattributable’ data made it difficult. However, where key 
statements are made that needed to be attributed to an author, I was able to 
negotiate with the interviewees concerned. 
 
The final ethical consideration entails intentions of the researched. For instance, was 
the information they supplied misleading or biased in order to pursue their own 
agenda? For example, if an official criticises another department on its performance, 
is this criticism genuine, is it concerned with a long term conflict on another issue, or 
is it a ploy to show their department or their role in a better light? These issues 
required careful and sensitive handling, to which some of the strategies outlined in 
the earlier section on triangulation and data validity were ideally suited. 
 
4.8 CASE SELECTION 
With the overriding objective of examining the effect of oil resources on Nigeria’s 
development on regional basis, it is vital that we consider issue of case selection and 
its benefits. As noted in chapter one, the use of two regions as case study research 
in this thesis is to use them as probes to examine “extent of regional development 
disparity in the face of oil wealth” and to explain role of elites in the face of resource 
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curse thesis which has been argued to shape development in Nigeria (Obi, 2011). 
Therefore, this section outlines and justifies the selection of the regions used to 
provide a more in-depth examination of oil management and regional development in 
Nigeria that chapters five and six sufficiently dealt with. 
 
Case study in research enables one carry out an empirical enquiry that “investigates 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, (Yin, 2003:13). This is often 
the case when boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident. This 
study adopted case study with the sole aim of examining the relationship between oil 
wealth and development in Nigeria on regional basis. This comparative study aim at 
establishing how workings of state institutions, shape resource management and 
development process across both national and regional frontiers, laying bare the 
extent to which  political and bureaucratic structures shape resource management 
and development process to generate regional development in Nigeria. To 
understand the complex social phenomena, there is need to use case study so as to 
be able to establish holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events.  This is 
because it allows a researcher to employ a full spectrum of methods, including 
documentary analysis, interviewing, FGD and use of questionnaires. 
 
The decision to choose a case must never be done before knowing what it means as 
well as the number of cases to be chosen. Though standard quantitative research 
espouses principle of ‘more is better’, (Peters, 1998a:58), qualitative research has a 
different strategy since large number may prove impractical as generalisation may 
arise therefrom. Consequently, Peters (1998a:59) cautioned that a small but 
representative number of cases be taken for a study. For this reason, this study 
selected two case studies to examine the subject of oil wealth and development on 
regional basis in Nigeria. The following sections discuss population and sample 
frame for the study. 
 
4.8.1 Population of the Study 
Population of any study according to Babbie (1992:98) is “the theoretically specified 
aggregation of study elements”. This means specified number of element meant to be 
studied or “every possible case that could be included in your study” (David and 
Sutton (2011). Driving this home and as already explained in chapter one, the 
 114 
 
population of this study is two regions in the southern part of Nigeria. These are the 
South-South and South-West regions. From these, a sample frame of three states in 
each region is randomly selected. The sample frame is usually derived from the 
study population. The 2006 census figure put Nigeria at 144 million people, (FoS, 
2005:10). Table 4.4 below shows regional population break down. 
 
TABLE 4.4: Zonal Population Distribution: National 
 
Geo-political Zone Population figure 
South East 16,381,729 
North East 18,971,965 
South-South 21,014,655 
North West 35,786,944 
South West 27,581,992 
North Central 20,266,257 
Total 140,003,542 
 
SOURCE: Source: Culled From Official Gazette of Feb. 2nd, 2009, No.2 Vol. 96, 
Pages B24-B40 
 
4.8.2 Sample Size 
As noted above, the population of this study includes all residents in three oil bearing 
states of the South-South region of the Niger Delta and three others in the South 
West region of Nigeria. A total sample frame of six states forms the sample size of 
this study. The states covered in the South-South include Delta, Edo and Rivers 
states while Ondo, Ogun and Lagos states, are covered in the South West region. 
These states are selected to serve as model to represent the two selected regions 
since vast size of both, will not allow adequate coverage. They share similarities in 
the level of urban-rural spread with similar geographical terrains. These states will 
help ascertain the extent to which oil wealth has affected the life of ordinary people 
since its discovery and exploration in 1956 and 1958 respectively. To do this, basic 
indicators such as means of livelihood, per capita incomes and human development 
index are studied from 2000 to 2011 in comparative terms to determine which geo-
political zone is better off with or without oil wealth.  
 
 
 115 
 
Table 4.5: Zonal Population Figures: SS and SW 
 
Geo-political Zone Population figure 
South-South 21,014,655 
South West 27,581,992 
Total 48,596,647 
 
Source: Extracted from 2006 Census figures 
 
Empirical findings from each region are examined in both chapters five and six. 
Before concluding this methological section, I briefly locate myself in the web of this 
research by stating my position in relation to both drive to undertake the study and 
position in the light of the research findings 
 
4.9 POSITIONALITY: 
Epistemological discourse in research, of necessity needs clarification on position of 
the researcher. That is why it is vital that a researcher make known his/her position 
in relation to study being undertaken to establish where personal interest lies. This 
helps mitigate possible effect of researcher’s bias since “positionality represents a 
space in which objectivism and subjectivism meet”, Bourke (2014:3). As the unique 
experience that situates researchers in their studies, personality help one realise 
how possible personal idiosyncrasies impact upon objectivity in research..  
 
This study aimed at finding plausible explanation to the development challenges 
facing the Nigerian state and the Niger Delta region in particular in the face of oil 
exploration, and is purely an academic exercise. Efforts were made, through 
findings, to measure the impact of oil exploration on regional development in Nigeria 
through the lens provided by the economic life of the people of the study frame in the 
adopted regions for the study. This was done with a view to ascertaining the 
developmental position of the regions in the face of oil exploration. As previously 
noted, the study is purely an academic exercise with no commercial strings. It was 
driven by my desire to explain the lack of development in the Niger Delta and not 
prompted by either government or any commercial interest.  
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My immediate interest on this topic, stems from ‘age-long yearning’ to find out why 
development appears to elude my country and in particular the oil bearing region of 
the Delta in the face of oil resources that heightened the hope of speedy 
development in the region.   
 
4.10 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter discussed and justified the methodological approach used in this thesis. 
Added to that, the chapter was able to achieve the following.  Firstly, it established 
that this research leans on critical realist research philosophy anchored on a mixed 
methodological and multi-theoretical approach. 
 
Secondly, the choice of elite interview, FGD and use of structured and unstructured 
questionnaires to elicit relevant data for the study was justified as the main 
methodologies that were used for this research. Elite interview and FGD were 
employed to tap the perceptions of people that have good knowledge of the workings 
of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria as well as the resource management and 
development process. Further documentary research was done to gather secondary 
data to support the results gained from the primary data collection methods. 
Triangulation and other validation strategies were followed in order to minimise some 
of the possible difficulties associated with the different methods employed. 
 
Thirdly, this chapter outlined possible ethical issues associated with my research. 
These were the issues of interviewee anonymity and the use of the data they 
supplied. These concerns required me to reach an agreement with each interviewee 
at the beginning of the interview. This assured participants of my sincerity and 
convinced them of my seriousness.  
 
Finally the case selection was explained and justified. The selection of two regions to 
explain impact of oil wealth on regional development as case studies was based on 
the findings of an extensive literature review (see chapter two and three). Both 
regions were selected to serve as explanatory variables to put issue of how oil 
wealth impacts regional development in Nigeria into perspective.  
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Having outlined the methodological strategies employed to conduct this research, 
chapter five looks at regional development in Nigeria. It traces the historical 
trajectory of development in Nigeria. While considering the pre-oil economies in the 
regions, the chapter argues that though things were not significantly better 
economically before oil, the positives of oil revenue allegedly failed to trickle down to 
the regions to enhance development efforts. The chapter ended with statement on 
positionality; where my position in relation to intent of the research and eventual 
findings, was made known to be neutral since it was purely an academic exercise 
devoid of commercial interest.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 118 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapters two and three laid the foundational discourse of the Nigerian 
developmental situation. It was demonstrated how the nation lack development in 
the face of abundant resource wealth. As earlier noted, there is a development 
disparity at the regional levels in Nigeria. Building on this issue, this fifth chapter and 
the sixth, will consider core issues of regional development in Nigeria and causes of 
regional underdevelopment or otherwise respectively. For clarity, this chapter begins 
with consideration of economy of the regions prior to discovery of oil and what 
shapes the development narratives in the post oil regional development discourse.  
To this end, focus will be on the regional resource governance system and how this 
helped or discouraged development at the regional level with both South-South and 
South-West regions as focal point since both constitute the area of interest of this 
study. To do this, focus is on the regional economic development in Nigeria since 
independence as well as the intricate political dynamics that shapes regional 
development all placed within the broader national context.  
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Origin of the present regional arrangement in Nigeria today can be traced to the pre-
colonial era where several ethnic and linguistic groups that make the Nigerian 
society such as Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, Ibo, Urhobo, and Jukun, among several 
others, existed. With distinct cultural and political systems, these groups had unique 
form of relationship is believed to have been built around trade. The emergence of 
the Nigerian state via the 1914 amalgamation of Northern and Southern 
protectorates administered by the British colonial authorities, led to the creation of 
three regions. These were the Northern, Western and Eastern regions. This tripartite 
regional arrangement which subsisted till 1954 when a federal system of government 
was adopted, gave way due to political pressure in 1960 that led to the creation of 
the mid-western region to give the country four regional structures. The existence of 
these regional arrangements engendered subtle competition that helped to some 
degree the development at the regional level as there was conscious effort to 
develop indigenous productivity with commercial value. 
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For example, the then Northern, Western and Eastern regions, had groundnut, 
cocoa and palm oil respectively that ushered in some measures of development in 
those regions. These cash crops, served as the main stay of the economy. At this 
material point in time the revenue sharing formula adopted was that of derivation 
principle where revenue generating regions, retained an agreed percentage for their 
own use and development. The derivation principle at this time, favoured the various 
regions from where these products were derived. Due to the huge resources 
available to the regions, they became very powerful such that central control over 
them became difficult (Ikeanyibe 2013). Inevitable rivalry between the regions and 
the centre brought great political instability that cumulated in a military coup in 1966. 
Subsequent events after the coup, led to the 1967 Nigerian 30 months civil war, 
Arowolo (2011). 
 
The ensuing military regime, in a bid to reduce the power of the regions, created 12 
states out of the existing structure in 1967. This was increased to 19 in (1976), 21 in 
(1987), 30 in (1991) and 36 in (1996) (Suberu 1995). With time, these states were 
made to cover six geo-political zones that can be likened to the previous regional 
arrangement that hitherto existed. The six geo-political zones otherwise called 
regions include North Central, North East, North West, South East, South West and 
South-South. The military government sought to centralize decision making rather 
than support the federal system, and made the centre so powerful such that it was 
able to shape the derivation dynamics of the country. This period coincided with the 
changed economic focus of the Nigerian state from agrarian economy to that of oil 
dominance. Consequently, the sharing of revenue was skewed to favour the centre 
at the expense of the regions as the latter depended on the centre to get resources 
for development. This situation created regional development disparity as 
acknowledged by the Nigerian vision 20:2020 development document. The 
document noted lopsided regional developmental strides in the country in a study it 
commissioned to assess extent of national development. The factors that have been 
attributed to this disparity, includes the peculiar environment prevalent in some 
regions but absent in others. For example, desert encroachment and environmental 
degradation in both the North and Niger Delta, are seen as factors besides that of 
rural-urban drift that affects all regions (Teriba 2013). 
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5.2 ISSUES DRIVING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT NARRATIVES 
One issue that has attracted robust attention since Nigeria achieved political 
independence in 1960 is that of underdevelopment. While the narratives that shape 
the Nigerian developmental discourse have largely been woven around many factors 
such as corruption (Obi, 2010, Nwabuzor, 2006, Shaxson, 2007), and a relatively 
imbalance federal system (Ikeji, 2011), investigations of the efforts made at situating 
the nation’s development along regional lines in comparative terms, are far and few 
between. At best, the existing literature has only addressed aspects of the key 
issues in isolation. The works of Ikelegbe (2005, 2007 and 2013), (Omeje, 2006), 
(Obi, 2010), (Watts, 2012) among others on the Niger Delta, presented ample 
platform to understand extent of regional development challenges in Nigeria, 
especially the oil bearing region. In similar vein, little is written in the existing 
literature on development in other regions. In terms of the South Western region little 
research has been conducted about its economic development let alone comparing 
same with any other region in the country. The introductory chapter of this study 
explained why focus is on both regions which among other things, put regional 
development in context in the face of revenue accumulations to both regions from 
the oil resources in the Delta. Omonona’s (2010) analysis of rural poverty in Nigeria 
failed largely to capture all that is needed to achieve a regional comparative study. 
For instance, mention was not made of the class differentials which would have 
place role of the middle class in the development process in the right perspectives. 
In similar vein, mention was not equally made of urban verses rural poverty and drift 
from the latter to the former. National poverty index goes beyond rural poverty; it 
must entail consideration of salient issues as would be seen in subsequent 
paragraphs that can put issue of regional development in the right perspectives. 
There thus the need to put issue of regional development in perspectives. 
 
The situation of the various regions in development terms in Nigeria is clearer if seen 
with the lens provided by the larger Nigerian state. As earlier mentioned, the kind of 
centralized federal system the Nigerian state operates, mean that regional 
development is tied to the actions of central government (Agagu 2013). Hierarchical 
control at the centre as Agagu noted, negatively affects public policy that leaves 
development planning skewed against the regions. In some political contexts such 
as Nigeria, federalism is expected to operate in a manner that the federating units 
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would have space to pursue policies to achieve public good. The reverse appears to 
be the case in Nigeria following the skewed federal structure that was later to shape 
regional development due to the patronage politics extensively discussed in chapter 
six of this study. Imhanlahimi (2000:57) had earlier drawn attention to the 
exclusionary planning practice that the nation embraces at the expense of both the 
people and the regions that once served as centres of development immediately 
after political independence. As noted in chapter two, where reasons were given for 
why development plans fail in Nigeria, there is little involvement on the part of the 
people in formulating and implementation of development plans. Consequently, 
people feel alienated from the planning process and thus, deny whatever plan 
initiated, the needed support for it to succeed. Alienation of the people from the 
planning process, also had regional dimension as the centralized state system, give 
little room for regions to plan developmental processes. Because of this, region 
based development initiatives, featured not necessarily to birth development since 
the central government overshadows the process (Ikeji, 2011) but simply to give the 
regions a sense of belonging (Teriba, 2013). 
 
The account of regional development through planning pathways given by Jelili et al 
(2008), noted a dearth of tangible plans at the regional level capable of driving the 
process of development. In similar vein, (Aigbokhan, 2008) drew attention to the 
inherent inequalities that exist across the various regions. What this means and seen 
from history, is that efforts made at regional levels to bring about desired 
development, differs from what is seen at the centre. For example, immediately after 
independence, the various regions pursued disparate educational policies, which 
were different from that pushed by the centre based on the resources available to 
them. As Teriba (2013) observed, “regional growth incidence has been primarily 
dependent on regional resource endowments”. This brings the central role available 
resources played and still play in regional development to the fore. In a sense, the 
nation’s development drive captured in Vision 20:2020, acknowledged the crucial 
role resources would play in each region to facilitate national development. Vision 
20:2020 is an official development plan of the Nigerian state that hope to revamp the 
economy and make the nation among the 20 most developed nations in the world by 
the year 2020. The vision in this respect, recorded resources found in each region 
and projected possible areas of strength of each reminiscent of the comparative 
 122 
 
advantage doctrine found in economics that allows nations to major in areas of their 
productive strength.  
 
Data from Nigerian Vision 2020 shows extent to which resources at the regional 
level, can aid the developmental process – see Table 5.1 below. The question one is 
prompted to ask at this juncture is, how the regions faired in the face of resources 
available to them? Is there disparity in the development of these regions? In 
subsequent paragraphs, focus would be on the regions with a view to ascertaining 
their extent of the development within the larger Nigerian state. 
 
Table 5.1 Regional Resource Base and Areas of Comparative Advantage 
 
 
SOURCE: Nigeria Vision NV20:2020, PAGE 15 
 
The implication of the above table is the primacy of regional economies to both 
regional and national development. It is then important to first pay attention to the 
resource endowment of the regions as well as their complex political economies and 
how same spurn development or otherwise. Subsequent sections deals with the 
economies of the regions with South-South and South West as focus point. 
 
5.3 ECONOMY OF THE SOUTH-SOUTH REGION 
As noted in the introductory chapter, the South-South geo-political zone in Nigeria 
forms the bulk of the Niger Delta region. It is the original geographical definition of 
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. This clarification becomes necessary because of 
            REGIONAL                           SPECIALIZATION 
S/N REGION PRODUCTS 
1 North East Processed minerals, ethanol, Biodiesel, Cement, Fruit Juices 
2 North West Processed Meat, Leather goods, Bio fuels 
3 North Central Cut granite, Furniture, Processed , Cotton fabrics 
4 South East Over the counter drugs, Leather goods, Garments, Palm oil 
5 South West Plastics, Garments, General goods 
6 South-South Petrochemicals (refined oil), Fertilizers, Plastics, Oil services 
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the varied definition that people give the Niger Delta region. While the geographical 
definition of the region sees it as the  ‘largest wetland in Africa and the third largest in 
the world consisting of flat low lying swampy terrain that is criss-crossed by 
meandering and anastomosing streams, rivers and creeks” (Emoyan et al, 2008). 
Political definition of the Niger Delta goes beyond geographical dimension as non-
geographical Niger Delta states were included to strike political balance. In this 
sense, states such as Ondo, Abia and Imo, which are not in the geographical Niger 
Delta, were included. Tamuno and Edoumiekumo (2012) traced this development to 
the politics associated with the creation of interventionist agency with the 
responsibility of addressing the developmental needs of the Oil bearing region. As 
previously noted, the South-South zone is interchangeably used with the Niger Delta 
that houses the oil belt of the Nigerian state. The region is situated in the southern 
part of Nigeria and bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the south and to the East by 
Cameroon. The region occupies a surface area of about 112,110 square kilometres, 
representing about 12% of Nigeria's total surface area, (Niger Delta Master plan, 
2000:49). An estimated population figure of over 28 million inhabitants was projected 
in the 2006 census exercise. 
 
In terms of economy, the region has a rich historical past that can be seen from the 
prism of both pre oil and the oil era. Like most regions in Nigeria, the South-South 
region has rich economic history prior to both independence and discovery of oil. 
The region has history of agricultural production that transcended colonial Nigeria 
until oil was discovered in commercial quantities in 1956. It is for this reason that the 
analysis of the economy of the South-South region will be outlined in historical 
phases. The first phase of our analysis would be the pre-oil era where the economic 
activities of the region will be considered briefly. The next will consider both the oil 
the post oil economy of the region, focusing on the analysis of the impact of oil 
exploration on the once agrarian economy that existed in the region. Table two 
below, captures the economic activities that existed in the region before oil was 
discovered in commercial quantities to pave way for its exploration thereafter. 
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Table 5.2: Primary Economic Activities of the Region before oil in 1956 
 
Type of 
activities 
% of people 
involved 
% Rural/Urban 
ratio 
% Contribution to 
development 
  
MEN WOMEN Rural Urban 
  
Farming 
 
49 54 15:20 05:20 65 
 
Fishing 
 
82 37 17:6 6:17 47 
 
Forestry 
 
68 21 16:8 8:16 55 
 
Trading 
 
56 79 13:5 5:13 71 
 
Civil service 
job  
67 47 11:7 7:11 27 
 
Services 
 
79 81 9:18 18:9 52 
 
Craft works 
 
91 49 16:12 16:12 69 
 
 
SOURCE: Researcher’s compilation based on Ikelegbe (2013b) 
 
From Table 5.2 above, the agrarian nature of the region before oil discovery in 
commercial quantities appear evident. This can be seen in the kind of activities that 
the region embraced. These included farming and other life sustaining activities not 
done in commercial scale. There is thus the need to focus on some the activities 
seen in the table above with a view to ascertaining how each affect the region in 
development terms. 
 
5.4 THE SOUTH-SOUTH REGION BEFORE OIL 
Various accounts available today such as that of Ikelegbe (2013b), Jack-Akhigbe 
(2013) and (Oviasuyi and Uwadiae (2010) of the South-South region show that prior 
to the 1956 discovery of oil in commercial quantity, the region was mainly dominated 
by agricultural activities in varying scales. According to Ikelegbe (2013b), the region 
engaged in primary production with over 80% of the population actively involved in 
agro-allied activities such as subsistence farming, fishing, forestry, as well as 
traditional craft industries. In similar vein, Tamuno and Edoumiekumo, (2012) 
attributed wide spread agricultural practice in pre-oil South-South region to soil 
fertility seen in the rich coastland of the region. Sofiri, (2010) however differed by 
contending that agriculture was never an exclusive preserve of the South-South 
region in the economy that existed prior to oil discovery. He argued that it was a 
national phenomenon where agriculture was the main pre-occupation prior to oil 
discovery. Implied in Sofiri’s contention is the fact that pre-oil economic activities of 
the South-South, never impacted the nation’s economy in any significant way other 
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than the self-sustenance of the region. Available literatures support this claim, as 
other sections of the country also participated in the agro-based economy that kept 
the nation afloat economically. According to Philips (1985), agriculture employed 
more than 60% of the national working population and was responsible also for more 
than 60% of national income. This however dropped to mere 20% by 1970 as the oil 
led economy, gathered momentum at the expense of once buoyant agro-led 
economy (Sofiri, 2010). 
 
It is thus imperative that focus should be on the economy of the South-South region 
so as to ascertain how it has fared so far since the oil economy, dominated that 
which once existed before the discovery of oil. Available records show that prior to oil 
discovery, productivity in the South-South region was mainly related to agricultural 
production better seen as both subsistence farming and primary production, (Ibid). 
The largely agrarian society produced what was barely sufficient for them to feed 
and sell the little excess as primary products. Absence of viable manufacturing 
sector is believed to have accounted for the failure of the region to process her 
primary products into finished products to boost local economy and development 
process by extension. Adofu (2010:11) believed this was the situation in virtually all 
the towns, cities, communities and villages that make up the region. Exceptions 
reportedly occurred in cases where some cities such as old Benin, Oghara, Calabar, 
Warri and old Port Harcourt, took up commercial activities such as trading and 
official public work as civil or public servants. In all, one can say that the region prior 
to oil discovery was involved in primary economic activities which were agrarian in 
nature. For clarity, focus in subsequent paragraphs would be on the primary 
economy of the region. 
 
5.4.1 The Primary Economy of the Region 
The picture of the South-South region prior to oil discovery depended on primary 
economy that favoured agriculture. This as noted earlier, was due to the rich 
ecosystem that supported farming in the region. Emoyan et al (2008:29) clearly 
stated this when they observed thus about the region:  
 
“…well-endowed ecosystem, which contains one of the highest 
concentrations of biodiversity on the planet, in addition to 
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supporting the abundant flora and fauna, arable terrain that can 
sustain a wide variety of crops and economic trees, has more 
species of freshwater fish than any ecosystem in West Africa” 
 
The above quote, underscored the rich base of ecological resources of the South-
South region and the Niger Delta by extension. These rich environmental resources 
were closely tied to the resources available to the region which by extension, propel 
over 80% of the people into the primary sector (Ikelegbe, 2013:31). What constituted 
the primary economy of the region included farming, fishing, forestry and traditional 
craft industries. All these activities briefly considered below, relatively thrived 
because of the favourable environmental factors such as fertile soil that facilitated 
them. Farming in relation to the cultivation of crops such as maize and yam for 
instance was embraced and thrived because of the soil fertility that led to high yields 
at the end of the farming season. The same can also be said of fishing because of 
the huge water resources that surround the region. Philips (1985) had observed that 
the favourable environmental conditions aided farming in the days that led to the 
discovery of oil. This accounted for the impressive economic fortune in the 1970s 
(Sofiri, 2010) which Ikelegbe (2013) noted plummeted the moment oil led to the 
development of a more mono-cultural economy for both the nation and the regions 
with the South-South as no exception. What then was the main occupation of the 
Delta population before oil came into the scene, and how did this help the region’s 
developmental drive? 
 
(A) Farming 
As previously noted, agriculture dominated the Niger Delta region prior to the 
discovery of oil in commercial quantity in 1956. The agricultural practices which were 
mainly represented through farming, were both traditional and subsistence. The 
people produced what they could eat and sold the excess that always come because 
of the soil fertility (SV/FGD-1). With individualized farming practices in most of the 
communities surveyed, the farmers cultivated among other relevant crops, the 
following: yam and cassava which they see as staple food; plantain; cocoyam; 
maize; groundnut; fruits such as mango, pineapple; as well as vegetable. Depending 
on the crop involved, the length of cultivation and harvest time varies. For cassava, it 
takes average of 6-9 months to cultivate and harvest. The yields are usually high as 
we earlier noted, the subsistence nature of farming that exist, it is practically difficult 
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to rationalize how such subsistence and primary farming can translate to regional 
development. What can possibly be seen as plausible reason for development 
situation in the region, can be seen in the position taken by Odjugo (2013) when he 
established a negative environmental impact on the oil bearing region of the Delta. 
There is thus the need to carefully examine the salient variables that can help 
explain where the region stood before oil came into the economic equation before a 
link can be drawn to the impact that its exploration has on the region’s development. 
 
(B) Fish Production  
This forms another main economic output of the region prior to the advent of oil. 
Taking to fishing for both consumption and sales, was naturally embraced by people 
of the region because of the favourable wetland environment of the region. The 
ecosystem with a lot of rivers tributaries and deltas leading into the Atlantic Ocean, 
make aqua-cultural activities almost natural to the people. In the region, fish stocks 
thrived in the inshore waters, mangroves, flood plains as well as rivers. Three broad 
categories of fish species according to Ikelegbe (2013:31) were exploited:  coastal 
marine, brackish and fresh water stocks. Harvesting season of these fish was usually 
all year round. As most respondents to the fieldwork survey noted (SV/FGD2), ‘the 
resort to aqua-culture in the region is explicable within the confines of what the 
environment offered”.  
 
(C) Forestry 
The pre-oil Delta region depended partly on forestry and plantation agriculture. Here, 
the huge wild-life available to the region was exploited for both survival and 
economic reasons. According to the Niger Delta master plan (2000), “The Niger 
Delta Region is a rich and diverse mosaic of ecological types”.  The rich ecological 
habitat served the economic and limited commercial needs of the people. For 
example, some of the forest plantations which are privately owned since land 
ownership is on family basis were preserved for socio-cultural and medicinal 
purposes. For the sick, forest herbs were obtained to secure healing. On the other 
hand, matured forest tresses were harvested to serve domestic purposes. In these 
cases, harvested forest trees become source of fire wood and served as the only 
means of heating during the cold seasons. Other uses of forest resources included 
serving the timber needs of the people in constructing of their houses. Other major 
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benefits the people derived from the abundant forest reserves, were the use of wild 
fruits and animal that serves as both source of income and survival. In this case, 
hunters took advantage of the huge forest reserves. 
 
Respondents to the administered questionnaires observed that the population was 
more in harmony with nature before oil induced construction activities which they 
claimed distorted their environment, began. For example, the Otorogun gas plant in 
Ughelli kingdom as huge industrial site is seen by many respondents to have 
distorted the natural environment that existed and supported the ecosystem. As 
expected, the life-sustaining ability of the environment dwindled due to the 
degradation that followed. Low crop yield and stunted growth besides avoidable 
health challenges such as skin cancer due to acid rains are some of the inevitable 
challenges that came with the degradation of the environment (Odjugo, 2013). Other 
loses that came with such huge industrial construction as Ikelegbe (2013:37) noted, 
resulted “from seismic operation of oil installation and gas flaring sites” includes 
artificial flood and golly erosions that threatened live and properties. This led to 
deforestation and a general degradation of the ecosystem, thus exposing soil to 
erosion and leading to gradual destruction of the forest reserves. With this came 
extinction of rare species of animals and annihilation of life-sustaining ability of the 
rain forest that once sustained the people before oil. In addition, Okunomo (2010) 
chronicled uses of various forest products in Nigeria. He noted how oil exploration 
led to extinction of the vast forest reserves in Nigeria, a claim Kadafa (2012) also 
made. 
 
(D) Traditional Industries 
A total of 93% of respondents to the survey instrument administered for this study 
noted that the pre-oil industry in the Niger Delta involved some more activities that 
include services that the people render and get paid for. Things like art and 
traditional craft fall within this category of industry in the pre-oil region. Some other 
activities include carving and building of canoes of various sizes that were sold far 
and wide for a living. In some communities, bead making was also important. 
Though all these were not done in large scale, the people survived based on what 
they were able to earn from it. According to Tamuno and Edoumiekumo (2012), the 
traditional industry, expanded the trade frontiers of the Delta. They however did not 
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specify the extent to which trade was based on traditional industry, expanded the 
development frontiers of the region or the extent of the viability of the trade in the 
region and beyond it. At best, what the traditional industry amounted to before oil 
emerged was nothing but rudimentary primary economy that kept the people afloat 
economically. A good example is the economically viable palm oil business in the old 
Asaba, Akasa and Oghara area of modern Delta state that attracted people from all 
over the nation. There is thus, the need to subject the issue to critical analysis to see 
where the region stands now that there is oil compared to the earlier time. 
 
The picture of the region before oil highlights the economic viability of the region as 
amplified in the self-sufficiency of the population due to the primary economic 
activities available to them (Odjugo, 2013, Tamuno and Edoumiekumo 2012, 
Ikelegbe, 2013). If we take this picture of self-sufficiency in the region before oil into 
consideration, the crucial question that should be critically analysed, is the issue of 
what became of the region in the oil era. Inevitable question of how the ‘self-
sufficiency’ status of the region can change over time and what can be attributable 
for such alteration needs careful analysis.  The next section, considers regional 
position in the oil era. 
  
5.4.2 The Oil Era in the Niger Delta 
Appropriate description of the fortune of the region in the days of oil exploration can 
best be described as poverty ridden. Indeed, in a piece published in 2007, Uyigue 
and Agho, while describing the region, held that the region is poverty stricken due to 
oil exploration. They noted that: 
“The people of the Niger Delta are highly dependent on their 
environment for their source of livelihood. The region has been 
described as the richest wetland in the world and the home of 
numerous species of aquatic and terrestrial plants and animals. 
Before the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta, the people 
depended so much on the resources from their natural 
environment.  They made their living from the exploitation of 
the resources of their land, water and forest as farmers, 
fishermen and hunters. They were attached to their 
environment. The economic activities of the people were soon 
distorted as a result of the environmental degradation caused 
by climate change and exploration and exploitation activities of 
multinational oil companies. These devastating effects on their 
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farmlands, crops, creeks, lakes, economic crops and rivers are 
so severe that the people can no longer engage in productive 
farming, fishing and hunting as they use to do”.  Uyigue and 
Agho (2007:19).  
  
Though the picture both authors painted capture situation of things, they however 
failed to a very large extent, to give detailed account of how individual welfare 
translated to and affects national development. Complete consideration of key issues 
beyond the ‘agriculture for survival before oil mantra’ is therefore needed. 
Consequently in subsequent paragraphs, focus will be on issues such as dynamics 
of regional economies and extent to which education helped the region to achieve 
development. 
 
While the agriculture era lasted in the region, this was not able to bring the region to 
economic reckoning due to the subsistence nature (Obi, 2010). This was to change 
years later as oil deposits were discovered in commercial quantities in the region in 
1956. The oil era in the delta represents a significant period in the national history 
where the economic paradigm shifted drastically from the lands to the rigs. As 
variously reported in the literatures (Omeje, 2007; Ikeji, 2011; Akpabio and Akpan, 
2010), the discovery of oil in commercial quantity in 1956, led to the decline of 
agriculture that once sustained the nation. In the same vein, regional economies that 
thrived on largely primary but agro-led economic activities such as farming also 
experienced the same transformation (see Chapter 2). The various regions on the 
basis of prevailing centralization of the federal system the nation operates, settled for 
oil revenue hand-outs from the central government as major source of monthly or 
annual income. A situation like this dwarfed the self-sustaining regional economies 
that competed positively to achieve regional development. As earlier noted in 
chapter two where the political economy of Nigeria was discussed, the Western 
region built the cocoa house and gave free universal education in the whole of then 
western region. A similar feat was recorded in the North where Kaduna as regional 
development hub, was established with Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria as the 
crowning glory of regional development efforts. 
 
In the light of the above, story of the South-South region in the age of oil forms 
crucial narratives that have shaped the Nigerian oil endowment and exploration 
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discourse. It is a story that has come to be woven around the intricate political 
economy of oil in Nigeria. Chapter two of this study laid the foundational discourse of 
the Niger Delta and the development question it raises. According to Nabbon (2010), 
the history of modern resource struggle in the oil rich region began with the Isaac 
Adaka Boro agitation for fairer resource space in 1966 movement. This followed 
failure of earlier palliative measures taken during the colonial era such as the 
Willinks commission which failed to assuage the fear of domination of minority 
groups in Nigeria by the minority but resource rich regions as it then was (Etekpe, 
2007 and Akaba, 2005). The driving issue is thus, that of the struggle for resource 
space in the Nigerian state as noted and explained in chapter two. The web of 
complexity has the oil bearing region feeling cheated in the sharing of revenue with 
the rest of Nigeria that accrues from the sales of oil from their environment, 
(Ikelegbe, 2005, Omeje, 2006, Obi, 2010, and Watts, 2012). There is equally a deep 
seated feeling of political alienation from the largely centralized federal structure the 
nation operates (Ikeji 2011), a situation Enweremadu (2009) noted, leaves the state 
units at the mercy of the Federal centre as ‘rent-collectors’. In this sense, 
development is inevitably stifled, leaving the regions in development deficit in varying 
degrees. The various regions, especially the two under focus in this study, have 
notable development disparities. Absence of basic infrastructure in the oil bearing 
region, attest to this. 
 
Pinning down the development issue of the region, demands critical analysis of the 
wider issues that shape the political discourse in Nigeria. To do this, focus falls on 
the position of the oil bearing region within the Nigerian resource space. This we can 
ascertain, by measuring how the region fared before and during the oil boom era, 
paying close attention to the larger welfare situation of the region in the face of oil 
exploration. Relying on the larger Nigerian development situation, the region cannot 
be said to have fared any better (Omeje, 2006; Ugoh and Ukpere 2010; Obi 2010; 
Watts 2012; Ikelegbe 2013). However, in reaching such a conclusion, the various 
authors tended to have ignored key internal dynamics such as corruption and 
leadership failures at the regional levels that could have led to the slowed 
development; they painted a picture of the obvious; lack and want in the face of 
abundance evidenced by dearth of essential amenities in the region. Ibaba 
(Undated) however linked problem of the region, to alienation from the mainstream 
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political system he believes, left the region short-changed in the share of oil revenue. 
He linked this to the upsurge of violent confrontation that arose due to what he 
described as ‘years of criminal neglect of the region by the federal/central 
government. 
 
Re-echoing Enweremadu’s (2009) position that the centralist federal government 
leaves the regions at the mercy of the centre and as mere rent collectors, one can 
then appreciate position of the latter in development terms.  This, in a sense brings 
to mind, the fact that the economic fortune of the nation does not match that of the 
regions believed to have suffered when oil resources were discovered in commercial 
quantities. The fact remains though that agricultural activity such as farming never 
ushered in the much development in the region before oil; it however left the people 
self-sufficient. That is, however, not the case today due to unfettered oil exploration 
that greatly devastated the environment. Also, the oil wealth does not appear to have 
had an impact Edigin (2014:46) was lucid when he observed thus:  
 
“Prior to the discovery of oil in Nigeria, the Nigerian economy 
thrived on the basis of agriculture.  Then, the economy was 
greatly supported by the complimentary role agricultural 
produce such as groundnut, oil palm and cocoa played in the 
nation’s economic life.  Though agriculture at this time cannot 
be said to have ushered in development in the country; it 
however provided sufficient products that made Nigeria self-
sustained in those agricultural products.  The complementary 
role these products played and the internal linkages that they 
engendered among the various sectors of the economy were 
adequate signs that an agro-based Nigerian economy would 
apart from leaving her land fertile also brought about foreign 
exchange and capital to develop the prostrate economy”.   
 
With used and degraded environment, the region is believed to have relapsed into 
famine as environmental hazards due to oil exploration from exploratory activities 
manifested. Bakare (2014) aptly captured this when he observed that: “The 
fishermen have been thrown out of business due to persistent seepages of oil flow to 
the streams, their water is contaminated and the once upon a fertile land became 
barren”. The situation manifested in the region as inability to feed itself, due to 
declining soil fertility. Consequently, the numbers of people that go without food in 
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the region, remain higher than that of other regions in both 2007 and 2009 as 
captured in table 5.3 and graph 5.1 below. 
 
Table 5.3: Food poverty in 2007 on a regional basis 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
NC 227 9.4 
NE 270 11.2 
SE 270 11.2 
SS 369 15.3 
SW 515 21.4 
NW 550 22.8 
Total 2201 91.3 
Missing System 209 8.7 
          Total 2410 100.0 
 
Source: Researcher’s SPSS computation from Afrobarometer dataset 2007 
 
While the increased number of hungry people in the region leaves more questions 
than answers in 2007, similar feat was repeated in 2009 with much higher number of 
hungry people as represented in graph 5.2 below. What can be gleaned from this, is 
simply the fact that oil economy made it difficult for the people to engage in activities 
that can sustain them. With devastated soil, the land simply refused to yield its 
increase, hence the hunger. 
 
GRAPH 5.1: Mean plot of ‘food poverty’ on regional basis 
 
 
Source: SPSS computation from Afrobarometer dataset 2009 
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NOTE: 
By food poverty, I mean individuals that find it difficult to feed themselves on daily 
basis, 
 
A similar picture was presented in table two in chapter one of this study, which 
clearly showed the situation in the region since the discovery of oil. It showed a 
region that despite the wealth it produces, lack many parameters for human well-
being. 
 
Table 5.4: Nigeria Poverty Profile: SW & SS 
 
Geo-political zone Poor Absolute poverty Relative poverty 
Dollar per 
day 
South-South 14.4% 15.1% 14.2% 15.3% 
South-West 10.2% 10.6% 11.1% 12.5% 
 
Source:  National Bureau of Statistics (2010) (extracted from table 2.1 above) 
 
What can thus be gleaned from situation of the region in the oil era is that of lack 
amidst plenty, reminiscent of the resource curse postulations about resource rich 
and dependent nations. This is especially seen in situations where those nations fail 
to reap expected benefits from oil exploration. Roll and Sperling (2011) believes that 
exploitation of oil in the continent simply fails the continent. The resource curse 
discussed in chapter one and three of this study can be said to be manifest in the 
African case and that of Nigeria in particular. This has been attributed to some 
factors such as role of the elite class (see Chapter Three). As noted in Chapter 
Three, the curse of resources is never a given, it arises in the event of failure to 
effectively manage the resources. That can spurn crisis that dovetails into crisis and 
curse eventually. This happens if either the elite or the ruling class pushes the 
struggle for resource space, to crisis point.   
 
In Chapter Six where causal links of regional development disparity will come under 
focus, the intricate nexus between role of the elites in shaping public policies and 
resource curse that can impact upon resource rich states, will be addressed. It is 
then imperative that the level of development in the region is put in perspectives with 
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a view to ascertaining extent to which the region suffers in the face of oil exploration. 
It is after successfully accomplishing this task that one can consider measures 
embraced to address regional development challenges in the oil bearing region. 
Consequently, the next section will explore the development situation in the region in 
the light of variables such as infrastructure, employment, social services and level of 
poverty. It will begin with tabular presentation of Regional Development Disparity 
(RDD) that helps put the oil bearing region as least developed due to deprivation, 
Ibaba, (undated) as oil became death for the region rather than envisaged life and 
development, Ian and Karl (2003). 
 
TABLE 5.5: Regional Development Disparities (RDD) 
Source: Mustapha (2007:2) 
 
 
S/N 
 
 
Zone 
 
National 
Population 
(2006) 
 
Number of 
Post 
Primary 
Institutions 
as 
percentage 
of Total 
1989 
 
% of 
University 
Admission 
 
Household 
Income 
1998-1999 
 
 
Incidence of Poverty (% of 
population) 
      1980 1985 1992 1996 2004 
1 
North-
West 
35,260 569 (9.7%) 4.7 738.94 37.7 52.1 36.5 77.2 71.2 
2 
North-
East 
18,973 343 (5.9%) 3.9 680.55 35.6 54.9 54.0 70.1 72.2 
3 
North-
Central 
20,265 
1022 
(17.50%) 
11.1 1,141.45 32.2 50.8 46.0 64.7 67.0 
4 
South-
West 
24,141 
1575 
(27%) 
17.4 2,096.37 13.4 38.6 43.1 60.9 43.0 
5 
South-
East 
9,613 
1208 
(20.7%) 
39.4 1,677.12 12.9 30.4 41.0 53.5 26.7 
6 
South-
South 
31,223 
1114 
(19.1%) 
23.3 1,412.12 13.2 45.7 40.8 58.2 35.1 
National - - - 1,142.59 28.1 46.3 42.7 65.6 54.4 
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From the table above, evidence of disparate development on regional basis appear 
perceptible. While one cannot say that the South-South zone does badly compared 
to the South-West or indeed the whole country where it is below the national 
average, we can however examine state of key development variables in both 
regions as done below to situate the level of development. To do this, focus will 
briefly be on infrastructure, social services, state of employment and incidence of 
poverty in both regions. 
 
(I) Infrastructures 
The level of infrastructural development in any nation which varies among nations to 
a very large extent, can tell how nations are developed. While some may have 
achieved a high level of infrastructural efficiency and qualified to be called 
developed, others such as Nigeria may just be lacking in critical infrastructures. In, 
Nigeria, there is dearth of basic infrastructure and the severity of this, varies form 
one region to the other. In the Niger Delta, there are few infrastructural facilities. 
Where they are available, they are usually few and often times, in poor condition 
(UNDP 2006; Kiikpoye, 2008: 269-270).  With only 2% of federal presence in terms 
of basic infrastructures, the region also lack non-oil industries capable of generating 
employment opportunity for its younger generation. This is however slightly different 
in the South-West region where there is a federal infrastructural presence as 
amplified by well paved and tarred roads as well as other basic infrastructural 
facilities. Rural areas of both regions, tell a different infrastructural tales.  
 
In the riverine parts of the Delta and because of the difficult terrains believed to have 
been made worse by neglect by the elite class, thousands of miles of rivers form the 
highways and communication routes for hundreds of villages, Chevron Texaco 
(2003:10). Despite this, costly water transportation due to high gasoline prices, drive 
rural transportation beyond the reach of rural dwellers.  This is however different 
from what occurs in the rural South-West where many communities are linked to 
national high-ways, thus making movement a lot easier (Ikelegbe 2013). Fuel cost is 
sometimes many times the cost of fuel in the upland parts, because of the absence 
of petrol in the rural areas of South-South. This makes river transportation, costlier 
than road transportation (Chokor 2005:366). Apart from absence of drivable roads, 
electricity supply critical to national development is equally in short supply. Though a 
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national problem, but its manifest effect is seen more in the rural areas. As of 2004, 
the entire Bayelsa state was not connected to the national electricity grid, thus 
denying so many communities opportunity to enjoy electricity like most communities 
in the South West. 
 
(II) Social Services 
The poor state of infrastructural facilities in the oil bearing delta equally manifest in 
the nature of social services available to the people. So poor is the state of social 
services that as of 2005, a single doctor was saddled with the task of attending to as 
much as 82, 000 people in the oil bearing region. This sharply contrasted with 
national average of a doctor to 39, 455 and a doctor to average of 41, 000 in the 
South-West, (Zalik and Watts; 2006). What this translates to, is that as of 2006, an 
average of one doctor attends to as much as 150,000 people in core Niger Delta 
states of Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa. This 89% of respondents in the survey for this 
research attributed to dearth of suitable health facilities. Where they exist, primary 
health care facilities lack basic requirement to meet the health needs of the people. 
Other basic social goods are equally in short supply. While just 27% had access to 
safe drinking water in 2004, only 30% were lucky enough to use electricity light. 
Confirming the poor state of the social services in the region, the U.N.D.P Human 
Development Report (2008-2009:28) had noted that the South-South region leads 
the pack in terms of poverty and inequality in Southern Nigeria. The report observed 
that about 49% in the region lacks access to improved sources of water. The report 
noted thus: 
Most settlements depend on untreated surface water and 
wells, which leads to health problems from waterborne 
diseases. It was estimated that only 20 percent to 24 
percent of rural communities and 45 per cent to 50 
percent of urban communities have access to safe 
drinking water. Poor access to adequate drinking water 
has had serious implications for the general health, 
environment, economic activity and sustainable 
livelihoods in the Niger Delta region. 
 
Besides what the report captured, the number of people without access to safe 
drinking water in the South-South is higher than in any other region especially the 
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South-West with the lowest. The computed mean plot below captured this 
graphically. What this portends, is obvious lack in an oil bearing region amidst plenty. 
 
GRAPH 5.2: Regional water scarcity 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Researcher’s computation (2009 Afrobarometer Data/SPSS) 
 
Added to the above is the fact that school enrolment in the region falls below national 
average of 76%. The 30-40% primary school enrolment in the region, contributed to 
high illiteracy level according to Fubara (2002:19). In some parts of the region, 
primary school enrolment drops below the regional average of 30-40 per cent, 
(Federal Office of Statistics, 2009). Maybe due to challenging environmental 
condition, student performance in the lowland/riverine parts according to Chokor 
(2005:367), is very low. In all, social services in the South-South region, falls behind 
what is seen in the South-West. Table three and four above chronicling 
developmental indicators of both regions, presents a graphical illustration of the 
extent to which the regions can be said to lag behind in terms of the aforementioned 
development indicators. 
 
(III) Employment  
Employment opportunities are in short supply in Nigeria but the severity of 
unemployment differs from one geo-political zone to the other. In the South-South 
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region, prior to oil discovery about 50-68% embraced agricultural activities such as 
farming and fishing (Worgu 2000:4). A 2004 estimation of the Niger Delta 
Development Commission, posited that about 70% of the population depended on 
farming and fishing in the region. A similar projection is also true for the South-West 
region where majority take to cocoa farming, (Adepoju, 2012:23). While this used to 
be the case, oil based environmental degradation has considerably depleted farming 
activities in the South-South. This came with unfavourable consequences on the 
livelihood of the people of the region, (NDDC 2004). Crop yields dwindled and the 
people’s food security came under direct challenge. Consequently, those hitherto 
employed in agro-based activities are due to environmental degradation unemployed 
(Odjugo, 2013). Low crop yield due to soil infertility and acute deforestation that 
prevented those that hitherto survived based on the rich forest reserves from doing 
so. Aqua farming was also severely affected as subsistence and commercial farming 
dropped drastically, (Ibid). 
  
While national unemployment average stood at 7.2% in 2000, most of the states in 
the South-South had figures above 10%. According to a report by the Development 
Policy Centre (2011), this can be broken down for the different regions to: Akwa 
Ibom (12.6%), Bayelsa (13.0%), Delta (16.2%) and Rivers (18.2%). While 3.7% 
national average was the corresponding figures for rural unemployment, figures for 
some of the states, were equally unsettling. Again, Akwa Ibom had (18.3%), Bayelsa 
(5.5%), Delta (8.8%) and Rivers (19.3%). According to the World Bank (2005), urban 
unemployment in the major towns in the region is very high. Port Harcourt, the 
capital of Rivers state, recorded 30% as against 9% recorded in Lagos for the same 
year (UNDP, 1995:77). Employment as a development indicator can thus be said in 
some areas of the region to be lower than ideal despite the expected sectoral 
complementarity needed to engender industrial growth and development. This 
means that the oil industry is not providing local jobs that can help the people earn a 
living. 
 
(IV) Poverty 
Enweremadu (2009) had noted: “… [The] increasing poverty rate in the Niger Delta 
has made the people largely malleable and susceptible”. The point he made can 
safely be seen to be largely reflective of the level of employment in the region. 
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Consequently, poverty remains pervasive in varying degrees in the regions. From 
findings, one can say that poverty is extensive and endemic in the oil bearing region 
of the Delta (NDES 2007).  The incidence of poverty is put at 58.2% in the Niger 
Delta in 2003 (Kemedi, 2003:8). Meanwhile the UNDP 2006 Human Development 
Report estimated an even higher poverty rate 74.8%.  A strong dichotomy of 
extremely rural poor and urban rich exists in the region. Much of the poverty that 
exists does in rural rather than urban areas. For instance, about 72% of households 
especially in the rural areas live below the poverty line. Overall, as can be seen in 
the tables below,  is that most of the states in the Niger Delta appear to be among 
states with highest incidence of poverty in Nigeria with the exception of Bayelsa, Edo 
and Rivers states. 
 
Table 5.6: Living Standards: South-South & South-West 
Source: National Office of Statistics, 2010 
 
NOTE: 
Figures representing both regions as presented above, are extracted from table for 
the whole nation.  
 
Zones States 
 
Very Poor 
%  
Poor 
% 
Moderate 
%  
Fairly Rich 
%  
Rich 
% 
 
Akwa 
Ibom 
14.0 
 
15.4 16.5 
 
4.5 
 
1.8 
 
Bayelsa 
 
32.6 
 
14.1 13.4 
 
1.7 
 
2.1 
South 
Cross 
rivers 
17.0 
 
14.1 13.2 
 
3.7 
 
0.7 
South Delta 
 
13.6 
 
12.5 14.2 
 
6.0 
 
0.7 
 
Edo 
 
3.9 
 
12.9 13.9 
 
6.1 
 
1.1 
 
Rivers 
 
12.0 
 
15.7 19.2 
 
6.2 
 
1.9 
Zonal total 
 
93.1 
 
85.2 90.4 
 
28.2 
 
8.3 
 
Ekiti 
 
8.0 
 
11.1 19.1 
 
2.7 
 
0.6 
 
Lagos 
 
4.3 
 
10.2 15.5 
 
8.3 
 
0.7 
South Ogun 
 
2.7 
 
10.3 16.2 
 
5.2 
 
1.0 
West Ondo 
 
5.9 
 
11.7 14.2 
 
3.4 
 
0.0 
 
Osun 
 
1.9 
 
9.6 15.3 
 
7.0 
 
2.3 
 
OYO 
 
7.6 
 
13.2 17.5 
 
3.9 
 
0.6 
Zonal total 
  
30.4 
 
61.1 97.8 
 
30.5 
 
5.2 
National 
average   
9.5 
 
37.2 47.2 
 
5.2 
 
0.9 
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Seen as multidimensional and complex (Nafziger 2006: 167-168) poverty in the 
region can manifest beyond what the official data reveals. Besides low income that 
appears common in the region, there is the issue of access to food, assets and 
access to basic and essential infrastructure noted above to be in short supply. Other 
poverty indicators in the region include illiteracy, poor health, powerlessness and 
political vulnerability (discussed in Chapter 6). Table 5.6 below, captures where 
states under focus in this study stand in several indicators over time. Poverty 
appears prominent as it increases in the oil bearing Delta, leading to low income 
believes to accentuate others. A clear picture of this was graphically painted by the 
UNDP (2006:36-37) in report that associated endemic poverty in the region was to: 
economic stagnation, agricultural underdevelopment from 
soil infertility, unemployment, poor quality of life due to 
shortages of essential goods, facilities and money; 
isolation and poor communication; government 
insensitivity; and an unhealthy environment spreading 
diseases and malnutrition ... poor environmental quality 
and high levels of pollution, conflict and lack of  security, 
threats to health and wellbeing including HIV/AIDS and 
unsustainable livelihoods. 
 
TABLE 5.7: Relative Development Index for Niger Delta states 
 
S/N 
 
States 
 
National 
Population 
 
Rural 
Population 
 
Urban 
Populati
on. 
 
Illiterate
s 
 
Jobl
ess 
 
Incidence of Poverty 
 
  % % % % % %     
       1980 1985 1992 1996 2004 
1 Abia 6.88 62.25 37.75 33.6 9.0 14.4 33.1 49.9 56.2 22.27 
2 Imo 6.43 67.33 32.67 32.7 11.8     27.39 
3 
Akwa 
Ibom 
6.51 87.89 12.11 36.5 9.2      
4 
Cross 
River 
6.01 74.92 25.08 36.9 7.8     41.61 
5 Delta 6.16 66.85 33.15 36.4 7.2 19.8 52.4 33.9 56.1 45.35 
6 Edo 6.62 54.56 45.44 38.6 7.6     33.9 
7 Ondo 5.11 59.62 40.38 33.4 2.9 24.9 47.3 46.6 71.6 41.15 
8 Rivers 5.67 68.65 31.35 20.3 12.6 7.2 44.4 43.4 44.3 29.09 
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9 Bayelsa - - - - -     19.98 
National - -    28.1 46.3 42.7 65.6 54.4 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2008 
 
While it is expected that oil wealth might push down the cost of living in the oil 
bearing region, the reverse happens to be the case. As UNDP (2006: 36-37) noted, 
there is an exceptionally high cost of living which never spared cost of petroleum 
products found in abundance in the region; and that of accommodation which is in 
short supply. Prices of those things and especially that of food are tied to the high 
earnings of oil sector workers, thus making living difficult for non-oil workers. As 
Ibeanu (2008:98) observed, “the cost of living index in the urban areas of Rivers 
State of 783 is the highest in Nigeria. Consequently, there is a decline in purchasing 
power in the region that amplifies poverty. There is thus a paradox of plenty in the 
region which UNDP 2006 report captured thus: 
 
Its rich endowments of oil and gas resources feed 
methodically into the international economic system, in 
exchange for massive revenues that carry the promise of 
rapid socio-economic transformation within the delta 
itself. In reality, the Niger Delta is a region suffering from 
administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and 
services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject 
poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict ... But 
juxtaposed against the potential for economic growth and 
sustainable development are deteriorating economic and 
social conditions that have been largely ignored by 
contemporary policies and actions. With local inhabitants 
subjected to abject poverty and suffering in the midst of 
plenty, some view the oil and gas endowments as a curse 
and a double edged sword (UNDP 2006:25). 
 
In the light of the above and based on existing realities in the region, one can say 
that the region hasn’t benefited from the oil boom contrary to expected development 
at the discovery of oil. Can this also be said of the South Western region? 
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5.5 ECONOMY OF THE SOUTH WEST: BEFORE AND DURING OIL 
The history of the South West region economically reflects the larger Nigerian picture 
because the later “thrived on the basis of agriculture” (Edigin 2014). Though national 
development cannot be said to have occurred during this period, the complimentary 
role agricultural produce such as groundnut, oil palm and cocoa played in the 
nation’s economic life, provided sufficient agricultural products that made Nigeria and 
the various regions self-sufficient. Besides minimal trade link amongst the regions, 
robust agricultural life prior to the oil era in Nigeria, engendered internal economic 
linkages that helped provide greater developmental opportunity that was never 
utilized. According to Iyoha (2005), the nation failed to harness the great opportunity 
agriculture provided with the failure to invest. Rather than invest in the sector that 
held the nation in place economically, the fertile lands were neglected and degraded 
due to oil exploration, Odjugo (2013) which made the country more mono-cultural  
(Edigin 2014) and oil based, depending on oil rents for survival (Ikelegbe, 2014;, 
Watts, 2012; and Obi, 2010). The region had a robust agricultural system where 
cash such as cocoa, was produced. The region gained popularity from the cocoa 
pods from Abeokuta and Oshogbo which equally gave the region a developmental 
edge evidenced in free education the region enjoyed besides improved 
infrastructures. 
 
As earlier noted, the discovery of oil led to the neglect of agriculture. This resonated 
in the productive sector that was starved of needed raw material supplies that 
agriculture hitherto provided. Consequently, many industries declined with 
associated job losses at the regional levels. Consequently, the once self-sufficient 
regions had their economic fortunes greatly affected. Cocoa pod in the west 
disappeared, the groundnut pyramid in the north vanished into the thin air while palm 
produce from the east, dropped to all time low of near non-existence (Ikelegbe 
2013). Oil wealth, which contributed about 90% of her Gross National Product, took 
the shine off the economic wellbeing of the regions as they relapsed into collecting 
federally collected oil rents from the centre government. By that token, the nation is 
seen by many to be resource dependent with the inevitable vagaries of resource 
exploitation while the regions became ‘rent collectors’ as their pre-occupation shifted 
from the land that once gave them regional development edge to collection of oil 
hand out from the centre (Enweremadu 2009, Sofiri 2010). Accruable oil rents came 
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but were grossly insufficient to tackle the regional developmental challenges in the 
face of endemic national corruption (Nwabuzor, 2006; Shaxson, 2007; Watts, 2012). 
The implication of this is the gradual decline of regional economies. This was the 
case in virtually all the regions. The Niger Delta aquatic life diminished, cocoa pod in 
the west sublimed as the groundnut pyramid and palm oil seeds disappeared in both 
the north and east of the country all because of oil and exploitation of same.  
 
Oil and the economy it wrought, disarticulated regional economies and delayed the 
development process. The south-west region for instance, had reversal of economic 
fortune with the coming of the oil economy (Teriba, 2013). Ibaba (undated) perceived 
the South-West region to have benefited more from the political economy of oil in 
Nigeria. He attributed this to the region’s higher levels of education which loosely 
translates to effective representation in the centralised Federal Government Nigeria 
operates, something he said the SS lacked as people in the region endure 
unpleasant externalities of oil exploration that affected farming activities in the 
region. Though farming scarcely met regional development needs before the advent 
of the oil economy, it however gave the regions an opportunity to feed themselves 
and compete among themselves effectively. The oil economy is believed to have 
stirred the people’s development expectation that appear to have been dashed as 
expectation of oil related employment that never came, reputedly made many lazy in 
the face of expected  accruable rents from the centre. These rents in most cases as 
seen in chapter three where administrative corruption was discussed were often 
stolen by self-serving corrupt public officials. 
 
In a quantitative study of Rural Poverty in Nigeria, Omonona (2010) observed that 
regional poverty is particularly high in the south west due to what he termed neglect 
of the primary economy that once sustained the region economically. A dearth of 
relevant information prevented me from obtaining the average GDP for the region 
before and during the oil era. It is however from account given by the respondents in 
this study, it seems that the region may have lacked what it takes to feed itself during 
the agricultural era before oil like the SS. The story is however different today due to 
alleged elite interference in resource management. Discussion of the intricate oil-
politics nexus in chapter two of this study, explored the extent to which the elite class 
with clientelistic disposition; meddled with discharge of official government 
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responsibilities. This has a lot to do with resource allocation which was earlier noted, 
besides been ethnic based, was done in a chaotic manner. In the light of this, it is 
then imperative that we put both regions in contrast to know where they belong in the 
scheme of things.  Consequently, the following section and subsections will focus on 
the situation of the regions in the face of oil exploration, mirrored against the pre-oil 
era. 
 
5.6 WHERE THE REGIONS STAND 
Determining position of the various geo-political zones in Nigeria in development 
terms has been increasingly difficult. This can partly be linked to the dearth of 
coordinated national development planning. As Imhanlahimi (2000) and Henley et al 
(2012) noted, the restriction associated with national planning, leaves the regions in 
a position that makes it difficult to plan to achieve their peculiar developmental 
needs. Ikeanyibe (2009) however introduced a new twist to the argument by pointing 
out the place of effective leadership in plan formulation and eventual implementation. 
By this, he saw no wrong in plans originating from the centre, but picked holes in the 
kind of leaders at the state levels meant to drive home, objectives of adopted plans. 
While Ikeanyibe’s (2009) position appears convincing, it is however unmindful of the 
role support for any plan can play to see to it realizing set objectives. Most plans that 
alienate the people from initiation to execution are often times starved of needed 
support and thus, inevitably lead to plan failure. This from what was earlier seen in 
chapter three; plans fail to achieve desired objectives because of its exclusionary 
orientation. 
 
While Jelili (2008) painted a picture of existent regional development plans to 
achieve regional development in Nigeria, existential realities say something entirely 
different as there exists a clear absence of regional-based development plans. What 
can loosely be called regional initiatives to achieve developmental outcomes, 
includes the South-South Economic summit (South-South) and Development 
Agenda for Western Nigeria (South-West). Though both are seen largely as regional 
efforts at achieving development, they do not yet, pass for a development plan. This 
is because the regions still do the bidding of the central government and in most 
cases, fail to implement centrally authored plans; (NEEDS 2004). Inevitable results 
are uncoordinated implementation plans which invariably lead to disparate 
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developmental goals and results. Examples are found in the number of projects 
executed on regional basis by the central government, (NDMP, 2000:12). Mindful of 
this, the National Plan (2004) meant to usher the nation into one of the 20th 
industrialized nations by 2010, acknowledged that:   
 
“There are disparities in regional development due to a number 
of factors, which include history, culture, natural endowment 
and the factor of politics. However, there are issues in regional 
development that are peculiar to some regions e.g. 
environmental degradation in the Niger delta and desert 
encroachment in the North and those that are cross cutting in 
all the regions e.g. rural-urban drift.” (NV2020, PP4) 
 
What one expects is robust regional development plans to tackle the peculiarity 
associated with the regions, but evidence shows that little is done in terms of 
development planning. Besides government development intervention agencies in 
the South-South region seen by Jack-Akhigbe (2013) as foisted on the region from 
the centre, the region lacks credible development plans that can help solve the 
developmental needs confronting it. Moreover, there are few development 
interventionist agencies in the region. Acute shortage of critical but needed 
infrastructures still remain palpable in the region. This is besides poor delivery of 
social services such as health care delivery and supply of clean and safe drinking 
water, (Ikelegbe, 2013). On the other hand, the South-West lacks clear economic 
plans for regional development, but enjoys mutual support in synchronizing 
economic policies across the region because of the inherent ethnic homogeneity in 
the region (Jelili et al 2008). Jelili et al’s submission can be said to have received 
strength from the fact that the centralized federal system in place leaves the regions 
with little or no chance to initiate development plans. Though recent moves 
discussed below, suggest a paradigm shift in this direction.  
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Table 5.8: Regional Resource Base: South-South & South-West Zones 
State Zone Solid minerals 
Agric/agro 
allied 
Oil and  
gas 
Industrial potentials 
Akwa 
Ibom 
South-
south 
Clay, glass, and 
bentonite 
Coconut, cocoa, 
rubber, raffia 
palm. Coffee, 
palm oil. 
Crude oil 
Agricultural/processing, oil 
and gas, and industries. 
Bayelsa 
South-
south 
- 
Plantain, 
banana, 
cassava, yam 
cocoyam. 
Crude oil 
and gas 
Oil and petrochemical 
Cross 
River 
South-
south 
Limestone, 
barite, uranium, 
bentonite 
Rubber, cocoa, 
palm oil, 
cassava, rice, 
fruits 
- Agriculture and fishing 
Delta 
South-
south 
Lignite, gypsum, 
tar sand, silica 
Palm oil, kernel, 
cassava, rubber 
and timber 
Crude oil 
and gas 
Petrochemical, oil and wood 
processing. 
Edo 
South-
south 
Cypsum, tar 
sand, lignite, 
marble 
Cassava, yam, 
garri, plantain, 
rubber, cocoa, 
palm oil. 
Oil and 
gas 
reserve 
Oil and gas industries, 
cement, food and rubber 
processing.. 
Ekiti 
South-
west 
Tantalite, 
quarta, kaolin, 
sand, clay, gold, 
feldspar. 
Cocoa, timber, 
palm produce 
- 
Food and canning, wood 
processing. 
Lagos 
South-
west 
Iron ore, 
marble, 
limestone, clay, 
feldspar 
Fish, coconut Crude oil 
Food processing oil and 
gas, paper mill 
Ogun 
South-
west 
Limestone, 
chalk, clay, 
kaolin, 
phosphate, tar 
sand 
Rice, maize, 
beans, palm 
produce, cocoa, 
rubber 
- Food processing mining 
Ondo 
South-
west 
Bitumen, 
limestone, 
kaolin, iron ore 
Timber, palm 
produce, cocoa, 
kolanut 
Crude oil 
Oil and gas, wood, food 
processing. 
Osun 
South-
west 
Gold, clay, 
limestone, 
kaolin, granite 
Cocoa, kolanut, 
rice, maize. 
- Food processing 
Oyo 
South-
west 
Dolomite, 
Kaolin, marble, 
iron ore, clay, 
gemstone 
Cocoa, palm 
produce, kolanut, 
cashew, maize, 
cassava. 
- Mining, food processing. 
Rivers 
South-
South 
Silica, sand, 
clay 
Palm oil, fish, 
cassava, fruits 
Crude oil 
and 
natural 
gas. 
Oil industries, 
petrochemical, glass works. 
 
Source: Field Survey 2013 and Adesopo and Asaju, (2004:279-280). 
 
From table 5.9 above, it is clear that all the states in both regions under focus in this 
study have more than one resource that can be harnessed to engender regional 
development. Have though efforts to harness these for regional development 
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changed with the discovery of oil? Chapter six will consider the intricate internal 
dynamics that shape regional resource management and ultimately, development.  
In the meantime, the crucial question one cannot avoid, is that of what happens to 
the regional ability to utilize these resources to facilitate development? 
 
According to Omoweh (2005), the issue of development problems in the Delta is not 
that of today but has roots traced to pre-colonial days. He also equated it to the very 
problem of minority groups in Nigeria which he noted, prompted the Willinks 
Commission to recommend the creation of the Niger Delta Development Board 
(NDDB) of 1958. This body was primarily meant to address fears of minority groups 
which Ibeanu (2008:17) sees as including “the poor state of infrastructure and the 
harsh terrain of the Niger Delta”. This happened in the then ‘yet to be established 
Nigerian state’ (Ibeanu 2008). Though NDDB was borne out of the cry of the 
minorities for fair treatment from the domineering ethnic majorities in the country at 
this point in time, it is instructive to note that the Niger Delta as of then, never 
represented the entirety of minority groups in the then emerging Nigeria as other 
minority ethnic groups exist especially in the North. Other measures taken after 
independence to address regional developmental needs in the South-South include 
the following. Niger Delta River Basin Authority (NDRBA) in 1976, the Oil Mineral 
Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) under Decree 23 of 1992. 
Others include the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) established in 
2000 and Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs created by late president Musa Yar’Adua 
2008-9 in a bid to douse heightened militancy in the oil rich region. 
 
While these measures represented an effort by the state to address needs of the 
people, they turn out to be huge failure as these interventionist agencies, 
encountered problems that many see as political. This range from lack of funds to 
the agencies and political will to envision and implement required programmes 
capable of addressing the region’s developmental needs as seen in the days before 
development intervention agencies, were created to address the developmental 
needs of the oil bearing Delta. One case is the East-West road that dragged till the 
minister of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs Orubebe Godswill was sacked for 
alleged failure to complete the aforementioned road which the people see as critical 
to the SS region’s development. The road serves as the major link between the 
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South-West and South-Eastern regions of the country. It is thus, seen as crucial to 
the region’s development since it provides the means of movement within and 
outside the region. Failure of the minister to complete the road under his ministry, 
was thus seen as not doing enough to solve some of the critical infrastructural needs 
of the regions despite been an indigene of the region. His action respondents to the 
research survey attributed to, the earlier mentioned elite dominated regional 
governance system extensively discussed in chapter six of this study. 
 
In the west, no development intervention agencies were created but the centralized 
revenue sharing method that favours them on the basis of the population numbers 
rather than derivation as it was in the 1960s had advantage over the latter. Many 
writers on this topic usually link it the inequality in the Nigerian state. Umanah 
(2002:11) and Ikeji (2011), for instance, see the unfavourable position of the Delta as 
one cause of the development difficulties the region faces. The former cited 
directives given to oil firms by the federal government between 1967 and 1980 to 
relocate their operational headquarters to Lagos (west) as one misplaced policy that 
left the oil bearing region in a disadvantaged position. He considered this and giving 
the west infrastructural development advantage over the oil bearing zone. What 
Umanah failed to acknowledge is the status of Lagos as the nation’s political and 
economic headquarters before the seat of power was relocated to Abuja late 1970s. 
Simply acknowledging this would have balanced the argument and possibly placed 
the narratives where it should be and not externalization of internal developmental 
issues. A crucial question that need response and will be partly answered in chapter 
six is what are the internal dynamics that accentuated regional development woes or 
disparate development where they exist? 
 
Reflective of the general situation in the country as seen in the introductory chapter 
of this study, one can safely say that state of regional development in Nigeria, is still 
problematic. This can specifically be said of both regions but perceptible differences 
can be seen in critical areas. While the Delta region lacks basic infrastructural 
facilities, the same cannot be said of the West which benefits from modern 
architectural facilities. A careful consideration of some key facilities in the regions 
would reveal the degree of disparity. For instance, the South-South region has the 
highest number of people that provide the water they drink as the graph below 
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shows. Though what is possibly responsible for this can be a subject of debate 
beyond this study, it is important we note that there is clear line of differences 
between the regions as the mean plot below shows. 
 
Graph 5.3: Private provision of water on regional basis 
 
 
 
Source: 2008 SPSS Afrobarometer Dataset Computation 
 
Despite oil wealth, the benefits have not trickled down into the region. Pictorial 
evidence of disparate regional development where the oil bearing region is seen 
disadvantaged was presented in Chapter One. This we noted, fuels feeling of 
neglect in the region. 
 
5.7 REVENUE SHARING IN NIGERIA: WHERE THE REGIONS STAND 
One issue that attracts attention in the political economy of Nigeria is that of revenue 
sharing. The nation has had to contend with the challenges of how to equitably 
distribute the accruable wealth from the sales of oil resources. Challenges 
associated with the revenue sharing in Nigeria Eghweree and Otoghile (2011) are 
embedded in the peculiarity of the federal structure the nation operates. The political 
economy of the nation which we noted in chapter two thrives on an intricate oil-
politics tangle which arguably makes it possible for the structure of the nation to be 
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altered to serve perceived and entrenched interest. That explains why in spite of 
massive oil production and revenues accruing to the nation from the South-South 
region, the economy of the region progressively declined over time. Besides 
unabated destruction of the ecological system that once supported the agriculture 
the region, the region only received small sum as derivation resources from the 
federation compared to what it contributes and suffers as externality of oil 
exploitation. 
 
A chronological account of the derivation principle in the Nigerian federalism shows a 
steady decline in the percentage resource bearing regions enjoy. In 1966, the hay-
day of agriculture, it was 59%. This became 45% in 1970 and 1% in 1979. It was to 
rise in 1982 when it became 2% and 1.5% in 1984, 3% in 1992 and jerked to 13% in 
1999 after fierce protest for fairer deals from the oil bearing region of the Delta. With 
these gradual reductions in the derivation principle, the region missed out on the 
envisaged benefit that came with the oil boom of the 1970s to 1990s that other 
regions took advantage of to help their developmental effort. For example, despite 
producing 60% of the nation’s oil, River State only got 5% as federally allocated 
revenue and only one fiftieth in revenues of the value of oil it produced between 
1970 and 1980 (Watts, 2005:67). This amplified an unsettling gap between huge 
revenue generation ability by the region and the small sum it receives as revenue. 
Ken Saro Wiwa, (Cited in Amnesty International 2005:2) described this situation as 
“... unjust, immoral, unnatural and ungodly...” 
 
TABLE 5.9: Percentage changes of the Derivation Principles over time 
  1966 1970 1979 1982 1984 1992 1999-2014 
Derivation  59% 45% 1% 2% 1.2% 3% 13% 
Population  7% 12% 20% 21% 23% 17% 25% 
 
SOURCE: Researcher’s compilation from multiple sources 
 
As though giving credence to the cries of marginalization by the resource bearing 
region, the table 5.8 above clearly shows how over time, the adopted revenue 
sharing formula, favoured the ethnic majors at the detriment of resource bearing 
ethnic minorities. While the ethnic majorities controlled resource base of the nation 
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which was agriculture between 1960 and 1966, favoured derivation principle was all 
time high at 59% while population which equally favoured them, was purposefully left 
at 7%. However, as the oil economy surfaced between 1979 and 1992, the 
derivation principle dropped to between 1 and 3 % while that of population increased 
to between 20-25%. What this implies is simply that the ethnic majorities, benefited 
at any rate, when they held sway through agriculture via high percentage in 
derivation or through population as oil economy came on board. Larger implication of 
this is that, there is stifled supply of funds to oil bearing delta region because of an 
increased focus on population that by extension favours majority groups. This 
consequently manifested negatively in the development efforts of the region. 
 
Evidence of the trickle of resource from the Nigerian state to the oil bearing region is 
failure of the latter to effectively manage environmental degradation and socio-
economic dislocation as the region’s mainstay of agriculture was sacrificed on the 
altar of oil exploitation. Consequently, poverty instead of wealth abounded. The 
people were impoverished as unemployment and malnutrition among the populace 
compelled the people to vent their anger and frustration against the state with a view 
to getting desired fair deal. Typical example is the rise in militancy in the region, 
(Ikelegbe; 2005:15). Consequently, by the 1990s, the level of neglect due to 
marginalization as well as parlous state of development due to environmental 
degradation pushed the people to embrace popular protest against the government. 
Various waves of violent engagement with the state such as the Ogoni uprising, the 
youth violence and insurgency among pockets of agitations across the region, attest 
to this. All this had a telling effect on oil production in the region (Ikelegbe 2004). The 
region that once exported food, can barely feed itself now as the socio-economic 
conditions deteriorates. As ECCR (2010:10) noted, the region now imports about 
80% of its food as life expectancy has fallen from 70 years in 1967 to about 45 in 
2005 (Economist 3:04:08 cited in ECCR 2010:10). What this means, is that the oil 
wealth has failed to a reasonable extent, to touch the Delta’s own grinding poverty 
(UNDP, 2006: iii).  
 
Crucially though, it is imperative to note that the development difference in both 
regions, manifest in urban and rural development dichotomy. The urban looks in 
Lagos for example, cannot be compared to the situation in Ikare in Ondo state with 
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its strong rural characteristics. In similar vein, seemingly hopeless rural situation in 
oil bearing Otefe village in delta state differs as well from what is seen in Port-
Harcourt which Pell (2005) regards as the oil headquarters of the Niger Delta. Lack 
critical amenities still exist in the regions. This was aptly captured in the collated 
response of people in both regions to the question of their living standard now 
compared to period before oil. A majority of respondents to the field surveys 
presented in the Table 5.9 below were not happy with gradual liquidation of the once 
fertile and eco-friendly environment that predated the oil era. This feeling was mostly 
expressed in rural communities where people appear not happy with their current 
living standards. 
 
TABLE 5.10: Responses to Question 34: Your living standard prior to the discovery 
of oil is better compared to what it is now. 
 
 
SOURCE: Field Survey, 2013/2014 
 
5.8 REGIONAL EFFORTS AT DEVELOPMENT 
Though attention has not been paid to the issues of regional development through 
the planning path-ways since development plans are centrally initiated and executed 
in Nigeria, there appears to be concerted efforts in recent times at the regional levels 
to map-out clear development path-ways to end the vicious cycle of 
REGIONS AND RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION 
Response 
South-South South-West 
RESPONSE           PERCENT RESPONSE        PERCENT 
Strongly 
Agree 34 4.36 79 10.16 
Agree 23 2.95 71 9.13 
No Opinion 88 11.29 166 21.36 
Neutral 67 8.60 99       12.74 
Disagree 265 34.01 102 13.12 
Strongly 
Disagree 302 38.76 260 33.46 
Total 779 99.97 777 99.97 
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underdevelopment. One of such regional based initiatives includes the BRACED 
commission and Development Agenda for Western Nigeria (DAWN) for the South-
South and South-West respectively. Both regional development initiatives may not 
pass for pragmatic development plans but represents practical steps aimed at 
achieving development in the long run.  What are the core elements of both plans? 
How far will they take both regions in their quest to achieve desired but elusive 
development? 
 
The BRACED commission is a brain-child of the South-South Economic Summit 
organised by committee of South-South governors. The summit which began in April 
2009 in Calabar has a broad theme of integrating the South-South region for 
sustainable development. On this basis, the states that make up the region BRACED 
(Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross Rivers, Edo and Delta- BRACED) agreed to 
cooperate and pull resources together to pursue regional developmental goals. By 
this, the BRACED commission with a director general and commission staffs, aim to 
pursue core developmental goals by harnessing the huge internal investment 
opportunities opened to the region. To this end, core focal areas for the commission, 
includes agriculture, environment, infrastructural development and industrialization 
(Keshi 2013). While the idea of the BRACED commission does not translate to 
regional development plans, it however represents willingness of the region to 
cooperate and pull resources together to pursue regional development outcomes. 
 
One novel thing about the idea according to the Director General is the ability of the 
South-Southern states to look beyond the oil rents and chart a developmental path 
that will transcend oil, focusing on viable investment potentials that can drive the 
region when oil eventually dries up. In line with this thinking, the Delta state 
government launched the Delta beyond oil campaign in 2013 (SV-Interview 
A2/DELTA-2013). Laudable as this step to achieving regional development appears, 
many believe it may not stand the tests of time due to expected internal political 
differences and corruption that will starve the ambitious regional development 
commission, of needed funds to pursue its stated objectives. Another envisaged 
challenge is that lack of both the enabling law and political will by the commission to 
accomplish its goals. In a region where many interventionist development agencies 
barely make impact due to endemic corruption as seen in the cases of administrative 
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corruption discussed in chapter three of this study, many expects that little would be 
achieved with the idea of the BRACED commission that appear to be mere political 
creation of the regional governors to remain relevant in the political turf. 
 
In the South-West region, the DAWN initiative was floated to chart regional 
development course for the Western region. Fashioned after that of the South-South 
region, the western DAWN initiative is facilitated by the Afenifere Renewal Group 
(ARG), a pan Yoruba socio-political organization, unlike that of the former that came 
out of an economic summit. Seen both as a document and as a process, DAWN 
represents a “composite regional integration and development agenda for the South-
West”, (Vanguard Newspaper 2012). This, the establishing document noted, is to 
fulfil the immense potential of the region for developmental purposes by fostering 
regional cooperation and integration which is expected to serve as a catalyst for 
decentralization. It provides a regional development framework that all the states 
within the region can work with to achieve developmental outcomes. The plank of the 
DAWN development strategy includes focus on effective and efficient utilization of 
human, financial and material resources available in the region to pursue a common 
set of integrated regional development strategies to achieve regional development. 
 
Both initiatives appear similar in that they seek to achieve similar goal of regional 
development. Its left to time to know how far the initiatives, can help both regions 
achieve desired but elusive development. Careful analysis of both plans in 
comparative terms as shown graphically below, reveals. Possible areas of strength 
and inherent weakness capable of derailing the developmental drives through the 
path-ways of regional cooperation and integration 
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TABLE 5.11: Regional development initiatives compared and contrasted 
 
 
S/N 
BRACED COMMISION DAWN INITIATIVE 
SIMILARITIES 
1 
Represents regional effort to achieve 
development 
Represents same regional effort at achieving 
development 
2 
Identified regional cooperation and 
integration as key to regional development 
Keyed into regional cooperation and 
integration also as a medium to achieve 
development 
3 
Realized the need for investment as a 
vehicle to sustainable development 
Realized investment too as regional strength 
to achieve development 
4 
Identified key areas of cooperation among 
member states such as agriculture, 
environment and human capital development 
as development catalyst 
Pinned down key focal areas too such as 
banking, industrialization, agriculture and 
robust trading as veritable regional 
development instruments 
5 
Hinged on practice of true federalism within 
the Nigerian state 
Emphasized true federalism in Nigeria as 
route to regional cooperation and 
development 
6 
Acknowledged parlous development 
situation of the region and the need to pull 
resources to birth development outcomes 
Equally saw deficiency in regional 
development and the imperative of regional 
cooperation to bridge the regional 
development gap 
DIFFERENCES 
1 
Has an established commission to 
coordinate its activities 
Relies on cooperation among serving 
political officers in the region for execution of 
activities 
2 
Lacks established funding arrangement 
except that governors from member states 
would give. 
Relies on both individuals, private sector and 
ethnic based interest groups to fund its 
programme 
3 
Lacks ethnic cohesion and as such, may 
suffer lack of support from the people 
Built on existing ethnic interest due to the 
homogeneity that exist in the region 
4 
Planning, initiation and possible execution 
were done by seating governors, excluding 
the people. 
Enjoyed wide acceptability because of wide 
consultation before its adoption 
5 
Position of the region is one seeking equity 
in the sharing of the nation’s federally 
collected wealth and not to seek self-rule 
Assertions made in the DAWN document, 
tended to seek self-governance so as to 
pursue regional development and possibly 
self-rule 
6 
BRACED commission represents a political 
bargaining chip of the region that may or 
may not birth desired development 
DAWN initiative, amplifies deep-sited socio-
political plans of ethnically homogenous 
Yoruba people with vantage position in 
public life. 
 
Source: Researcher’s compilation 
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While it may be too early to write off both regional efforts at development, it is 
important to note that the state of development in both regions remains uncertain 
with that of the South-South worse off as manifested in acute shortage of critical 
infrastructural facilities and services. The reason why there is this disparity, is a 
subject that chapter six takes up. 
 
5.9.0 CONCLUSION 
In sum, development in Nigeria and the regions by extension as seen in chapter two 
and so far in this chapter, cannot be said to be commensurate with the situation in 
some other oil bearing states. Consequently, there is manifest lack of development 
across the nation with disparities at the regional level. This chapter focused on the 
two adopted regions for the study. These are the South-South and South-West 
regions. Historical account of both regions, showed how both regions engaged in 
agricultural activities at subsistence level prior to discovery and exploitation of oil. 
Agriculture-related activities the chapter noted, kept both regions afloat but the tide 
changed the moment oil wealth came into the scene. The coming of oil left the 
regions in precarious situation where they became solely dependent oil rent hand-
outs from the Federal Government, which Enweremadu (2009) noted left the states 
in a weak position to develop.  The situation as painted above coupled with lack of 
foresight and pragmatism on the part of the regions, left employable hands roaming 
the streets as massive poverty and decline in living standard continued unabated, 
(See tables 5.5 and 5.6 above). 
 
The chapter ended with a comparative analysis of both regional development 
initiatives, noting apparent failure off same. This we noted should prompt the need to 
address the causes of both regional development deficiency and disparity that exists 
between South-South and the South-West regions. Chapter six examines regional 
development in Nigeria; looking at factors responsible for the noted regional 
development disparity. These are done with a view to examine adopted hypotheses 
for the study in the light of generated data from conducted survey for the study. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CAUSES OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT DISPARITY IN NIGERIA: 
INTERROGATING DOMINANT PERCEPTIONS 
 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
This sixth chapter will among other things, build on the issue of regional 
development in Nigeria. The previous chapter did a comparative study of both the 
South-South and South West regions adopted for the study and placed the issue of 
regional development in perspective. While not undermining the difficult development 
situation across the whole of Nigeria, the chapter notes that development disparity 
exists among the regions. There is thus the need to focus on salient issues that 
brings about regional development disparity in Nigeria. This chapter takes a look at 
popular perceptions put forward to explain Regional Development Disparity (RDD) 
such as the issue of environment and regional development, as well as that of 
conflict and regional development. It was observed that though these were strong 
enough to lead to dearth of development, they are not sufficient enough if affairs of 
the regions are managed well enough to mitigate negative environmental impacts 
and to avert crisis that can cripple developmental efforts.   
 
Consequently, the chapter beginning with exploration of the regional development 
challenges, shifted the regional development paradigm beyond what popular 
literatures on the subject has done to that of governance and how same is and can 
be used to shape regional development. To this end, the central theme of 
governance was given attention with focus on Nigeria. The chapter consequently 
mirrored governance at both the centre where the federal system Nigeria operates 
come under focus and at the   regional levels in Nigeria with associated features and 
how same encouraged development or otherwise explained. Deficient leadership 
manifested in inefficient resource management was established at both national and 
regional levels which negatively impacts developmental efforts. In all, the analysis of 
regional development disparity done in details, adopted hypothesis for the study 
where considered where appropriate; with available data while research questions 
equally found answers in some of the empirical findings that the chapter presented. 
Section 6.1 below begins by putting regional development disparities into 
perspective. 
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6.1 UNDERSTANDING THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT DISPARITIES 
In chapter five, it was noted that the Nigerian state in the face of abundant human 
and natural resources that can be translated into positive development outcomes, 
faces development challenges. While these development challenges at both national 
and regional levels attract popular discourse among many, few talk about their 
underlying causes. This in itself creates the problem of how to situate the underlying 
drivers of underdevelopment, which is reflected in acute shortage of basic 
infrastructural facilities especially at the regional levels. This is further complicated by 
divergent opinions that explain cases of regional underdevelopment. There is thus 
the need to stretch advanced perceptions to establish their merits. 
 
In the South-South region for instance, the people see ‘unfair treatment’ at the center 
with regards to resource distribution, as the cause of the region’s underdevelopment. 
This popular perception is what Wantchekon and Asadurian (2002) and Alabo-
George (2012) termed marginalization which they argued, stemmed from flaws 
associated with the federal system the nation operates. In the South-West on the 
other hand, 75% of respondents during the survey for this research, believe that 
paucity of funds to the region as responsible for their developmental challenges. 
There is thus the need to look at dominant perceptions so as to put in perspectives 
to be able to understand what shapes both national and regional development. 
 
Doing this will enable us examine the adopted hypothesis for this study in chapter 
one which holds that “the oil industry has had an adverse impact on the development 
of Nigeria, and, in particular, the Niger Delta region in which it is concentrated”.  This 
as central hypothetical statement was adopted to guide this study because of the 
need to explain the alleged development disparities between the South-South and 
South-West regions in Nigeria. Serving as explanatory variables, key concepts in 
both the main and supporting hypothesis will help assesses effects of the oil industry 
on Nigerian and regional development. For instance, “Adverse environmental impact 
of the oil industry contributes to underdevelopment." and “Corruption birth and 
deepens underdevelopment”, will be explained in relation to the resource curse 
theory and how same shapes development.  
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6.2 THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE 
As previously noted in both chapters two and five, development challenges confront 
the regions in varying degrees. What many hold responsible for this varies. While 
72% of respondents in the South-South hold flawed federal system responsible for 
their deplorable development situation, 70% of those in the South-West ironically 
believe that related issue of paucity of funds from the centralized federal system is 
an issue. Besides these, there are popular perceptions in the regions that need 
examination. These include the issue of violent conflicts and regional development, 
that of allegedly flawed federal structure in Nigeria that leaves those in the oil 
bearing region feeling short-changed in development terms (Ikeji, 2011, Akpabio and 
Akpan:16). Others includes the issue of paucity of funds to the regions from centrally 
collected oil revenues which in a way exemplify the imbalance federal structure 
earlier mentioned and the issue of negative environmental impacts that affects 
regional development. These perceptions are examined in detail below, to pin down 
their relevance to be able to know extent to which they capture prevailing 
perceptions seen responsible for the development situations at the regional level. 
 
The next section will focus on issue of management of the environment, violent 
conflicts, and that of governance which bifurcates into center and regional 
governance to help put the regional development debate into perspective. 
 
6.2.1 Environment and Regional Development 
As seen above, the argument here has it that adverse environmental impact 
negatively affects regional development. What are then the specific environmental 
issues and how do these shape regional development?  How do the regions fare in 
the face of negative environmental condition impinging development? The South-
South region comprises mainly of coastal terrain, occupying more than 80% of 
Nigeria’s 853km coastline (UNDP, 2006). Consequently, the majority of the 
environment is covered by water unlike the South West region where many states 
except Lagos surrounded by water, comprise of dry land. In addition to the 
unfavourable environmental condition in the region that could serve as trade route 
and rich aquatic resource but for poor management, negative externalities of oil 
exploration further compound the problem. According to Ikelegbe (2013b) and Obi 
(2010), oil exploitation leads to environmental degradation which distorts the 
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ecological system with established consequences on development efforts. To 
examine this, two known effect of oil exploration; oil spill and gas flaring, will be 
carefully considered. 
 
(I) Oil Spills 
According to Adati (2012), oil spills in the Delta (see picture 6.1 below) have been 
occurring for decades and have resulted in contaminated rivers, streams and acute 
deforestation of areas surrounded by water. Amnesty International (2013) however 
observed that the number of oil spills in Nigeria since oil became an economic 
resource of note is unknown. Olagoke (1996) noted that oil spills pose threat to 
human health and conceptualized same as “the release of liquid petroleum products 
to contaminate the environment. A contaminated environment has wide implications. 
This ranges from the degradation  of drinking water, effect on crop yields and dearth 
of aquatic life such as depletion of fishes which serves as natural source of protein in 
the oil bearing Delta. In addition, it also causes acid rain with associated public 
health challenges such as lung cancer and stunted growth in oil bearing region, 
(Odjugo, 2013). Wolicka et al, (2009) noted leakages of oil storage tanks and 
pipelines, oil well blowouts, operational discharges and inefficient terminal loading as 
well as dry dockings and poor transportation processes, causes oil spillages in the 
region. According Ajugwo (2013), cases of oil spill in the Delta captured in the table 
below, are under reported but its manifest impacts are pictured below. 
 
Table 6.1: Statistics of Onshore Oil Spills By Operator 
S/N YEAR 
Agip on 
NOSDRA 
database 
Shell on 
NOSDRA 
database 
Shell on 
Shell’s 
website 
Total and 
E&P on 
NOSDRA 
database 
 
Overall Oil 
spilled 
1 2007 180 171 320* 3 354/503 
2 2008 238 95 210* 3 333/448 
3 2009 258 118 190* 2 378/450 
4 2010 323 188 170* 1 512/49 
5 2011 400 201 207* 1 608/- 
6 2012 474 207 192* 7 688/673 
7 2013 411** 138* 138* - -/- 
TOTAL 2,3421 1,124 1,427 17 2,870/2,119 
 
SOURCE: Amnesty International (2013:10) 
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Note: NOSDRA means National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency. 
 
While the impact of oil spills remain debatable, a 2006 UNDP report and a 2013 
Niger Delta Environmental Studies report, summed up the impact of oil spills on the 
environment as among other things, high mortality of aquatic animals, adverse 
impact on human health due to emission of poisonous substance into the 
atmosphere and loss of biodiversity as well as breeding grounds and damage to 
crops. 
 
Picture 6.1: Cases of oil spill in the Delta 
 
 
 
Source: 1 Ed Kashi and 2 Morris Alagoa (both showing oil spill in oil bearing 
communities) 
 
(II) Gas Flare 
Gas flaring is the release of associated gas into the atmosphere in areas where oil 
production takes place (see Image 2 below). It is employed to dispose-off unwanted 
gas by-product of oil production and happens where there is insufficient 
infrastructural investment in petroleum-producing areas that can utilize this unwanted 
natural gas. The history of gas flaring in Nigeria can be traced to the discovery and 
exploitation of oil itself in the 1960s (Ajugwo, 2013). Available records show that 
flaring of gas is a global phenomenon that exists across oil bearing countries. Asume 
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and Roderick (2005) saw Nigeria as the highest flarer of associated gas in the world, 
while at the same time outlining the associated dangers since this constitutes threat 
to both human and the environment and thus the development of the oil bearing 
delta. Both scholars had observed thus: 
 
“…gas is flared more in Nigeria than anywhere else in the 
world. Estimates are notoriously unreliable, but roughly 2.5 
billion cubic feet of associated gas with crude oil is wasted in 
this way every day. This is equal to 40% of all Africa's natural 
gas consumption in 2001, while the annual financial loss to 
Nigeria is about US $2.5 billion. The flares have contributed 
more greenhouse gases than all of sub-Saharan Africa 
combined. And the flares contain a cocktail of toxins that affect 
the health and livelihood of local communities, exposing Niger 
Delta residents to an increased risk of premature deaths, child 
respiratory illnesses, asthma and cancer.” Asume and Roderick 
(2005:4) 
 
Besides the adverse effect on livelihood, the harmful effects on health of the people, 
is enormous. According to Etekpe (2007) and Ogigbe (2006:6), release of poisonous 
chemicals such as combustible by-products (nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide) into 
the atmosphere, pose threat to human in form of threat to public health in 
communities exposed to the exploration of oil and gas. This Ikelegbe (2013b) noted, 
is associated with health challenges such as respiratory problems and skin cancer 
due to acid rain that equally corrode roofs in oil bearing communities. When this 
happens, host communities that in most cases are not directly impacted with the oil 
wealth, suffer avoidable hardship. Cases like this abound as seen in Otefe and 
Ovade communities in Oghara, both oil bearing communities in the Delta. 
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Picture 6.2: Oil Flames in Pictures 
 
 
Picture 1 by Ed Kashi & Picture 2, Flames of Hell (Oil Report by ThisDay newspaper 
2011) 
 
6.2.2 Environmental Impact 
The overall impact of the environment on development, varies on regional basis, it 
nevertheless remains alarming. As captured in the table below, regional responses 
to the question of how negative environmental practices affect development gave 
rise to divergent opinion in the surveys for this study. In the general survey, a total 
89% and 79% in the South-South and South-West respectively believed that adverse 
environmental impacts inhibit development, especially in oil bearing region, while 
32% and 29% respectively saw no environment as impediment to regional 
development in the face of available resources. What we can deduct from this is 
simply that though the negative externality of oil exploration as captured in the 
survey table 6.2 below is seen by many in the population to pose challenges to 
regional development, it is however insufficient to shape the regional development 
narratives since it failed to pay attention to peculiar internal dynamics that drives 
development. Adverse environmental impact can be managed and if mention is 
made of same unfavourable environmental impact on development, what happened 
to management of the environment? There is therefore the need to consider other 
factors such as leadership. This study decides to see leadership and how same 
shape regional development. Careful look at governance as done in subsequent 
sections will provide the opportunity to balance the regional development narratives 
in Nigeria. 
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Table 6.2: Environmental impact of Oil on Regional basis 
 
 
S/N 
 
 
POSITIVE EFFECT 
 
REGIONAL  
 
 
NEGATIVE EFFECTS 
 
REGIONAL 
SS SW SS SW 
1 
Provision of farming 
and fishing tools 
 
73 
 
35 
Deforestation and 
environmental 
degradation 
 
89 
 
45 
2 
Provision of some 
amenities such as 
light, water and 
health facilities 
 
72 
 
45 
Oil spillage and bio-
chemical land 
degradation 
 
92 
 
28 
3 
Building of schools 
and markets 
65 55 
Extinction of animal 
species 
79 44 
4 
Provision of 
scholarship for locals 
 
65 
 
69 
Adverse health effect 
and noise pollution 
 
87 
 
39 
5 
Provision of 
employment 
opportunities 
 
55 
 
65 
Drastic reduction in 
agricultural yields and 
stunted plant growth 
 
88 
 
51 
6 
Introduction of 
modern farming 
techniques due to 
influx of foreigners 
 
67 
 
51 
Heightened urban 
migration and dwarfed 
rural taste for locally 
made goods 
 
92 
 
50 
 
SOURCE: Field Survey 2014   
 
To be able to determine extent to which supporting hypothesis three (“Adverse 
environmental impacts of the oil industry contribute to underdevelopment”,) adopted 
for this study agrees with collated responses of the people to an environment based 
question posed in the conducted survey for the study, data from table 6.2 above will 
be a guide. Table 6.3 below represents frequency table generated from survey 
question 31 (Q3) which asked “does “negative impact of oil exploration, surpasses its 
benefit in the Delta” and computed chi square from same. Besides the response 
reflected in the table below, 55% elites interviewed, said yes while 21% said no. 
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Table 6.3: Frequency table for Q31 
 
RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION 
 
SS 
 
SW 
 
TOTAL 
YES 320 272 597 
NO 179 79 258 
TOTAL 504 351 855 
 
Source: field survey 2013 
 
The frequency table above captured expressed perceptions that tried to establish a 
nexus between adverse environmental practices and development in both regions. 
The Chi Square table below is done to establish the statistical veracity of this 
perception that the frequency table captured. 
 
Table 6.4: Chi Square Table for Q31 
 
CELLS 
 
Fo 
 
Fe 
 
fo-fe 
 
(fo-fe)2 
 
(fo-fe)2/fe 
A 325 351 -52 2704 7.70 
B 272 245 27 54 0.22 
C 179 152 27 54 0.30 
D 79 105 -26 676 8.55 
TOTAL 855 853 -24 3488 16.77 
 
Source: Researcher’s computation 
 
                                          X2 =        (fo – fe)2          
                                                                 Fe 
 
Calculated X2 > critical X2 @ α =16.77 
 
NOTE:   
X2 = Symbolizes chi-square, fo = frequencies observed, Fe = Frequencies expected 
and = Sigma 
 
From table 6.4 above, there is statistical significance at 95% confidence level 
between adverse environmental impact and development at 16.77% sampling error. 
This shows the perception among people sampled that there exist an association 
between negative environmental impact of oil exploration and development at the 
regional level. The Degree of severity in each region though not established in the 
computation above but can be seen in picture one and two as well as table 6.3 
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above. From the table 6.2 above, the oil bearing region benefited minimally from the 
benefit of oil exploration in terms of “Provision of some amenities such as light, water 
and health facilities at 75%, while suffering 92% “Oil spillage and bio-chemical land 
degradation”. This sharply contrasts with what obtains in the South-West where 
there is 45% and 28% respectively for the same variable under focus. 
  
Evidence of farming and fishing tools the regions received due to oil exploration can 
be seen in the Otefe community farming academy and the Olomoro extension 
farming programme, (Otoghile, 2013:23). Ironically, these are accompanied with high 
degree of deforestation and environmental degradation that followed, vitiating 
expected benefits. Effort made to obtain graphical data to portray level of 
environmental degradation and development, proved abortive due to official secrecy. 
However, popular perception of 79% against 37% in both regions believes that 
negative environmental practices, outweigh expected development. 
 
A situation where negative environmental impact outweighs benefit according to a 
community leader (Interview 16, SS), “amounts to giving with one hand and taking 
back with two” while an environmentalist ((Interview 7, SS), explained that “oil 
exploration has, and continues to destroy the ecosystem, making life difficult for host 
oil communities and making chances of development slimmer each day”. Another 
interviewee (Interview 9, Social commentator) held similar view when he observed 
that “oil exploration destroyed the ecosystem and made development difficult for host 
communities”. An academic who was interviewed for this study (interview 2, 
Academic), goes a step further to confirm impact of adverse environmental practice 
on development as well as laid blames. He observed thus: “the elite class failed to 
use available oil wealth to mitigate avoidable negative impacts of oil exploration on 
the environment. I think it’s a question of leadership failure that spurns corruption 
that manifest laxity in implementing environmental laws meant to curb adverse oil 
exploration activities”. 
 
Synergizing these views above as well as data earlier seen, suggests that “(H3) 
adverse environmental impact of the oil industry contributes to underdevelopment” 
may have some relevance. However, to test this hypothesis more deeply, a robust 
set of environmental and developmental data is needed for statistical analysis. 
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However, for the purposes of this thesis it was not possible to collect such data or 
obtain access to government records that contains such data. Relying on findings 
seen through pictures and tables above, we can say supporting hypothesis number 
three, seems plausible in the light of findings. Next section explores nexus between 
violent conflict and development. 
 
6.2.3 Conflict and Regional Development 
In examining conflict and its relationship to regional development, the focus will be 
on oil related violence in Nigeria and its impact on development. Conflicts in Nigeria 
besides being associated with oil exploration and exploitation in the Delta are also 
concerned with cases of ethnic conflicts, social identify and agitations for resource 
control with a view to gain a vantage position in the quest for resources space by 
ethnic groups (see Chapter Two of this study). While it is difficult to establish the 
extent to which these crises negatively impact upon regional development in Nigeria, 
deeper consideration of this issue in this section explores the impact it has had on 
development. Preliminary findings in this study, shows that conflict make good 
governance and development by extension, difficult. Subsequent paragraphs deals 
with oil related violence in Nigeria. 
 
Resource based violence has come to be identified with the Nigeria state for greater 
part of the period since the oil discovery in 1956. These crises arise due to the 
struggle for resource space by stakeholders in the oil and gas industry. These come 
with their disruptive effect on development which Osaghae et al (2011) noted, 
happen at three levels between the Federal Government and oil bearing 
communities; oil bearing communities and the oil companies as well as that within 
and between the oil bearing communities themselves. Known cases include the 
Ogoni vs Federal govt (1990-95), Elelenwo vs. Shell (2000) and Otefe vs Ovade 
(2003). All these conflicts have to some extent, roots traced to pre-colonial era where 
ethnic minorities canvassed for greater self-determination, local autonomy and 
democracy in the country and have similar causes that border on unresolved issues 
of inequitable resource distribution. The subtle struggle for ample resource space 
initially among the various ethnic groups, took a political dimension with time. This 
happened when oil bearing minority ethnic groups started making moves to resist 
alleged domination by the major ethnic groups with governors instituting court case 
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against the federal government dominated by major ethnic groups in 2002-2005, to 
seek total control of their resources, (Interview 7, SS). Though the case was later 
thrown out for lack of merit, it however signalled a deep seated ethnic divide over 
resource management. 
  
These unresolved issues and the ensuing ethnic based politics, were poorly 
managed which further politicized the polity as groups’ deployed ethnic identity to get 
resource space advantage. The expected reaction was and remains intense struggle 
for ample resource space by the minority groups for equitable distribution of 
resources to shore up their developmental deficits. The phased agitations recorded 
events such as the Ogoni movement of 1995 and the Kaima declaration of 1999 
(Sofiri et al, 2012, Ogege, 2011) and armed militancy by 2001-2004, (Ikelegbe, 
2005). 
 
The violent dimension of the struggle amplified frustration of host oil communities 
that expressed dashed development hopes in the face of extensive oil exploration 
that left huge environmental impacts in its trail (Interview data, Okuegba community, 
FGD 7, SS). It was then possible for aggrieved women, community leaders and 
armed youths to engage the state in armed conflicts all in a bid to achieve desired 
but absent development. The Ogoni nine experiences, Ijaw-Elaje community crisis of 
2001, the Odi invasion of 2006 etc., left destructive spells that negatively affected 
both national and regional development. For example, the Ogoni crisis of 1995 that 
led to the extra judicial killing of agitators, adversely affected economy of the oil 
bearing region as Nigeria had economic sanctions placed upon it by the international 
community (Boele et al, 2001). The situation was however different in the South-
West region with no record of oil related conflicts. The table below chronicles oil 
related conflicts and extent to which, these affected development. 
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Table 6.5: Record of Conflicts 1966-2010 
 
 
S/N 
 
Action/ 
date 
 
Bodies at the 
receiving end 
Affiliation of 
those 
responsible 
 
Demand 
made 
 
Outcome 
1 
Isaac 
Adaka 
Boro’s 
Revolt, 
1966 
Nigerian State Izon Ijaw 
Self- 
determination 
and control of 
resources in 
the Niger Delta 
Agitation/Revolt 
crushed by state 
might 
2 
MOSOP 
1990-1997 
Nigerian State Ogoni people 
Self- 
determination, 
control of 
resources in 
Ogoni land. 
Creation of 
Ogoni state 
and more 
LGAs 
Repressive 
action that led to 
the killing of the 
Ogoni nine 
3 
Hostage 
taking of 
10 
workers/ 
April 2002 
Shell 
Militant Youth 
Gang,  
Ekeremor 
LGA, Ijaw/ 
Bayelsa State 
Ransom 
Demand for 
NGN 3.1m 
Resulted from 
failure to yield to 
alleged frivolous 
demands 
4 
Kidnap of 
staff/ June 
29–July 
2003 
Oil Servicing Co. 
working for Shell 
Ijaw youth 
militants in 
Bomadi/Burutu 
LGAs/ Delta 
State 
 
Demand for 
NGN 25.4m 
State 
Government 
Intervention/ 
Negotiated 
release after 14 
days 
5 
Kidnap of 
9 crew & 4 
military 
escorts of 
oil barges/ 
Nov. 11– 
13 2003 
Several oil firms 
involved 
Ijaw Militants 
Ransom/ 
Other 
demands 
Released 2 
days later after 
threats by State 
Government/ 
Security 
Agencies 
6 
Kidnap of 
14 
workers/ 
Nov.2003 
Chevron Texaco 
Militant Ijaw 
youths/ 
Bayelsa State 
Ransom 
demands 
Intervention of 
State 
Government 
7 
Kidnap of 
19 oil 
workers 
Nobel 
Drilling/Prospecting 
Ijaw Militias/  
Delta State 
 
Ransom 
demands 
 
 
Intervention of 
State 
Government 
8 
Kidnap of 
7 workers/ 
Nov. 28– 
Dec. 2003 
Bredero Shaw Oil 
Servicing Co. 
(Shell) 
Militant Ijaw 
Youths/  Delta 
State 
Ransom 
demands for 
USD 5m. 
State 
Government 
Intervention/ 
Negotiation 
9 
Murder of 
7 workers 
& military 
personnel/  
April 2004 
Chevron Texaco 
Militant youths 
along Benin 
River area/ 
Delta State 
Unclear Unclear 
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10 
MEND 
1999-2008 
 
 
The Nigerian state 
Coalition of oil 
bearing 
communities’ 
youths 
Self-
determination, 
Niger Delta 
republic, 
Resource 
control, 
Political 
relevance, 
security of life 
and property 
Grant of 
amnesty in 2010 
to rehabilitate 
militants, 
enhanced 
development 
attention for the 
region, 
increased 
funding to the 
region 
 
SOURCES: Field work 2013 and Ikelegbe 2005 
 
NOTE:  
Information contained in serial numbers 1-6 were adopted from Ikelegbe (2005) 
while serial numbers 7-10 are survey data.  
 
Though the table 6.5 above only chronicled oil induced conflicts, available records 
didn’t show how much impact this had on development. However, conflicts and 
development are mutually exclusive and as such; impact of conflict on development 
can be appreciated. According to Etekpe (2007) and Keshi, (2012), series of oil 
induced conflict in the Delta, “negatively shaped the development fortune of the oil 
bearing region”. While it is true that no development can take place when peace is 
elusive, neither of the aforementioned authors said extent to which these crises 
affected development. Though Osaghae et al, (2011) collaborated this when they 
observed that the “violent dimension of these crisis, dealt a devastating blow on 
developmental efforts in the region”. Search for solution achieved little until the 
federal government declared amnesty for the militant youths in 2009 (Ibaba, 2011, 
Ogege, 2011 and Sofiri et al, 2012) but not after the recorded social, economic and 
political disruptions believed to have affected regional development in the oil region 
whose socio-economic life got paralyzed due to the inevitable drop in revenue flow 
due to slowed oil production. Consequently, the local people bore the brunt of the 
conflict. A member of the Otefe Community (FGD 5, SS) had this to say. 
 
“The gale of conflicts left us in disarray. Our local lives were 
altered as military men took over our streets, making it difficult 
for us to do our farm work. Our local market days became 
inconsistent after long term suspension. This made life difficult 
for us as a community. We pray that ugly situation is 
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permanently resolved or doesn’t arise again because it affected 
our peace and took away our means of livelihood”. 
 
From the table and the account above, one can say that oil induced conflicts are 
likely to have affected development. The severity of the impact on regional basis is 
also clear from the table and available accounts of recorded oil based conflicts in 
Nigeria. We can however identify the following ways the conflicts affected the oil 
bearing region. First, the economy of the region was negatively impacted due to the 
insecurity in the region. This made simple production difficult with attendant 
economic benefits, left to suffer. Secondly, associated destruction of infrastructure 
due to the crises further depleted available infrastructures in the region. This derailed 
progress made to arrest shortage of available infrastructure in the region. And finally, 
a waste of able-bodied young men needed to build the region in avoidable crisis, is 
believed to have rolled back the developmental stride of the region. In all, 
unmitigated oil related conflicts in Nigeria, seems to have negatively affected 
development in the South-South region.  
 
Though these perceptions put forth above to explain regional development 
challenges in Nigeria appear to put the causes of regional development problems in 
perspective, they however failed to capture the larger picture. If adverse 
environmental impact and conflicts distorts development efforts, what happened to 
effective management to overcome environmental and security challenges? It is in 
this light that subsequent section will explore governance and its effect on 
development. This will help explore salient but largely ignored issues of resource 
management and utilization for development. In the next section, clarification of key 
concept of governance and leadership and how the former connects development 
are given attention. 
 
6.3 GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
Governance can be seen as management of the affairs of society to achieve a goal 
which varies from one individual/society to another. Giving the term a conceptual 
definition, Pryor (2003) said “governance essentially refers to the mechanisms, 
processes and institutions for citizens and groups to exercise their legal rights to 
meet their obligations and mediate their differences”. If governance from all we have 
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seen is taken to be the effective management of societal affairs to achieve goals, 
which could be development, then it can equally be said that there exists vital linkage 
between governance and development. Hyden (1992) highlights the effective, 
proactive and efficient exercise of power and management of the collective will of a 
people or group as crucial to identifying and managing known or envisaged societal 
problems so as to achieve developmental goals. Doing this oftentimes, entail 
formulating and implementing suitable and relevant policies to address such 
identified societal challenges. As Wohlmuth (2000:8) noted, some systems of 
governance can be ‘growth enhancing and developmental’. In similar vein, Demmers 
et al (2004:24) noted that “the year 2000 Good Governance had been globally 
accepted as a crucial means to achieve both development and poverty reduction, as 
is shown by the world leaders’ adoption of the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration”. 
 
Instances abound where governance is used as public instrument to achieve 
developmental goals.  This is often hinged on the quality of leadership that exists. In 
an apparent reference to the pivotal role good leaders play in facilitating responsive 
and result oriented governance, Lawal and Owolabi, (2012) noted that the political 
system must be manned by quality leaders. The absence of good leadership which 
is an inevitable ingredient of governance makes the achievement of development 
goals difficult. Ahmed (2012) traced development challenges in many developing 
countries to the dearth of good leadership which he said, accentuates poor 
governance that besides promoting corruption, trashes development drives. In the 
Nigerian context Ogundiya, (2010) noted that abundant natural and human resource 
endowment in Nigeria is yet to translate to positive development outcomes due to 
dearth of leadership. In a similar manner, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2014) noted 
that absence of purposeful leadership in Africa, serves as the albatross of 
continental development as most leaders destroys the very foundation of 
governance by being unwilling to democratically transmit political powers, e.g. 
Zimbabwe, Libya under late Ghadaffi, Burkina Faso until recently and Niger. What 
this tells us is that leadership plays a vital role in bringing about impactful 
governance since effective administration of public life needed to achieve economic 
growth and development, depends largely on the former. 
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Emphasizing the place of good leadership in governance, Milliken & Krause 
(2002:761) saw good governance, which is the result of the former, as instrument 
that can be deployed to effectively manage available resources to achieve 
development. This happens when the state’s capacity to effectively manage power to 
enhance as well as provide suitable investment climate for human, social and 
economic activities to facilitate economic growth and development, is strengthened. 
We equally need good governance to facilitate effective management of resources to 
achieve development goals. If good leadership encourages development-oriented 
governance, it is then vital that attention is given to issues that encourage good 
leadership that will culminate in good governance. Opaque governance which 
negates principles of governance earlier seen must be avoided because according to 
Iyayi (2010), secrecy in governance in Africa, encourages corruption that vitiates 
developmental efforts. 
 
6.3.1 Governance in Nigeria 
Nigeria operates a federal system made up of thirty six states and a capital city as 
federating units. The nation attempted a unitary system of government between 
1960 and 1970 but failed. The 1970 federal constitution led to the foundation of 
federalism in Nigeria (Ewetan, 2012). While equity is seen as the defining features of 
federalism, this aspect is largely lacking in Nigeria (Ikeji, 2011:12, Higgins, 2009). 
Consequently, the need to give federating units a sense of belonging, have 
prompted calls for entrenchment of true federalism in the country. To understand 
governance in Nigeria in relation to this study, workings of the federal system will be 
considered. 
 
Federalism refers to a political system where there exist at least two levels of 
government that constitutionally share power, influence and responsibilities. 
Associated with K.C. Wheare, who conceived it as a “method of dividing power so 
that general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinate and 
independent”, federalism is not a new concept. Giving it a conceptual definition, 
Approdorai (1975:495) saw federalism as: 
 
“…a state in which there is a central authority that represents 
the whole and acts on behalf of the whole in external affairs 
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and there are also provincial or state authorities with powers of 
legislation and administration within the sphere allotted to them 
by the constitution”. 
 
It works with clear cut constitutional powers that delineate authority and the area of 
influence among the organs/levels of government.  It is often times adopted to foster 
unity among diverse groups, (Otoghile and Eghweree, 2011). 
 
Arowolo (2011:2) noted that federalism in Nigeria developed in the colonial era when 
it was introduced alongside the 1954 Lyttleton constitution. He further noted that 
besides achieving administrative convenience, the colonial administration, adopted 
federalism in Nigeria to achieve unity of the diverse groups that made up the yet to 
be named country in 1954.  Despite the aim, the federal system that eventually 
formed failed to provide a level playing field for all sections of the country as there 
was an unequal division of the country with the North seen by many to be bigger 
than the entire South in landmass. This singular feature which was reflected in the 
larger political landscape signalled beginning of the flaws believed to have been 
entrenched in Nigerian Federalism (Otoghile and Eghweree, 2011). 
 
(A) Governance At The Centre 
As noted above, Nigeria operates a federal system which seems to be unequally 
divided in favour of centre. This section focuses on governance at the center, 
exploring its workings and how it shapes regional development. As previously noted, 
workings of the federal system and environmental governance at the center, will be a 
guide. 
 
(i) Workings Of The Federal System 
As noted above, the working of the federal system in Nigeria is seen to fuel regional 
development disparity. Here, the issue that comes to mind is that of alleged 
imbalance in the federal system with a powerful central government at the expense 
of the federating units. This situation in Nigeria according to Ikeji (2011) engenders 
marginalization of the federating units since power is centralized as the patronage 
politics that ensues; see to it that the federating units unequally benefits from the 
commonwealth, especially in terms of revenue from the center. A powerful center 
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leaves federating units financially disadvantaged and this skews the development 
process. Exploring the issue of fiscal federalism in Nigeria within that defines the 
relationship among the various level of government; Aworo (2011) noted that there 
exists unequal relationship among the various levels of government in Nigeria. The 
issue of revenue sharing in Nigeria has attracted wide debate with many decrying 
the extent to which this births centralization of government. Mention is however not 
made of how this lead to regional marginalization and how same skews 
development. This is extensively discussed in chapter two of this study where the 
political economy of the Nigeria was discussed. 
 
If the federal system seen by many to be flawed in the context of development in 
Nigeria (Ikeji, 2011, Aworo, 2011, Jinadu, 2002), as noted above, it is fundamental 
that we know extent to which this translates to failure of governance. To examine this 
issue, some of the attributes of good governance earlier mentioned will be carefully 
examined in the following sections. These include equity seen through the lens 
provided by governance at the center and accountability mirrored with pictures of 
governance at the regional levels. 
 
(ii) Equity In Central Governance  
Central governance in Nigeria is said to lack equity in several respects. One area in 
which, equity is seen to be lacking includes the structural configuration of the system 
the nation operates. This in turn, fuels disproportionate distribution of resources to 
federating units. It is in this wise that skewed revenue sharing formula in Nigeria 
seen to lack equity, is often an issue in governance. While the federating units are 
expected to be equitably treated irrespective of size or ethnic background, the 
reverse appears to be the case with skewed federal system in terms of size and 
access to resources by the federating units. Consequently, there is subtle struggle 
among the regions represented ethnic groups for adequate resources from the 
center to better their development fortune. 
 
The struggle for ample resources space as earlier noted pitched the regions 
represented by the ethnic groups against one another, was actually the struggle of 
the oil bearing minority of the delta for survival, (Ikelegbe, 2005). Though population 
counts in the sharing of accruable revenue, the manner in which accruable revenues 
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from the center were shared showed lack of equity in resource governance at the 
centre. This situation seems to be at the expense of the minority groups that lack 
both the voice and number in national politics to speak for their interests (Obi, 2010). 
Regions with major ethnic groups such as the monolithic North and the South-West 
get more resources on the basis of adopted revenue sharing formula of landmass 
instead of derivation once used while agriculture sustained the nation (Omeje, 2006). 
On the other hand, minority groups of the oil bearing South-South, get what is widely 
seen as not commensurate with their resource contribution to the federal purse, (Ojo, 
2010). For this reason and other peculiar dynamics such as adverse environmental 
situation, fortunes of oil bearing regions with limited resources from the center, 
dwindles. Consequently, disadvantaged region’s efforts at achieving positive 
development outcomes, yielded minimal result. 
 
In a nutshell, the issue of marginalization in governance at the center borders on 
resource governance. Though this resonates in the political realm as reflected in the 
struggle for elective offices, it equally has effects on regional development. For 
instance, it is widely believed that the oil bearing region of the Delta is marginalized 
due to lack of equity in resource management as captured in the revenue sharing 
schemes (Omeje, 2006) and (Obi, 2010).. While reversal of the trend was expected 
with the election of the country’s first minority president, Goodluck Jonathan, in 2011, 
the trend still continues existential realities, reveal. The period prior to oil era 
witnessed robust revenue sharing formula when between 1960 and 1966 when 
major ethnic groups produced products that sustained the nation, 50% revenue 
allocation policy was adopted. The trend was reversed when oil from minority area 
became main revenue earner, the rule changed as other principles such as 
population and landmass which obviously short-change resource bearing region, 
became operative. Ikelegbe (2010:28) listed the gradual decline when he observed 
thus: “oil based revenues declined from 50% in 1966, to 45% in 1970; 20% in 1975; 
2% in 1982; 1.5% in 1984; and 3% in 1992’. Decline in the revenue sharing 
percentage means reduced revenue to oil bearing regions and this has negatively 
affected regional development initiative while other regions such as the South-West, 
enjoyed robust federal patronage that helped develop cities such as Lagos, 
Abeokuta, Ado-Ekiti and Oshogbo among others. The ‘patronage politics’ at the 
center according to a business leader (Interview 10, SS) and a School teacher 
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(Focused Group Discussion 7, SW) translates to systemic failure at the center that 
limits the regional development effort and invariably cause development deficits. The 
table below captures the gradual decline. 
 
Table 6.6: Gradual changes of the revenue sharing formula over time 
Major revenue 
derivative 
Year 
Allocation 
% 
Benefiting 
ethnic 
groups/state 
Effects on the benefiting 
regions 
Palm oil and 
Palm Kernel 
1954-
1980 
100% Igbo 
Some measures of development 
amidst mild protests 
Cocoa 
1954-
1980 
100% Yoruba 
Some measures of development 
amidst mild protests 
Groundnut and 
Cotton 
1954-
1980 
100% Hausa/Fulani Satisfactory development 
Rubber/Latex 
1954-
1980 
100% 
Mid-Western 
states 
Some measures of development 
amidst mild protests 
Crude oil 
1980-
1999 
25% 
South-South 
region 
Protest, complaints of injustice 
and marginalization 
Crude oil 
1990-
1999 
1.50% Niger Delta 
Complaints of injustice, 
marginalization fear of 
underdevelopment, fear of 
political irrelevance Ethnic 
identity negotiation 
Crude oil 
2000-
2014 
13% 
Niger 
Delta/South-
South minorities 
Resource control agitation, 
marginalization, ethnic identity 
negotiation, underdevelopment, 
intra- inter communal conflicts 
 
Source: Field work, 2013, Ikelegbe 2005 and Akpabio and Akpan (2010) 
 
The 13% derivation policy between 1999/2000 did very little to impact upon the 
centralized federal structure that favoured major ethnic groups at the expense of 
minorities. Ensuing agitations in the region that culminated in armed militancy 
between 2003 and 2008 drew attention to the development plight of the region in the 
face of oil wealth. The argument that inequality in governance at the center fuels 
regional development disparity can be said to have received impetus from existing 
realities. Table 6.7 below which depict patronage politics in Nigeria, show position of 
the regions in the scheme of things.  
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Table 6.7: Patronage vs Working of the Federal System: Where the Regions Stand 
 
 
S/N 
 
ITEM & Corresponding Year 
NO/% 
Where The Regions Stand 
NC NE NW SE SS SW 
1 NO. of president produced 1966-2014 3 1 5 1 1 3 
6 Poverty ratio in the year 2004 67.0 72.2 71.2 26.7 35.1 43.0 
9 
Occupants of petroleum ministers 1970-
2014 
2 4 3 - 1 2 
11 Rate of absolute poverty 2010 59.5 69.0 70.0 58.7 55.9 49.8 
12 Derivation principle 1954-1959 100 100 100 100 100 100 
13 Derivation principle 1968-1980 25 25 25 25 25 25 
14 Derivation principle 1990-1999 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
15 Derivation principle 1999-2014 13 13 13 13 13 13 
 
Sources: Field work 2013/2014, Akpabio and Akpan, 2010, Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 
(2010), National Bureau of Statistics (2010), Mustapha, 2004, Agbola and Olurin 
2003 
 
Where the regions stand in the largely patronage federal system in Nigeria can be 
seen from the table 6.7 above. The trend shows dominance of the system by the 
larger ethnic groups at the expense of the oil bearing minority. This connotes 
lopsided nature of the system earlier noted to be lopsided. If the system were fair, 
evenly shared, benefit would accrue to the federating units in similar manner, 
especially in the allocation system that exists.  
 
To explore this issue further it is important to focus on the issues of representation 
and allocative policies that appeared tilted to favour major ethnic groups. For 
example, the derivation principle of revenue allocation which gives an agreed 
percentage of accruable benefits to regions from where such resources are derived 
was 100% between 1954 and 1959. This coincided with the time agriculture 
sustained the national economy with the ethnic majorities in charge. This changed 
from 1980 as the same principle was reduced to 25% and 1.5% by 1999 when oil 
resources obtained from the minority of the Delta sustained the economy. 
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Consequently, accruable resource to the oil bearing region dropped compared to 
what hitherto was the case in 1954. Development in the region was arguably 
affected due to paucity of funds amidst enormous environmental challenges amidst 
oil exploration. 
 
Another issue worth considering in table 6.7, above is that of representation in 
central government. Inequality in representation manifested as office of the president 
was dominated by major ethnic groups of Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba before now. It took 
relentless protest within the oil bearing Delta to change the trend. While the 
argument of who occupies where may not be tenable in the development narratives 
of the oil bearing delta, it’s important to note that who occupies what and where in 
system where patronage politics is rife, is an issue worth exploring. Who allocates 
resources and developmental projects? The political class peopled by the major 
ethnic groups does. For example, the number of federal ministers from the oil 
bearing minority of the Delta made up of minority ethnic groups in Nigeria, remains 
negligible with major ethnic groups treated differently. Where it ever happens, 
appointed ministers and other political figures, act as support to their majority ethnic 
group counterpart. Example of political appointees of northern extraction made by 
late Sani Abacha, underscore this. Since creation the creation of the nation, no oil 
bearing minority ethnic group has been made a defence minister. The same can also 
be said of minister of justice. That this means is that the region is inadequately 
represented and thus lack the voice to address issues of disparate benefit. 
Consequently, as the ethnic majorities benefit maximally, ethnic minors especially 
the oil bearing Delta, minimally benefits. This was the amplified and palpable feelings 
of the people during the survey conducted for this study. Table 6.7 above captured 
responses to survey questions administered for the study. Being direct response 
from the people, it collaborates the account given above. Synergizing tables five, six 
above as well as responses from table seven below, we can determine where 
supporting hypothesis two adopted for the study stands. 
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TABLE 6.8: Response Rate to Regional Position in an ‘Unbalanced’ Federal system 
(Q 22). 
 
 
RESPONSE 
REGIONS 
SOUTH-SOUTH SOUTH-WEST 
Strongly Agree 970 71.90% 660 64.01% 
Agree 235 17.42% 212 20.58% 
No Opinion 75 5.56% 62 6.02% 
Neutral 39 2.89% 19 1.84% 
Disagree 19 1.41% 22 2.14% 
Strongly disagree 11 0.82% 55 5.34% 
Total 1,349 100% 1,030 100% 
 
SOURCE: Field survey, 2013-2014 
 
From the table four above, a total of 970 and 660 respondents representing 71.90% 
and 64.01% of the sampled population in both South-South and South-West zone 
respectively, strongly agreed that “Faulty federalism and minority status of the Niger 
Delta, contributes to underdevelopment”, should be held responsible for the 
development difficulties of the oil bearing Delta despite oil wealth. Conversely, 11 
and 55 persons in both regions representing 0.82% and 5.34% respectively, feel that 
this is not entirely correct. Reasons for the disagreement, varied from corruption to 
leadership failure. In addition to the tables above, the bar chart of how ethnic groups 
are unfairly treated, equally tell story of flawed federal system that negatively affects 
the Delta with attendant effect on development as the hypothetical statement have it. 
 
Table 6.9: Percentage Mean of how ethnic groups are unfairly treated 
 
GeoZones Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
% of Total 
Sum 
Median Sum 
Grouped 
Median 
SW 1.79 500 1.970 19.6% 1.00 896 1.40 
SS 2.72 509 2.743 30.3% 2.00 1387 1.83 
SE 2.24 242 1.400 11.9% 2.00 543 2.18 
NE 2.06 286 1.827 12.8% 2.00 588 1.76 
NW 1.56 479 1.396 16.3% 1.00 747 1.38 
NC 1.36 308 1.591 9.2% 1.00 420 1.11 
Total 1.97 2324 2.013 100.0% 1.00 4581 1.55 
 
Source: SPSS Computations from Afrobarometer 2009 dataset 
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In addition to the above, action of the central government in funding Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) it created to address development challenges of 
the oil bearing region, shows same unfair treatment. 
 
TABLE 6.10: Federal Release of Funds to NDDC 2001-2008 
 
Year 
Budget 
Allocation 
Releases 
Releases as % 
of Budget 
Releases as % of Federal 
Government Revenue 
2001 10,000 7,500 75% 1.4% 
2002 12,650 11,385 90% 1.85% 
2003 10,064 10,064 100% 1.4% 
2004 14,000 7,000 50% 1.33% 
2005 60,150 17,357 29% 1.2% 
2006 96,250 26,130 26% 1.13% 
2007 26,565 24,000 19% 1.1% 
2008 79,200 19,050 25% 1.3% 
Total 408,880 156,484 - - 
 
SOURCE: Federal Dept. of Finance, Expenditure Dept., June 2004 & Revenue 
Mobilization and Fiscal Commission, February 2009 
 
The table above shows that the central government is not committed to the 
development agency it established to bring about development in the oil bearing 
region believed to have been devastated by environmental degradation. Federal 
project such as East-West road in the Delta suffered neglect due to lopsided federal 
patronage while the situation is different in the South-West region. For example, 
Federal projects such as the dualization of Abeokuta-Ore, Lagos-Ibadan roads as 
well as establishment of modern airports in Lagos, Akure and Osobo, got speedy 
attention. Another interviewee (Interview 12, University Professor) had observed 
that:  
 
“Workings of the federal structure, encourages inequality 
because of the entrenched ethno-religious interest that 
weighed precariously against minority interest groups without 
political voice” 
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A similar view was expressed by a clear majority of participants (69%) during 
focused group discussion conducted for the study, who believed that the federating 
units contribute to the federal purse unequally and are rewarded in similar manner. 
Another interviewee (interview 3, Traditional ruler) attributed deficient development in 
the oil bearing Delta to what he called “cheating of the region in the revenue sharing 
models adopted that change on regular basis”. Though table six and seven above 
supported this submission, it however was not supported by Anonymous (Interview 
NO 11, Civil Society Activist) who observed that:  
 
“Revenue sharing formula though changed severally, it 
however contributed little to the development woes of the oil 
region. What happened to management of given resources for 
development of the region? How do you place the elites placed 
in position to manage the development intervention agencies 
but failed? I think the region simply failed to actualize 
development with given resources and not necessarily unfair 
treatment by the central government as many would have us 
believe. If elite corruption is tackled, the region will develop” 
 
Though the position above refused to see flawed federal system as sufficient reason 
for regional development challenges, it failed to show the extent to which this flaw 
shaped regional development. Table nine below, further shows the patronage nature 
of governance at the center. 
 
TABLE 6.11: Funding of the River Basin Development Authorities 1976-1980 
 
S/N 
River Basin Development Authorities 
(RBDAs) 
BENEFITING 
ZONE 
TUNE of Funding 
(Mn) 
1 Sokoto-Rima Basin Authority North West 650.7 
2 Chad Basin Authority North East 296.6 
3 Hadeija- Jama'are Basin Authority North West 286.8 4 
4 Ogun Osun River Basin Authority South West 183.6 
5 Upper Benue Basin Authority North East 139.5 
6 Niger River Basin Authority North Cent. 131.1 
7 Anambra-lmo Basin Authority South East 118.3 
8 Lower Benue Basin Authority North Cent. 102.3 
9 Benin/Owena River Basin Authority Niger Delta 89.9 
10 Niger Delta River Basin Authority Niger Delta 76.7 
11 Cross River Basin Authority Niger Delta 60.6 
                  Total Allocation 2,136.1 
 
Source: NNPC, (2006:3), Federal office of statistics, 2010:11 
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In all, evidence provided in this chapter supports hypothesis two which sees the 
absence of equity in governance at the center, negatively shaping regional 
development: “Lopsided Federal structure undermines equitable distribution of 
resources which leads to underdevelopment in politically less powerful regions”.  
What this implies, is that the imbalance in the system, disproportionately reward the 
regions, with politically powerful regions at advantage. In relation to this study, 
South-South zone from data seen above, experience less political patronage 
because of the minority status unlike the South-West due to its majority status. This 
amplified the patronage politics this study noted, stifles regional development efforts. 
To expand the governance discourse and how same shapes regional development, 
there is the need to explore other variables such as regional governance which the 
section below, focuses on. 
 
(B) REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 
Besides governance at the central earlier seen, federating units of state, local and 
communities, also play governance role. At these levels, government play roles that 
shape the developmental process as far as their area of influence is concerned. That 
is why this section governance at the regional level will be carefully considered. 
Doing this means a focus on the revenue receipt and expenditure pyramid of the 
regions and how this translates into positive development outcomes. To look at 
governance at the regional level, the focus will be on the following themes: resource 
management, the handling of government authority and elite dominance of public life 
and how these shape development process across regional levels. 
 
(i) Resource Management  
Resource management and its translation into development has been the 
preoccupation of this study as it analysed how oil revenue fail to contribute 
significantly to regional political and socio-economic development in Nigeria. This 
leaves the question of how efficient available oil resources are managed to impact 
the socio-economic development of Nigeria largely unanswered. Regional 
economies prior to discovery of oil in commercial quantities, survived based on 
agriculture. Despite the amount earned from oil revenue in the 1970s which raised 
hope of speedy development, this remains elusive as majority of the people live in 
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poverty. Thomas and Canagarajah (2002:4) attributed this to failure of government to 
effectively manage oil wealth.  
  
While the picture painted above depicts what happens at the national level, the data 
collected in this research suggests a similar thing is happening at the regional levels 
where very little is achieved with the available resources in terms of development in 
the face of biting corruption (Interview 15, SS, Development experts). At this level, 
public policies are argued to be wilfully distorted and the management of the 
economy to facilitate positive development outcomes is undermined by the elite 
class putting their interests first (Ibaba, 2011:12). Consequently, tales of continuing 
failure to effectively tackle both poverty and regional underdevelopment, abound.   
 
“With bloated annual budgets withered by large scale 
corruption, little is achieved in development terms. Resource 
management can only make needed development impact only 
if the elite class stop corruption and resource mismanagement.” 
(Interview 4, Social Critic; SS). 
 
The respondent’s position above though captured popular opinion expressed by 72% 
survey respondents that identified poor governance induced corruption as 
problematic. As there are systemic lapses that make self-enrichment possible since 
elite dominated socio-political system, lapses are inevitable. 
 
Mention was made of huge regional budgets that achieved very little in development 
terms in chapter one of this study. This we noted was perhaps acerbated by 
corruption. Corruption has been identified in this thesis as having negative impacts 
on both human and infrastructural development in Nigeria. This has continued to 
dwarf the enormous potential that exists through efficient resource management to 
facilitate positive development outcomes at the regional level. Rather than manage 
the economies, investment in agriculture, and real estate for instance, those saddled 
with government powers allegedly simply enrich themselves, (Nwabuzor, 2006). This 
prompted Okonjo-Iweala (2009:22) to conclude that: 
 
“Little progress has been made in putting in place the 
infrastructure, and consistent microeconomic and sectoral 
policies needed to encourage private sector investment to 
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induce this growth. This has largely been due to serious 
corruption and governance issues. Little progress will be made 
as long as monies intended to upgrade and install new 
infrastructure are not directed to their intended uses.” 
 
Cited examples collected in the course of the research of corrupt enrichment at the 
expense of regional development include Lucky Igbinedion’s waste of Edo State 
funds for eight years without commensurate development, (FGD 05, SS);  Lucky 
Igbinedion was a state governor in the oil bearing Delta). He was later charged and 
convicted for corrupt self-enrichment. Another is the case of Olomoro community in 
Delta state where a committee saddled with task of managing funds meant for 
development was accused by one interviewee of having used the funds for their own 
benefit rather than wider community development (Interview 12, SS). 
 
(II) Use Of Government Authority 
Besides poor resource governance noted above, government authorities also lack 
effectual management at the regional levels. At this level, there is poor handling of 
government authority expected to manage societal affairs to achieve developmental 
goals. This was attributed by respondents in the field survey to absence of needed 
leadership skills by those saddled with government authority. In the course of the 
survey conducted, 72% and 69% in the SS and the SW respectively, noted the 
absence of effective management of government authority which they saw as dearth 
of proactive leadership. A proactive leader they argue is able to identify peculiar 
societal needs and make sure steps are taken to meet them. At the regional levels, 
respondents argued that this is not the case and they attributed this to lack of 
discipline by those saddled with government authorities which affect their ability to 
take steps to address obvious developmental challenge. This inability, 61% of 
respondents believe, receives impetus from endemic corruption that makes it 
possible for public officials to enrich themselves with public funds, making public 
office a lucrative business by those in position of political authority. Strong sectional 
alliance and support, arguably gives such corrupt officials unofficial support 
whenever they reward themselves with public funds. This leaves governance at both 
the state/regional and communal levels, in bad shape and development unattended. 
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According to Ikelegbe (2013:11) the “…lure of public office has constructed a terrain 
of political and electoral violence, as everyone engages the other in vitriolic and epic 
warfare over access to choice offices that are not for service but private enrichment”. 
This brings to the fore flaws associated with the electoral system that make 
manipulation of the system possible. This is seen in chaotic electoral processes in 
the country that undermine the essence of popular and inclusive governance. The 
overall impact of this on regional development is enormous and varies from one 
region to the other.  A possible explanation was seen in that made while reviewing 
associated literatures on resource curse in chapter 2 where the domestic impact was 
made known. What appears to be predatory oil clientelism is believed to have arisen 
as oil resources thrived amidst allegedly corrupt system. This inevitably led to poor 
resource management since bad governance which precipitates political, 
unavoidably manifests. Consequently, leakages are seen to exist between tax and 
government since accountability would naturally became a problem as the system is 
corrupt ridden with weak democratic structures. 
  
According to responses from the fieldwork in this research, in the SS, oil clients 
dominate and make it possible for them to reward themselves with public resources 
so as to remain in power. This has hindered regional ability to undertake meaningful 
developmental initiatives. The story was slightly different in the SW where there 
appear to be transparent management of resources.  As one respondent put it (, 
FGD 9, SW):  
 
“Massive abuses of oil revenues have over the years served 
the voracious appetite of the political class at the expense of 
development. This is why Nigeria's socio-economic 
development challenges persist due to gross mismanagement 
of government authority manifested in resources 
mismanagement” 
 
The implication of this argument is that personal interest rather than development 
are served. This feeds into the argument of how intricate political interest of the elite 
class, seems to limit development. 
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(III) Elite Dominance Of Public Life 
Following from the above, regional governance in Nigeria has privileged elites 
dominating the political system. The oil dominated economy, attracts rent seeking 
elites that pursue their personal interest and not development. This paves way for 
the elite class to emerge as economic bourgeoisies with immense wealth at the 
expense of the state. The undue advantage that comes with capture of the economy, 
gives the elite power opportunities for self-enrichment and to edge out majority of the 
people from the governance process. Clear example is evident in the list of owners 
of oil wells in Nigeria. The ownership is believed to be lopsided as both elite majority 
ethnic groups, dominates with the Northern and South West owning 83% and 13% 
respectively (Oluwole, 2013). Besides being self-serving, they have huge political 
control. The self-serving nature of the ruling elites besides compromising the needs 
of the various regions, qualifies them for what Lewis (2010) called ‘roving bandits’. 
 
The big picture was seen in chapter three where conceptual issues of corruption in 
Nigeria, was discussed among other things. Nwabuzor (2006), Shaxson (2007) and 
Mustapha, (2010) held that high concentration of self-seeking elites in government 
often times pursuing self-enriching goals, thwarts developmental efforts. Ironically, 
this shapes the elite driven public life at the regional levels where governance is less 
responsive to development needs. While the picture painted depicts what happens in 
the South-South zone, it is however different in the South-West where ruling elites 
appear to be development conscious. According to an Interviewee, (interview 6 SW), 
the elite classes are answerable to the people who regularly ask questions. While an 
interview from the SS (FGD 3, SS) noted that “elite class are in a world of their own 
where mad acquisition of wealth at the expense of development, is top on their 
wicked agenda. The region will suffer development challenges as long as this 
continues”. ”. An interviewee (Interview 7, Rtd Military officer, SW) acknowledged 
prevalence of elite in every system, he noted that “where elite exists, it’s for the good 
of the system and not necessarily for selfish reasons. However, our peculiar case is 
due to the low level of education that makes few educated folks to hijack governance 
for selves”. 
 
While the respondent explained away elite dominance with his observation, it is clear 
from Aina’s position that people in the SW have the opportunity to ask question and 
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put their leaders to account for their stewardship and be able to chart the cause of 
development; an opportunity that eludes those in the SS. Development disparity 
arises from elite dominated political system at the regional levels Teriba (2014). 
 
Besides perceptions of elite dominance and corruption and self-serving behaviour 
amongst the elite class, there is apparent disarticulated of public development 
policies. At the communal levels, conflict of interest occurs between community 
members and those saddled with governance responsibilities as well as opinion 
leaders due to rivalry anchored on mutual suspicion. Where it is poorly managed, the 
struggle for resource space could boil-over to disrupt initiated community 
development projects. In some cases, community leaders receive bribes from oil 
companies to compromise development projects and compensation due to the 
communities. The case of Olomoro community in Delta state where communal 
uprising among the ruling elders and opinion leaders that led to the killing of their 
king, amplifies this. The self-interest actions and dissensions among the youth 
groups, women, elders, chiefs and local king makers, leads to physical harassment 
of both local and expatriate company staff seen to have direct links with TNOCs. 
Known example remains the Ogoni and Ovade episodes (FGD 2 & 9, SS) where in-
fighting, caused crisis that thwarted rather than encourage development efforts. 
Failure to amicably resolve such issues, has led to the kidnap of staff and eventual 
abandonment of initiated projects as was the case in Otefe community where 
community liaison officer to Pan Ocean Oil Company was attacked for taking sides 
with the TNOC. A similar case was recorded in Olomoro community in 2010, 
(Ikelegbe, 2013:15). Where crisis ensues as seen above, projects are either re-
directed or out-rightly abandoned with beneficiaries denied accompanying benefits 
(Ikelegbe, 2009). 
  
In all, besides the aforementioned factors that tend to explain causes of regional 
development challenges in Nigeria, the role governance plays is crucial. Painfully, 
there seems to be a governance deficit at all the levels of governance considered. 
Expressed views of the people captured in the table below, makes this clear. 
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Table 6.12: View of Nigerians on leadership related issues 
 
 
S/N 
 
PRIORITY 
DISLIKE 
1960-1990 
    DISLIKE 
1991-2013 
SS SW NATIONAL SS SW NATIONAL 
1 Poor leadership * 17 11 15 76 49 50 
2 Poor governance* 16 9 13 75 56 65 
3 Corruption* 14 7 12 62 79 77 
4 Environmental degradation* 14 4 5 91 34 55 
5 Unemployment 14 11 13 67 65 79 
6 Low education 11 7 9 64 33 45 
7 Insecurity 6 14 12 77 65 90 
8 Lack of infrastructure* 4 2 5 89 71 67 
9 High cost of living 4 3 5 59 67 62 
10 Poverty 3 4 6 55 48 60 
 
Source: Field survey 2013 and Francis Paul, Deirdre Lapin, and Rossiasco 
(2011:34) 
 
NOTE: 
The table above combined both secondary and secondary data. Items asterisked are 
primary data obtained mainly from the FGD exercise conducted during the survey 
where participants were made to vote on core issues central to the study. Each item 
were placed on cardboard where those in support or against; were counted. The 
periodization was purposefully done to mirror what the situation was before and 
during oil exploration in both regions. Detailed analysis on trend of the data and what 
it reveals in relation to the study, is  
 
From the table, between 1960 and 1990 prior to oil dominance of the economy, 
people of the South-South and the South-West, had 17% and 04% dislike for the 
kind of governance in their regions respectively. This increased to 49% and 76% in 
reverse order between 1990 and 2013 as oil became an economic factor. What this 
tells us is that though enormous resources are in the hands of those in government 
which increased development expectation, those saddled with governance 
responsibilities, failed largely in their responsibilities. Consequently, there may well 
be a failure by the ruling elites to translate available resources to positive 
development outcomes. This study saw this governance deficit with varying degree 
of severity across the region. In the South-West, those saddled with leadership 
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responsibilities are seen to be more responsive to the people when compared to the 
South-South, (FGD 2 & 6). Elite dominance and resource management tango and 
effect of same on development came crispier when mirrored against adopted 
theoretical frames of analysis. In the light of the above, adopted hypothesis for the 
study will be weighed against available data. 
 
To put supporting hypothesis two adopted for this study which seeks to examine the 
‘extent to which ‘leadership failure’ and rent-seeking induced ‘corruption’ cripples 
development efforts’ into perspective, focus will be on data collected that addresses 
these variables. Focus on regional governance so far where there appear to be 
apparent leadership failures and endemic corruption cases. Tables 6.12 above  and 
6.13 below, guides us in doing this. 
 
(IV) Leadership failure, Corruption and Development: 
The account of governance deficit so far seen suggests leadership failure. To 
establish this, people’s perception on this was recorded to establish the extent to 
which respondents held leadership failure responsible for their development 
challenges. Responses to the question of how “Leadership failure contributes to the 
development woes of your region in the face of oil production”, are presented in the 
table below. 
 
TABLE 6.13: Response Rate to Question 28: “Leadership failure contributes to the 
development woes of your region in the face of oil production” 
 
 
RESPONSE 
REGIONS 
SOUTH-SOUTH % SOUTH-WEST % 
Strongly Agree 734 72.53 579 59.51 
Agree 205 20.26 312 32.10 
No Opinion 34 3.36 39 4.01 
Neutral 19 1.89 10 1.03 
Disagree 13 1.28 17 1.75 
Strongly 
disagree 
07 0.69 16 1.64 
Total 1,012 100 973 100 
 
Source: Field survey 2013 
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The table above shows that 72.53% and 59.51% in both South-South and South-
West respectively strongly agreed that leadership failure fuels regional 
underdevelopment. Implication of this is that leadership failure besides affecting 
development is perceived to be more severe in the oil bearing region of the SS.  In 
similar vein, issue of corruption and how same cripple development efforts, supports 
views expressed above as well as that seen in the bale below. 
 
TABLE 6.14: Cases of corruption on regional basis 
S/No Name Region Social status Case Case status 
1 Ayo Fayose SW 
Former Governor of 
Ekiti state 
Trial on-going (#1.2 
billion) 
Granted bail by the 
court 
2 
Adenike 
Grange 
SW 
Former Minister of 
Health 
For hearing (#300 
million) 
Granted bail by the 
court 
3 James Ibori SS 
Former Governor of 
Delta State 
Alleged to have 
stolen billions of the 
oil rich state’s funds 
Acquitted in Nigeria but 
later jailed by a UK 
court for same offence 
4 
Iyabo 
Obasanjo-
Bello 
SW Serving Senator 
Trial on-going (#10 
million) 
Granted bail by the 
court 
5 
Lucky 
Igbinedion 
SS 
Former Governor of 
Edo State 
Alleged and 
convicted for stealing 
the state’s funds 
Convicted but the 
EFCC appealed the 
judgment 
6 Roland Iyayi SS 
Former Managing 
Director of FAAN 
Trial on-going (5.6 
billion) 
Granted bail by court 
7 
Nyesom 
Wike 
SS 
Serving Chief of 
Staff to Governor of 
Rivers State 
For hearing (#4.670 
billion) 
Granted bail by court 
8 
Kenny 
Martins 
SW 
Police Equipment 
Fund 
Trial on-going (7.740 
billion) suspect 
Granted bail by court 
9 
Prof. 
Babalola 
Borisade 
SW 
Former Minister of 
Aviation 
Trial On-going (5.6 
billion) 
Granted bail by court 
10 
Femi Fani-
Kayode 
SW 
Former Minister of 
Aviation 
Trial on-going (#250 
million) 
Granted bail by court 
11 Bode George SW 
Chieftain of the 
ruling PDP 
Trail on-going (#100 
billion) suspect 
Granted bail by court 
12 
Rasheed 
Ladoja 
SW 
Former Governor of 
Oyo State 
Trial on-going (#6 
billion) 
Granted bail by court 
 
SOURCE: Field work 2013, Agih (2009) and Leadership Newspaper, (2010 Sunday, 
June 28, P.5). 
 
NOTE:  
# used in the table represents Naira sign, the Nigerian currency symbol.  
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From table 6.13 above, recorded cases of corrupt practices on regional basis, shows 
the South-West lead with a total of eight known corruption cases prosecuted by the 
Nigerian anti-corruption agency, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, 
(EFCC. However, the story is different in the corruption index projected by the 
Afrobarometer for 2013 with the South-South taking the corruption lead. 
 
Table 6.15: 2013 Percentage of Corruption on Regional basis  
Region Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
Sum 
Grouped 
Median 
% of Total Sum 
Lagos 1.69 187 .694 315 1.64 7.4% 
North-Central 1.72 337 .796 579 1.66 13.7% 
North-East 1.75 297 .723 519 1.72 12.3% 
North-West 1.67 545 .635 913 1.65 21.6% 
South-East 1.87 302 .941 564 1.81 13.3% 
South-South 1.91 390 1.482 744 1.67 17.6% 
South-West 1.74 343 1.073 597 1.63 14.1% 
Total 1.76 2400 .959 4231 1.68 100.0% 
 
SOURCE: Researcher 2013 Afrobarometer SPSS computations 
 
Elite interviews conducted on the same subject, revealed that there is a link between 
corruption and regional underdevelopment. An environmental activist (interview 5, 
civil society) remarked that “the dominance of the public life by the petro-bourgeois, 
sap the region of needed funds for development. This is worsen by the largely 
patronage system that the nation operates that leaves minority groups like the oil 
bearing regions, disadvantaged in development terms”. The aforementioned 
supporting hypothesis in the light of the above, we can say leadership failure as seen 
in the oil bearing region seemingly contributes to the development challenges of your 
region in the face of oil production”. Though many believe that corruption in the oil 
bearing region is enough to stunt development, available data do not support this 
claim as corruption appears endemic in both regions. We cannot thus say that 
“Corruption is more likely in oil rich regions despite the fact oil wealth encourages 
rent seeking”. The reason why development appears disparate in both regions can 
be attributed to leadership approaches which is responsive in the South-West and 
non-responsive in the Delta. The next section, tests the main hypothesis for the 
study. 
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6.4 TESTING MAIN HYPOTHESIS ADOPTED FOR THE STUDY 
To test this hypothetical statement adopted for this study, triangulation of data would 
be employed. Among data sources to be used, include tables and pictures depicting 
adverse effect of oil exploration on development of Nigeria, particularly, the Delta. All 
these would be in addition to responses to questions posed during survey conducted 
for the study. Other invaluable data sources include Afrobarometer dataset, official 
government documents and publications relevant to the study. As stated in chapter 
one, a core question the study seeks answers to shown below, is largely supported;  
 
“Why has the oil industry had an adverse impact on the 
development of Nigeria, and, in particular, the Niger Delta 
region in which it is concentrated? 
 
To put this in perspective, two key areas of how the oil industry adversely impacts 
the nation’s development will be considered. These are the environment and 
administrative impacts. As illustrated above, oil exploration have adverse 
environmental impact that negatively affects the nation’s development. Account of oil 
spillage and gas flaring depicted with picture one and two above as well as picture 
three below, collaborates adverse environmental impact of oil exploration. This 
makes development difficult since the environment, plays key role in the 
development process. Other environment linked effect of the oil industry seen to 
have affected the development quest of Nigeria and the Delta in particular, is dearth 
of the agricultural sector as noted in chapter five, supported the nation and region’s 
economy prior to oil discovery and commercial viability of same. Supplementary role 
agriculture played to support economic growth, vanished, thus killing the industrial 
and production sectors of the economy, (Edigin, 2014:46). 
 
Administratively, the oil industry negatively shaped development of Nigeria in the 
following ways. They include:  
 
(i) Creation of elite dominance of public life which thrived on corruption, 
(ii) Dearth of accountable leadership capable of championing development 
course.  
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These factors seem to have created an avoidable struggle among the political class 
for power to administer oil wealth rather than proactive regimes that can solve 
problems. 
 
While virtually all the above are self-explanatory, salient points in the data here 
presented below, will help make this clearer. Table one that chronicled administrative 
corruption discussed in chapter three and section 6.6 above which talks about oil 
induced patronage politics in Nigeria, negatively affected development of the nation. 
In addition, response to the survey questions 11 and 17 presented in the tables 
below suggest that people perceive the disruptive effect of the oil industry on the 
development of the nation. 
 
TABLE 6.16: Responses to Q17 (Development challenges are more pronounced in 
the oil bearing region compared to the South-West 
 
 
RESPONSE 
 
REGIONAL AGGREGATE 
SOUTH-SOUTH % SOUTH-WEST % 
Strongly 
Agree 812 65.59% 775 70.39% 
Agree 317 25.61% 219 19.89% 
No Opinion 71 5.74% 51 4.63% 
Neutral 07 0.57% 17 1.54% 
Disagree 10 0.81% 20 1.82% 
Strongly 
disagree 21 1.69% 19 1.73% 
 
Source: Field survey 2013 
 
The table above, shows that majority of the people believe that development 
challenges are more pronounced in the oil bearing region compared to the South-
West region. A total of 65.59% and 70.39% in the South-South and South-West 
respectively, strongly agreed that development woes plague the Delta more. This 
response rate can be attributed to the expectation-reality loop, that’s the expected 
development due to abundant oil wealth and the stack reality of lack despite the 
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wealth.  If the people so believe that development difficulties occur more in the delta 
compared to the South West region, how does this pan out in the larger picture of 
the adopted hypothesis? Analysis of responses to Q11 as done below, make the 
picture clearer. 
 
TABLE 6.17: Responses to Q11 (Resource /Oil and its exploration have brought 
development to Nigeria) 
 
 
RESPONSE 
REGIONAL AGGREGATE 
SOUTH-SOUTH % SOUTH-WEST % 
Strongly Agree 879 66.44% 695 66.57% 
Agree 316 23.88% 239 22.89% 
No Opinion 81 6.12% 61 5.84% 
Neutral 17 1.28% 19 1.82% 
Disagree 11 0.83% 13 1.25% 
Strongly disagree 19 1.44% 17 1.63% 
Total 1,323 100% 1,044 100% 
 
Source: Field survey 2013 
 
Though both tables differ slightly but paint similar picture of higher percentage of 
people strongly agreeing that development is far removed from the oil bearing region 
and that oil exploration has failed to develop Nigeria. A majority of respondents, 
66.44% and 66.57% in both regions, respectively held this view. The Percentage of 
people that hold similar views during the focus group discussion, equally weigh in 
this direction of support for the adopted hypothesis for the study. Collated on 
regional basis, 85% and 73% in the South-South and South-West respectively, 
agreed that oil exploration in Nigeria, achieved very little in development terms. 
Transcribed elite interviews, equally supports this. An interviewee (Interview 1 SS, 
Traditional ruler) had observed thus: “Oil exploration has destroyed our environment 
and denied our ecosystem the needed strength to sustain our farm work. In 
development terms, very little can be said to have been achieved as oil wealth in the 
hands of politicians, are used for private gains rather than development.  A similar 
view was equally expressed by another interviewee who works with an oil company 
when he said that: 
 
“Oil wealth has failed to translate to expected development 
because of the opaque nature of the oil industry. Virtually all 
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concerned with management of oil resources, pursue personal 
interest with little regard to the devastated environment and 
development. I think we would have been better off without oil 
since its discovery leaves very little to show for it besides few 
privileged elites that became millionaires” (Interview 8, SW) 
 
In view of this and data presented above, we can say “the oil industry has had an 
adverse impact on the development of Nigeria, and, in particular, the Niger Delta 
region in which it is concentrated”. Table 5.5 and 5.7 in the fifth chapter of this study, 
showed the unfavourable position of the region in terms of development. The region 
has 93.1 % of very poor people against national average of 37.2% while that of the 
South-West stood at 30.4%.  The graph below showing how often people go without 
food on a regional basis, though it shows the NC leading the packs, it still have the 
SS having more people going without food unlike what obtains in the SW in the 
same graph shown below. 
 
GRAPH 6.1: 2008 food poverty on regional basis 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Researcher 2008 Afrobarometer SPSS computation 
 
On the basis of this and analysis done so far in this chapter depicting adverse effect 
of oil production on the environment seen via the lens of oil spills with damning 
environmental consequences, we can then conclude that findings in this study, 
supports the hypotheses that the oil industry has had an adverse impact on the 
development of Nigeria, and, in particular, the Niger Delta region in which it is 
concentrated.  
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Furthermore, survey data from administered questionnaires, besides been analysed 
as appropriate as seen above, is also presented here to establish regional 
development positions.  Here, some questions vital to analysis that ran through the 
study, are presented in table 6.18 below, with both the frequency and percentage of 
responses in a particular manner as well as the use of Spearman ranking system to 
establish the correlation efficiency ratio of responses of respondents to a particular 
question and extent to which that can be relied on. See Appendix G below for the 
response rate to questions posed on regional basis.  
 
TABLE 6.18: correlation efficiency ratio of responses to some questionnaire 
questions (Spearman ranking). 
 
S/N Questions  Region SA A NO N D SD R 
12 
Resource /Oil and its 
exploration have brought 
development to Nigeria. 
South-
South 
879 
(66.4) 
316 
(23.9) 
81 
(6.1) 
17 
(1.3) 
11 
(0.8) 
19 
(1.4) 
0.99 
South 
West 
695 
(66.6) 
239 
(22.9) 
61 
(5.8) 
19 
(1.8) 
13 
(1.2) 
17 
(1.6) 
13 
The South-South and South-
West zones are richly endowed 
with natural resources capable 
of engendering development 
South-
South 
778 
(56.9) 
523 
(38.3) 
9 
(0.7) 
33 
(2.4) 
21 
(1.5) 
3 
(0.2) 
0.98 
South 
West 
693 
(50.9) 
601 
(44.2) 
12 
(0.9) 
19 
(1.4) 
29 
(2.1) 
7 
(0.5) 
14 
Utilization of these resources 
has brought about even 
development in both zones. 
South-
South 
19 
(1.2) 
8 
(0.5) 
11 
(0.7) 
9 
(0.6) 
599 
(38.2) 
921 
(58.8) 
0.98 
South 
West 
17 
(1.2) 
7 
(0.5) 
6 
(0.4) 
11 
(0.8) 
420 
(29.4) 
970 
(67.8) 
15 
Development is obviously 
reflected in the South-West than 
in the South-South zones in the 
face of resource utilization 
South-
South 
1027 
(59.8) 
357 
(20.8) 
9 
(0.5) 
13 
(0.8) 
110 
(6.4) 
201 
(11.7) 
0.99 
South-
West 
361 
(40) 
311 
(34.4) 
8 
(0.9) 
17 
(1.9) 
97 
(10.7) 
109 
(12.1) 
16 
Inefficient resource  utilization in 
both zones, leads to 
underdevelopment in the face of 
abundant resource wealth 
South-
South 
820 
(50.1) 
677 
(42) 
7 
(0.4) 
19 
(1.2) 
27 
(1.7) 
63 
(3.9) 
0.99 
South-
West 
774 
(55) 
530 
(37.7) 
13 
(0.9) 
11 
(0.8) 
21 
(1.5) 
58 
(4.1) 
35 
Allowing regional control of 
natural resources would bring 
about development 
South-
South 
1391 
(57.2) 
909 
(37.4) 
9 
(0.4) 
19 
(0.8) 
31 
(1.3) 
73 (3) 
─0.35 
South-
West 
181 
(7.6) 
93 
(3.9) 
11 
(0.5) 
13 
(0.5) 
1155 
(48.7) 
919 
(38.7) 
SOURCE: Author. 
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Where SA = strongly agreed, A = Agreed, NO = No opinion, N = Neutral, D = 
Disagreed, SD = Strongly Disagreed, r = Correlation efficiency (Spearman ranking). 
 
NOTE:  
r varies between 0 and 1. The closer r is to 1, the stronger the agreement (or 
disagreement) between the perceptions of the respondents from south-south and 
southwest, and the closer r is to 0, the weaker. Positive (+) r signifies agreement and 
negative (─) r value indicates disagreement. 
 
From table 6.18 above, it can be seen that ‘r’, carries a negative sign because it is 
far from 1. What this means, is that the people failed to agree on the issue of 
resource control as a leeway to internal regional development. Granted that this 
captures how the people responded, it is however important we realize that 
differences in both regional development status and political position, influences 
some of the responses. If the natural resource that sustains the nation were found in 
the SW, the reserve outcome would have been possible. The people of SW with the 
highest percentage of those strongly disagreeing as against those in SS seeking 
control of their resource, highlights the oil politics this study observed; i.e. the failure 
to facilitate development at both national and regional levels. This reinforces my 
argument that malignant oil politics that thrived on patronage politics hinders both 
regional and national development. Sub hypothesis two of this study (See chapter 
one), reflects this. 
 
Related to the issue of governance which came out strong as having perceived links 
with regional development situation, are the issues of how both politicians and 
structure of governance, interfere with the development process. Respondents to 
administered question and focus group discussions were almost unanimous in their 
response to this issue. Responses to Q20 and Q22 are quite interesting here. 
Though percentage of response to the measurement scale appears similar, 
observed differences, reveals what this study is interested in. For example, while 
71.9% believes that faulty federal system denies them development in the SS, 66.07 
believe the same in the SW. What comes to mind here is embedded disenchantment 
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about workings of the Nigerian system that this has study noted is rooted in 
patronage politics. If the SW with majority ethnic group still complains of 
unfavourable federal system, the plight of oil bearing minority SS region can better 
be understood. 
 
Graph 6.2: Q22: Faulty federalism and minority status of the Niger Delta, contributes to 
underdevelopment 
 
Source: Author 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sought to better understand the factors that contribute towards 
regional development disparities in Nigeria. Focus was on the South-South region, 
mirrored against the South-West region as the scope of this study. The central 
argument had been that though there is some truth in the popular assumptions that 
holds difficult physical environment, trickle revenue inflows, poor environmental 
management, poor corporate social responsibility and violent conflicts responsible 
for the regions’ subsisting development challenges, there exist greater and more 
dominant truth to explain the development situation of the region. Governance was 
therefore singled out to explain regional dynamics that accentuated 
underdevelopment in the regions. Consequently, poor governance seen as off-shot 
of ineptitude is seen as a root cause of the under-development of the regions with 
greater severity seen more in the Delta. 
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Having outlined the main empirical findings and their relationship to research 
hypothesis, the next chapter (seven) of the study summarizes the key findings and 
concludes with policy recommendations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 202 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
“Oil wealth has failed to translate to expected development 
because of the opaque nature of the oil industry. Virtually all 
concerned with management of oil resources, pursue personal 
interest with little regard to the devastated environment and 
development. I think we would have been better off without oil 
since its discovery leaves very little to show for it besides few 
privileged elites that became millionaires” (Interview 8, SW). 
 
The above remark was made by an interviewee who works with an oil company in an 
interview conducted during the study. This comment indicates how well, oil wealth 
failed to engender needed development in Nigeria. A very similar examination has 
been empirically presented by this thesis’ examination of the impact of oil wealth on 
regional development in Nigeria.  
 
This thesis explored the complex nexus between oil, politics and regional 
development in Nigeria. It explored how intricate oil politics shape regional 
development in Nigeria with special focus on the period between 2000 and 2013. In 
specific terms, the study looked at internal political dynamics that shaped 
management of oil resources and how this influences the developmental process 
both at the national and regional levels. 
 
As outlined in Chapter One, the main aims of this thesis were to ascertain whether 
oil resources have engendered regional development in Nigeria, and if not so, to 
identify why, so that strategies can be suggested how well oil resources can be 
effectively deployed to birth development in Nigeria. This research has sought to 
tackle these aims by engaging in a comparative study of two regions to mirror what 
happens in the Nigerian state. This was done with clear understanding of the political 
economy of Nigeria (see chapter two), delving into the internal dynamics of the 
political oil in Nigeria and how same shape regional development, (see chapter three 
and five). A review of relevant literatures to the study; generated the following four 
research objectives:     
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• To examine the effect of oil resources on Nigeria’s development and the South-
South compared with the situation in the South-West.  
 
• To analyse the role of politics in the developmental experience of the South-South 
compared with that of the South-West.  
 
• To assess the extent to which institutional frameworks aid or slow down the 
development process in Nigeria and the South-South, and 
 
• To provide insight into how to effectively and efficiently employ oil wealth to 
facilitate positive development outcomes in Nigeria nationally and regionally. 
 
How these objectives were addressed, is briefly considered below followed by first, 
summary of main findings of this thesis with assessment of how well they meet 
aforementioned. Second, limitations to this study and how they were surmounted are 
discussed. Third, it outlines new research directions. Finally, it discusses the wider 
contributions to knowledge made by this research. 
 
Objective one which dominated the study examined ‘effect of oil resources on 
Nigeria’s development and the South-South compared with what obtains in the 
South-West’. Reviewed literatures and primary data generated, helped reveal how 
much impact oil wealth has on Nigeria’s development as well as that of the regions 
adopted for the study. While findings show that oil resources were expected to better 
the development lot of the nation, prevailing circumstances shows that the nation 
lacks development in commensurate terms as key development indicators indicate 
(See chapter three). At the regional levels, impact of oil resources on development, 
is not felt despite notable negative oil exploration impacts such as oil spill and gas 
flaring in varying scale at the regional level with the oil bearing delta at the receiving 
end. Adverse environmental impact the study noted, erodes gains supposedly 
derived from exploration of oil resources. The objective was therefore achieved 
because it enabled us ascertain extent to which both regions benefited from oil 
resources with the oil bearing region’s development negatively due to oil induced 
environmental impacts. 
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Objective two was achieved in chapter two where the political economy of Nigeria, 
was examined. Oil politics and how same shape revenue allocation was given 
adequate attention in this study to understand the role of politics in the 
developmental experience of the South-South compared with that of the South-West.  
The regional development discourse was consequently shifted from popular 
narratives to consider the place of leadership cum governance at both national and 
regional levels and how same shape development. Findings revealed leadership 
failures which affects development, at all levels with that of the SS worse off in the 
leadership deficit equilibrium compared to what occurs in the SW where there is 
relative leadership accountability that aided their developmental drives. Objective 
number two was thus achieved because detailed analysis of the oil politics and how 
this shapes both national and regional development in Nigeria; was done to know 
which region out of the two, is better off. 
 
Objective three that assess extent to which institutional framework aided or slowed 
down the development process in Nigeria and the South-South was achieved via the 
careful analysis of the workings of federal system in Nigeria. Findings revealed 
structural imbalance that births inequality in resource allocation. This was made 
glaring with exploration of identified patronage politics where allocation policies were 
tinkered with and changed regularly to suit whims and caprices of major ethnic 
groups to the detriment of minorities in the multi-cultural Nigerian polity. This which 
help establish existence of institutional lapses exist that tilted political patronage the 
way of ethnic majors while minors, enable me achieve third objective of this study.  
 
The fourth and final objective was achieved in chapter seven where 
recommendations are made on ‘how to effectively and efficiently employ oil wealth to 
facilitate positive development outcomes in Nigeria and the South-South region in 
particular’. 
 
7. 1 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
In addition to the objectives achieved mentioned above, key findings of this study 
built around themes that resonated throughout the study, are briefly considered here. 
This helps bring out, some of the novel achievement of the study and how same can 
be applied to related studies in the future.  
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Resource Curse, Elitism and Development in Nigeria 
The thematic thrust of this study relies on the complex but often ignored link between 
resource curse and elite theories in the study of resource based economies. While 
acknowledging resource curse postulations that natural resources can actually bring 
about underdevelopment, this thesis has however pointed out the pitfalls of solely 
relying on resource curse explanations. The argument is that it is insufficient to 
conclude that natural resources can cause underdevelopment in isolation from role 
and behaviour of elites in the economy. The study thus recommended the additional 
inclusion of the elite theory in conjunction with the resource curse concept to 
understand development in resource rich developing economies. This will help will 
help balance the analysis because natural resources on its own do not cause 
problems but management of such resources by the elite class make such resources 
either a curse or a blessing. 
 
Oil and the Politics of Revenue Allocation in Nigeria 
The issue of oil and the politics of revenue allocation it spurns in Nigeria, found 
ample expression in this study. The study noted that struggle for political power, was 
equated with struggle for control of oil wealth. Consequently six geo-political zones 
with dominant three ethnic groups in Nigeria scrambled for political power with a 
view to having an edge over others in the quest for resource space. The consequent 
manifest but subtle political struggle for oil wealth between the majority and minority 
ethnic groups, gave rise to a revenue allocation formulae that constantly changed to 
reflect political elite power and dominance. Such changes which Akpabio and Akpan; 
(2010) noted were to the detriment of the minority groups engendered the needless 
political rivalry among the various regions and ethnic groups. With vested interest 
thriving on primordial impulse the study noted, revenue allocation politics became 
the “struggle for power to administer the commonwealth”. 
 
The study discovered that the politics of power which is a central issue in Nigeria 
sees regions struggle to control political power. While the North, South, East or West 
wants power retained, the real quest is actually to benefit dominant ethnic groups 
such as Hausa/Fulani in the North, Yoruba in the West and Ibos in the East. This 
confirms the fact that whoever holds political power controls almost everything in 
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Nigeria as the constant tilting of the revenue allocation seen in the study, shows. 
This situation is a challenge to good governance due to weak and corrupt political 
leadership and this has attendant effect on development in Nigeria. The study 
critiqued the deep seated politics associated with the exploration of oil and allocation 
of accruable revenue in a manner that disproportionately rewards all regions as well 
as the ‘winner takes it all kind of thing that revenue allocation politics in Nigeria 
promotes. The study recommends that politics should be divorced from management 
of oil resources in Nigeria. 
 
Regional Development in Nigeria 
This theme with associated sub-themes, focused on regional development in 
Nigeria, using the South-South and the South-West geo-political zones as case 
studies. The comparative approach adopted to x-ray this theme, placed development 
situation in both aforementioned regions in perspectives, placing existing perceptions 
in context of existing realities. Efforts were made to account for the weak attempts at 
achieving regional development through the planning pathways (Jelili et al, 2008). 
Consequently, available natural resources peculiar to each region that could be 
harnessed for positive development outcomes, were abandoned in the wake of the 
discovery of oil in commercial quantities. This situation, Chapter 5 noted, was 
synonymous with the resource curse syndrome that intricately mixed with elite oil 
politics that promoted struggles amongst elites for resource space above 
development. In the light of this, development efforts in both regions was weak albeit 
in in varying degree. While establishing a more favourable development situation in 
the South-West as available data shows, the opposite is the case in the oil bearing 
South-South region.  The chapter noted the growing apathy among the people of the 
South-South region where a majority feel ‘disconnected’ from the mainstream politics 
that revenue sharing presents since there appear to be little to show in development 
terms form the huge contribution of the region makes to the revenue pool (Research 
Survey, 2013). The chapter ended noting that there is need to address the disparate 
development in both regions and therefore recommended an overhaul of the 
planning mechanism as well as the revenue sharing formula to ensure that equity is 
reflected therein. 
 
 
 207 
 
Perceptions on Regional Development Disparity 
This theme built on the previous one that placed regional development in Nigeria in 
perspective by explaining causes of regional development disparity in in Nigeria. 
Here, prevalent perceptions held as factors responsible for regional development 
challenges, were examined to determine their merit. The study revealed that though 
some of these perceptions such as unfavourable environmental situation and violent 
conflicts are capable of hindering development as noted in the Chapter 6, they are 
however insufficient to explain’ persistent regional development challenges in 
Nigeria. The analytical lens was thus shifted to consider internal political dynamics 
that helped explain regional development challenges in Nigeria.  
 
Consequently, governance seen as central to explaining the issue of regional 
development in Nigeria was explored. On examination, chapter 6 found deficient 
governance at the center that skewed federal patronage against oil bearing region, 
making receipt of federal revenue available to the oil bearing region insufficient to 
cope with attendant environmental challenges on account of oil exploration. At the 
regional levels, similar deficiency in varying degree was seen in governance with the 
oil bearing region worse of. This help put causes of regional development disparity in 
perspective. Based on available data, the chapter ended by noting that dearth of 
effective leadership reflected in the poor management of affairs of the regions, 
negatively affect its developmental efforts. 
 
Oil, Politics and Development in Nigeria 
This section sums up the study by examining adopted objectives for the study. Effort 
is made here to locate place of oil politics in the development process in Nigeria. 
With the lens provided by the oil politics theme, the study identified how the  oil 
economy  shaped politics in a way that contributed to the nation’s development 
challenges since discovery of oil in 1956 in several ways. The study specifically 
identified rent-seeking culture that came with the oil industry and corruption that 
followed,. Consequently, key sectors of the economy capable of driving the 
development process, were neglected as the dominant elite class guided by self 
rather than national interest struggled for resource space. While this persisted, 
corruption allegedly worsened, leading to neglect of the agricultural sector as well as 
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key infrastructural facilities. To drive home findings of the study, the next subsection 
mirrors extent to which findings meets objectives of the study. 
  
7.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
In the course of this study, I experienced some of the following challenges which 
served as limitations.  
 First is the difficulty in getting the needed and relevant information. Official 
secret syndrome which is the tendency of public officials to hoard information, 
posed a challenge in the course of the study. Reliance on multiple sources to 
gather needed data and use of informants, helped ameliorated this challenge, 
it nevertheless, was a challenge that this study identified as limitation. 
 
 The second challenge is the problem of time. From preliminary studies to 
survey and analysis of results, time was a limiting factor. My personal 
experience of having to work with three different supervisors, stifled available 
time for me as I have to literally ‘start almost all-over again each time there 
was a change of supervisor’. I consequently had to embark on several field 
trips; unknowingly passing the granted ethical permission date in the process 
(see initial ethics approval and extension in appendix). Though I was able to 
manage the situation reasonably by putting up spirited effort to work within 
available time, it was however a limitation to this study.  
 
 The inability to expand scope of the study beyond two regions in Nigeria and 
Nigeria as a country, are limitations to this study. Suggested use of elite and 
resource curse theories, needs wider application beyond what both regions 
selected for the study can possibly reveal. There is need to expand this 
approach to other oil bearing nations struggling with resource curse 
problems.. Recommended replication of this study nationwide and in other oil 
bearing nations, are the panaceas to this limitation. In response to this, some 
vital ‘academic recommendations’ stemming from this study are made 
below 
 
 The fourth and final limitation of this study is inadequate finances. This posed 
serious challenges and as such, is a limitation to the study. Sourcing 
 209 
 
information and executing the scheduled survey in the course of this study 
were capital intensive. In my peculiar case of three changes in supervisors 
necessitated my embarking on multiple field works, drained my funds 
considerably. Consequently, available funds were insufficient to see the study 
through meaning I had to interrupt my studies for a period of time.  
 
Despite all these challenges, this has illuminated on development challenges faced 
by Nigeria and the South-South states in the face of abundant wealth from oil 
resources. It is in the light of this that the following recommendations are made 
based on findings from the study. 
 
7.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
The issue of resource management and development in resource rich and 
dependent countries is one that has enjoyed robust attention in recent years. This 
can be gleaned from attention paid to the issue of resource curse and resource 
induced corruption and how these shape the course of development. This study so 
far, was able to put the whole issue of resource management and development from 
the Nigerian context, in perspective. This study should therefore be seen as a pilot 
study that only considered two regions in Nigeria. There is therefore the need to, 
embark on further research into the issue of resource management and 
development. If that is to be the case, what shape and form of future research should 
be embraced? 
 
First, there is need to examine power and fiscal relations in other resource rich and 
endowed multi-cultural federal settings like Nigeria. Understanding this will help 
place the issue of resource distribution, management and the development process 
in perspective. I see this study as a ‘pilot study’ that will benefit academic discourse if 
replicated in other settings to establish how sectional interests shape resource 
allocation and the development process by extension. The study explored 
extensively, how interest driven patronage oil politics shaped resource allocation 
processes in Nigeria with politically powerful regions favoured at the expense of 
politically weak regions. Deeper understanding of the power structure will help 
establish clear structural system that better promotes equity in both resource 
allocation and the development process. Researchers should endeavour to consider 
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historical facts to establish trends and traditions to determine how such multicultural 
society operates.  
 
Secondly and related to the above, there is the need to deploy both elite and 
resource curse theories in the study of resource related development discourse in a 
scale larger than that considered in this study. Understanding the place of the elite 
class in resource management and dominance of public sphere will help unveil how 
the latter can lead to resource curse and how this reflects in the development 
discourse. In doing this, scholars should be able to make such a study as extensive 
as possible so as to cover the entire nation unlike this pilot study where two regions, 
were the focus. The study may also be extended to non-oil resources and in terms of 
how they are governed to achieve developmental goals. The use of resource curse 
theory in a stand-alone form means that the role played by the elite class plays in 
both resource management and the development process is elusive. There is need 
to isolate both theories to establish links between them to consider . In doing this, 
researchers should be able to understand institutional structures and how policy 
making and implementation works to know where structural failures exist on account 
of elite interference in public life. When this is done, one would be able to establish 
causal links this study believes exist between elitism and resource curse. Deploying 
both theories to study larger in scope will help establish the peculiar character of the 
elite class and how it shapes both resource management and the development 
process.  
 
Third and finally, efforts should be made to carefully look at the issue of 
environmental management and development. The study observed unpleasant 
externalities of oil exploration that affected development process. There is therefore 
the need to look deeper at this to determine extent to which this affects development. 
In doing this, researchers should be able to look at existing environmental laws and 
how well they are complied with by oil companies to achieve a healthy environment 
that can support sustainable development. Any development that sacrifices the 
environment can never be said to sustainable. There is therefore the need to look at 
this carefully not in Nigeria but other oil bearing nations to ascertain how well oil 
related environmental impacts are handled to pave way for sustainable development.  
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Besides these recommended areas where future research is needed, the following 
recommendations are equally made to be the government and policy makers on how 
well, accruable resources from exploited resources, can be effectively and efficiently 
managed to birth positive development outcomes. 
 
Recommendations for Government 
(i) The federal government should establish a joint development project 
monitoring structure where there will be no duplication of roles and efforts. 
With this in place, Local, State and Federal Governments, the oil 
companies and other multinational corporations will have defined roles to 
play in the initiation and implementation of development projects at both 
national and regional levels as the case may be. Civil society should also 
be integrated to the development planning process.  
(ii) Sure and reliable measures should urgently be taken to address structural 
imbalance in the federal system to end the disproportionate allocation of 
resources to the regions. 
(iii) Steps should be taken to address environmental problems. Where they 
are found inadequate, new and protective environmental laws should be 
made to address the negative externalities of oil exploration. Doing this, 
will help address ecological devastation that led to impoverishment and 
underdevelopment. 
(iv) To boast the development pace of the oil bearing region there should be 
increment in the allocation of funds to the region. To this end, the current 
13% percent derivation revenue to the oil producing states of the Niger 
Delta should be increased to 25% minimum while establishing project 
monitoring mechanism that will protect against embezzlement of such 
funds. Increased funding of the region will help mitigate the adverse 
environmental situation there and fast track development. 
(v) Stricter measures should be adopted to limit elite dominance of public life 
that has led to corruption and under-development.  
(vi) Development plans should be all-inclusive with the people allowed to have 
an input.  
(vii) There is the need to review and reassess the strategy and measures put 
in place to combat the scourge of corruption in Nigeria.  
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(viii) Besides development plans been left for trained technocrats, adequate 
measures should be put in place to initiate, plan and execute development 
plans with feed-back loop feed into it to forestall failure of development. 
(ix) Governance mechanisms should be strengthened to curb the negative 
effects of oil politics. The scramble for resource space by the elite class, 
can be more likely averted if this is done.  
 
Recommendations for policy makers: 
(i) There should be policy monitoring mechanism in place to check how well 
policies are embraced and extent to which, action can be taken for 
identified lapses. 
(ii) Policy formulations processes must be transparently done to enable the 
people to identify and associate with and support policies. 
 
 
7.4 THE MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS   
 
To conclude this thesis, the following summarise its main contributions to knowledge: 
 
First, the thesis raised core issues of intricate nexus between resource management, 
internal governance and development. Doing this, existing debates centred on 
utilization of natural resource to drive the development process in resource-
dependent developing countries, were re-examined. For instance, the concept of 
resource curse was reappraised to determine the suitability of its stand-alone use in 
the development discourse of resource rich but dependent nations. Consequently, 
one of the major academic contributions of the thesis to knowledge is that it 
advanced resource curse debate beyond the traditional position where it is employed 
to underpin the study of resource economies. The study identified the limitation in 
doing this and challenged conclusion by many scholars that natural resources 
translates to curse which limits development in endowed but dependent economies. 
Discussing the Nigerian situation, the study contended that natural resources are 
blessing and not curse and that it is the misuse of the resources due to poor 
governance by elites which is the problem. The resource curse theory works well in 
combination with elite theory to give insights into the political economy that 
accompanies management of resources to either make it a curse or a blessing. 
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Secondly, the thesis expanded the narrative and scope of the oil based development 
debate in Nigeria by introducing the comparative dimension that brought two regions 
in comparison. Doing this, afforded the thesis an opportunity to put salient internal 
variables that shape the resource management and development at the regional 
level in Nigeria into focus. To this end, popular perceptions seen as precipitating 
regional development challenges were stretched through the lens of comparison that 
the study adopted. The explanations here will help shape further discussions on how 
the intricate relationship between oil and development in resource economy like 
Nigeria’s can be effectively handled. It will also help shape internal regional 
comparative studies in both Nigeria and other resource rich and dependent nations. 
The internal governance mechanism hitherto undermined in the development 
discourse in Nigeria that was given attention in this study, help subject salient issues 
hitherto undermined in the development discourse to the analytical test in 
comparative terms. 
 
Thirdly, the study established how structural defects in the Nigerian state, spurns 
regional development disparity. This was established through the lens provided by 
analysis governance at the center where lack of equity in revenue allocation was 
seen as responsible for the disproportionate allocation of resources. To this end, the 
study identified sharp fall in the resources to the oil bearing region that has huge 
environmental challenges on account of oil exploration. The study linked agitation 
principally challenging this disproportionate reward, as reasons for the conflicts that 
distorted development efforts in the oil region. Though the central theme of fiscal 
federalism was not the focus of the study, it however built on expressed feelings of 
marginalization in the regions, to ask a broader question of how equity is achieved in 
the administration of natural resources to achieve positive development outcome in 
Nigeria. 
 
Fourthly, the research provided a deeper understanding of the Niger Delta 
development challenges seen through the lens of intense oil politics built around 
primordial and regional interest in Nigeria. This gave an insight into the real 
development challenges that the study traced beyond popular perceptions to salient 
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but often neglected internal dynamics that helped place the issue of development in 
a broader perspective. 
 
Finally, the study adopts a comparative approach to the analysis and to answer 
adopted research question to reveal how intricate resource politics and regional 
dynamics shape development. Employing triangulation of data and theory, gave the 
study opportunity to place core issues central to the study in perspective. On the 
basis of this, popular perceptions in both regions were put to the analysis test in a 
comparative manner. This is besides giving fresh perspectives to development 
discourse in Nigeria which help nullify some bogus explanations that embellished the 
real issue of development. 
 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
This study provided insights into the intricate oil politics in Nigeria and how they 
shape regional development. The issue of developmental challenges especially at 
the regional levels in Nigerian oil led economy, intrigues many. When mirrored with 
the lens provided by the three dimensions of development, this appears to be lacking 
at both the national and regional levels. Views on what causes this differs amidst 
strong perceptions advanced that failed to capture existential realities. In the period 
under review, the issue of oil revenue and national as well as regional development 
resonated and all perceptions put forward to explain absence of same that dwarfed 
heightened expectations of development at the discovery of oil in commercial 
quantities, failed to fit in. Intricate oil politics that thrives on regional and ethnic 
sentiments came in the way of national interest meant to usher in development of all 
segments of the society. While issues raised received extensive deliberations, it is 
important to note the discussion here are by no means exhaustive. They only form 
part of explanations that can shape further discussions on how the intricate 
relationship between oil and development in resource economy like Nigeria’s can be 
effectively handled. In another breathe; it also will help shape internal regional 
comparative studies in both Nigeria and other resource dependent nations. 
 
In practical terms, the study drawing on available data, confirmed adopted 
hypothesis which indicates that: “the oil industry has had an adverse impact on the 
development of Nigeria, and, in particular, the Niger Delta region in which it is 
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concentrated”.  This is in addition to support hypotheses that were equally confirmed 
in the light of presented data. In the light of the above and findings seen in the 
course of the study, the following conclusions expected to give fresh perspectives to 
issues under scrutiny, can thus be made. First, despite the huge oil related 
resources available to Nigeria to achieve positive development outcomes, the 
reverse is the case as the nation lack development at both national and regional 
level in varying degrees with the resource bearing Delta negatively affected. 
Secondly, deployment of one theoretical framework such as resource curse to 
underpin resource dependent economy will always undermine the elite factor that in 
most cases, struggle for resource space to drive resource rich nations into the throes 
of resource curse. In realization of this, the study embraced both resource curse and 
the elite theories to shore up the insufficiency identified in resource curse in this 
regards. 
 
Thirdly, leadership failure and associated vice such as corruption, dwarfs 
developmental efforts. This is reflected in governance deficits the study noted, 
negatively affected the development outcomes in Nigeria and the regions in 
particular. Corruption as an offshoot of poor leadership, engendered regime of 
profligacy that left very little done to achieve expected development. This dwarfed 
derivable benefits from sales of oil resources, development inclusive. Another 
conclusion that can be drawn from the study, is the uncomplimentary role ethnicity 
played in the management of oil resources and the issue of development in Nigeria. 
Ethnicity and regional solidarity reflected in revenue sharing formula shaped the 
developmental trajectory in Nigeria. While this existed, merit expected to drive the 
development process, suffered a set-back. Deployment primordial sentiments that 
weighed dangerously against minorities rather than merit driving the Nigerian federal 
system, acted negatively against the nation’s developmental drive. 
 
In sum, I therefore conclude that oil, politics and regional development do not mix as 
expected. As revealed in the study, expectation of speedy development on account 
of oil exploration, failed in several respects due to the intricate elites power play that 
negatively shaped resource distribution and utilization. As seen in the course of this 
study, the manifest negative externality of oil exploration that gas flare and oil spill 
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represents, inherent variables such as corruption in the elite dominated public life, 
worked against the expectation of enhanced development by the people. 
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APPENDIX A 
                                        QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DATA COLLECTION  
PROJECT TITLE: OIL, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: SOUTH –SOUTH 
AND SOUTH-WEST REGIONS COMPARED 
SECTION A: PERSONAL INFORMATION 
PERSONAL DETAILS:  I would like a little information about you, your occupation and your 
state/LG of origin:    
 
Please indicate your answer by ticking relevant box (√) 
1. Your Gender: Male (    )            Female (  )  
2. Your Age:    18-25 (  ), 26-40 (  ), 41-60 (   ) 61- 75 (   )  
3. State, LG and Village: State:………………., LGA:………………. 
Village:……………..….. 
4. Place of Residence: State:…………….……., LGA:………………. 
Village:……………….… 
5. Occupation:……………………………………………………………………………………
…. 
SECTION B:  YOU AND DEVELOPMENT  
6. What does development mean to you?  
a) Improved Standard of living and infrastructure 
b) Increased per capita income, gross domestic product and prolonged life 
expectancy ratio 
c) Access to government patronage   
d) …………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………… 
e) …………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………… 
 
7. Based on your response to the question above, can you say Nigeria, your State or 
LGA/Village is developed? Yes (   ), No (   )  
 
8. If your response to the above is no, what do you think is responsible?  
(a) Role of Government  
(b) Corruption in the country 
(c) Insufficient funds  
(d) Role of multinational oil corporations 
(e) Inequality in regional composition in Nigeria 
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(f)………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………. 
  
9. Do you see your elected representatives as development-oriented? 
Yes (  ),   No (  ),   Undecided (   )  
 
10.  To what extent do you see development removed from your community? 
(a) Removed (   ),   Very removed (  ) (b) Not sure (   ), (c) Not removed (   ) 
Undecided (   ) 
 
SECTION C: OIL AND DEVELOPMENT: SOUTH-SOUTH AND SOUTH-WEST ZONES 
The scale runs as follow: 
           1                          2            3              4  5                        6 
  Strongly Agree      Agree    No Opinion           Neutral        Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
  
S/N 
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11 Resource /Oil and its exploration have brought 
development to Nigeria. 
      
12 The South-South and South-West zones are richly 
endowed with natural resources capable of 
engendering development. 
      
13 Utilization of these resources has brought about even 
development in both zones. 
      
14 There is efficient resource utilization in the South-
South zone than in the South-West Zone.   
      
15 Development is obviously reflected in the South-West 
than in the South-South zones in the face of resource 
utilization 
      
16 Inefficient resource  utilization in both zones, leads to 
underdevelopment in the face of abundant resource 
wealth 
      
17 Development challenges are more pronounced in the 
oil bearing region 
      
18 Economic life is better in the South-South states  than 
in the South-West States 
      
19 Internal political differences and ethnic division of the 
South-South zone deny the region development in the 
face of oil wealth. 
      
20 Are politicians the bane of development in your region?         
21 Community/youth leaders are the bane of development 
in the region 
      
22 Faulty federalism and minority status of the Niger 
Delta, contributes to underdevelopment 
      
23 Corruption is one challenge of development in the       
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region 
24   Corruption is more in Niger Delta than in South-West 
States 
      
25 People of the Delta are responsible for their 
development woes 
      
26 Underdevelopment  is a Niger Delta problem and not 
Nigerian induced   
      
27 The Nigerian state  is responsible for 
underdevelopment of Niger Delta  
      
28 Leadership failure contributes to the development 
woes of the Niger Delta in the face of oil production 
      
29 Elites in the South-West are development oriented 
compared to those of the South-South zone 
      
30 Discovery of oil is a curse to the Niger Delta       
31 Negative impact of oil exploration, surpasses its benefit 
in the Delta 
      
32 Development occurs in the urban centers only       
33 Oil exploration has positively impacted your life in the 
last 10 years 
      
34 Your living standard prior to the discovery of oil is 
better compared to what is it now 
      
35 Allowing regional control of natural resources would 
bring about development 
      
 
Thanks for your time. 
 
APPENDIX B 
Table of Development plans in Nigeria 
PLANS TARGET ACHIEVEMENT WHY IT FAILED 
TEN YRS 
COLONIAL 
DEV 
PLAN, 
1946-61 
ALLOCATE 
DEVELOPMEN
T AND 
WELFARE  
FUNDS MADE 
AVAILABLE BY 
THE COLONI 
AUTHORITIES 
SET THE BALL ROLLING 
FOR DEV PLANN- 
ING AND LAID 
FOUNDATION FOR 
INDUST 
RIAL GROWTH 
FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE 
PRODUCTIVE  
SECTOR, POOR FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES 
WEAK FORMULATION AND 
IMPLEMENTA 
TION MECHANISM, ABSENCE OF 
FOCUS 
1ST 
NATIONAL 
DEV 
PLAN, 
1962-68 
TO ACHIEVE 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOMENT 
OF 
THE COUNTRY 
CREATED NATIONAL 
MAN-POWER BOARD 
CONSOLIDATED 
PLANNING PROCESS BY 
GIVING ATTENTION TO 
HUMAN ELEMENT 
INADEQUATE PLANNING TIME, 
LACK OF  
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, DEARTH 
OF TECH 
NOCRATS TO EXECUTE THE 
PLAN, POLIT- 
ICAL INSTABILITY THAT LED TO 
THE 1966 
COUP 
2ND 
NATIONAL 
DEV 
PLAN, 
1970-74 
ACHIEVE 
UNITED,SELF
-RELIANT, 
DEMOCRATI
C AND 
ECONOMICA
STRENGTHENED 
PLANNING MECHINERY 
IN NIGERIA 
LACK OF FINANCE AND POLITICA 
WILL  
IMPLEMENT THE PLAN,  MONO-
CULTURAL 
STATE OF THE ECONOMY 
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LLY 
EGALITARIA
N STATE 
3RD 
NATIONAL 
DEV 
PLAN, 
1975-80 
ECONOMIC 
DIVERSIFICATI
ON, REDUCE 
UNEMPLOYME
NT, EVEN 
DISTRIBUTION 
OF INCOME 
HELPED ENHANCE 
LIVING STANDARD OF  
THE COMMON MAN WITH 
BY FOCUSING 
ON AGRICULTURE, 
WATER, HOUSING, 
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY. 
CHANGE OF GOVT, FINANCIAL 
PAUCITY, 
POOR IMPLEMENTATION 
4TH 
NATIONAL 
DEV 
PLAN, 
1981-85 
ESTABLISH 
LONG TERM 
ECONOMIC 
AND 
SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMEN
T 
HELPED ACHIEVED 
BROAD BASED PARTIC 
IPATION IN THE 
PLANNING PROCESS 
REGIME CHANGE, FINANCIAL 
PAUCITY, 
INADEQUATE FORECAST BY 
PLANNERS 
NATIONAL 
ROLLING 
PLAN 
(SAP), 
1986-93 
SHIFT 
ATTENTION 
FROM 
PROJECT-
BASED 
POLICY-
BASED 
ECONOMIC 
PLANNING  
SYSTEM, 
EVALUATE 
THE FIXED 
PLANNING  
THAT 
HITHERTO 
EXISTED 
HELPED ENCOURAGE 
PRIVATE-SECTOR 
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 
ECONOMIC PRO 
CESS AS OPPOSED TO 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
DOMINANCE. 
LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT 
DUE TO THE 
AUSTERITY MEASURE 
INTRODUCED, 
REGIME CHANGE, FAILURE TO 
IDENTIFY 
PRIORITY AREAS. 
VISION 
201O: 
1996-2010 
(ABACHA) 
IMPROVE 
QUALITY OF 
LIFE OF 
NIGERIANS, 
LARGE SCALE 
ECONOMIC 
DEREGULATIO
N, 
LED TO A DEARTH OF 
INVESTMENT IN INF 
RASTRUCTURAL 
FACILITIES, JOB LOSS,  
CAUSED HARDSHIP 
FAILURE TO RELEASE FUNDS 
FOR PROJEC 
TS, POOR IMPLEMENTATION 
NATIONAL 
ECONO- 
MIC 
DIRECTIO
N, 
1999-2003 
ACHIEVE 
STRONG, 
VERILE AND 
BROAD- 
BASED 
ECONOMY, 
ALLEVIATE 
POVERTY 
AND PROVIDE 
IMPROVED 
BUREAUCRAC
Y 
FAILED TO ACHIEVE 
TANGIBLE RESULT AS 
PARTY DOMINATED 
POLITICSANCHORED  
ON RED-TAPISM, 
MESSED THE PLAN 
IMPROPER ARTICULATION OF 
THE PLAN, 
LACK OF FUNDS, DIVISIVE 
PARTY  
POLITICS, POOR 
IMPLEMENTATION 
NATIONAL 
ECONO- 
MIC 
EMPOWE
R- 
MENT 
CREATE NEW 
NIGERIA VIA 
VALUE RE-OR 
IENTATION 
AND 
ERADICATE 
ACHIEVED STRUCTURAL 
REFORMS SUCH 
AS BANK REFORMS, 
GROWTH OF NON- 
OIL 
SECTOR,LIBERALIZED 
LACK OF POLITICAL WILL TO 
FAITHFULLY 
IMPLEMEMT THE PLAN, POOR 
INFRAST- 
RUCTURAL BASE, SOLE 
DEPENDENCE ON 
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STRATEG
Y, 
(NEEDS I), 
2003-2007 
POVERTY VIA 
EMPLOYMENT 
GENERATION, 
WEALTH 
CREATION 
IMPORT TARIFF 
REGIME AND 
INTRODUCED 
WHOLESALE 
DUTCH AUCTION SYSTEM 
OIL REVENUE, IMPORT 
DEPENDENT 
ECONOMY 
NEEDS II 
2007 
TACKLE 
EMPLOYMENT 
AND JOB 
CREATION 
SERVED AS A SOLACE TO 
THE FAILURE OF 
NEEDS I 
LACK OF COORDINATION AS 
SEEN IN 
NEEDS I 
7 POINTS 
AGENDA 
2007-2010 
ACHIEVE 
DEVELOPMEN
T WITH FOCUS 
ON 
INFRASTRUCT
URE, FOOD 
SECURITY, 
HUMAN 
CAPITAL DEV., 
WEALTH 
CREATI- 
ON,SECURITY, 
NIGER DELTA 
& LAND TEN- 
& HOME 
OWNERSHIP 
BROUGHT RELATIVE 
PEACE TO THE NIGER 
DELTA REGION, 
ACHIEVED APPRECIABLE  
IMPROVEMENT IN 
ELECTRICITY GENERA- 
TION. 
DEATH OF PRESIDENT 
YAR'ADUA, LACK OF CLARITY  
OF PURPOSE THAT CLOUDED 
THE PLAN 
VISION 
20:2020 
2011-
20:2020 
MAKE NIGERIA 
ONE OF THE 
20TH ECONO- 
MY IN THE 
WORLD BY 
THE YEAR, 
2020 
ON-GOING AMIDST 
UNCERTAINTY 
LIKELY TO FAIL IF NOT 
PROPERLY PILOTED 
  
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
APPENDIX C 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
This study titled “Oil, politics and regional development in Nigeria” is designed to 
examine the impact of oil resources on regional development in Nigeria as well as 
other set of objectives outlined in sub-section four of this study. As a way of aiding 
understanding in this study, the following concepts as concerned this study, are 
explained. 
 
 
 
NIGERIA 
Nigeria is an oil bearing country in West Africa. With a democratic system of 
government anchored on a federal structure, the country has six geo-political zones. 
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These are the South East, South-South and the South West in the Southern part 
while North East, North Central and North West are in the Northern region. Focus of 
this study would be on two of these regions which include South-South and the 
South West regions. 
 
OIL 
This is a natural resource with special characteristics that when explored positively, 
births development outcomes for endowed nations. It has been the engine of 
globalization. Nigeria alongside other nations, are endowed with this natural 
resources. It is found in the coastal belt of the Niger Delta in Nigeria as the first 
discovery was in 1956 when it was discovered in commercial quantity in Oloibiri, 
present day Bayelsa state, South-South geo-political zone of Nigeria. 
 
DEVELOPMENT 
Though opened to varied interpretation, this means general improvement in the life of 
an individual, group or a nation. Conceptually speaking, it entails enhancing the 
condition of life of an individual, group or the society in general. That means, making 
life meaningful.  
 
NIGER DELTA 
This is an oil bearing region of Nigeria. It forms the chunk of the South-South geo-
political zone of Nigeria. The region has both geographical and political definition. The 
geographical definition has the core Niger Delta states of Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-
River, Delta, Edo and Rivers States as making up the Niger Delta. On the other hand, 
the political definition of the region with origin traced to 2000 when the Niger Delta 
Development Commission, a development intervention agency was created. 
Consequently, the number of states with geographical link to the Niger Delta, increased 
to nine as Abia, Imo and Ondo states were added to the original six geographical Niger 
Delta states.  
 
 
 
OIL COMMUNITIES 
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This refers to communities in the Delta region of Nigeria where oil resources are 
found in abundance. Prime example of such community, is Oloibiri community in 
Bayelsa state where oil in commercial quantity, was discovered in 1956 in Nigeria. 
These communities which are basically agrarian in nature, harbour oil wells or 
Creeks, Manifolds, Pipelines, Flow stations and residential estates of oil companies. 
This means that they are prone to the diverse effects of activities of the oil industry 
which from existential realities, include environmental degradation due to oil spillage. 
While these communities bear the oil that sustains the nation’s economy, they 
ironically live in squalor as development is far removed from them.  
 
OLOIBIRI 
This is an oil bearing community in the Niger Delta. Located in present day Bayelsa 
state, South-South Nigeria, Oloibiri made his in 1953 when oil in commercial 
quantity, was found in this largely agrarian community. The community is again, 
renowned for its lack development in the face of oil exploration that rendered her 
arable lands desolate. 
 
CORRUPTION 
Seen by many as illicit deals for private gains, corruption often times seen as misuse 
of public resources or power for private gains. It’s often times seen as rent-seeking; 
especially in resource rich and dependent states. 
 
DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
These refer to public policies initiated by any government to address development 
challenges. Though such plans come beautifully packaged, they however achieve 
different development outcomes for nations based on implementation.  
 
RENTIER STATE 
This refers to a state that relies solely on rents accruable from the sale of natural 
resources at the expense of key economic activities capable of bringing about 
internal development.  
 
 
OIL POLITICS 
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This refers to the intrigue that accompanies the exploration of oil mineral resources 
in oil rich and dependent states such as Nigeria. It encapsulates the whole battle for 
resource space in an oil rich and dependent state such as Nigeria.  
 
RESOURCE ENDOWMENT AND DEVELOPMENT MIX-MATCH 
This means the failure of the abundant resources at the disposal of an endowed 
state to engender internal development. Tit in a sense, amplifies resource curse 
which brings about disequilibrium between resource abundance and achievable 
development.  
 
RENT 
This associated with proceeds from exploration of resources, means profits from the 
sales of resources. Many sees it as profit after the exploration cost of natural 
resources such as oil mineral resources.   
 
RENT-SEEKING 
This refers to concerted effort by those exposed to the rents derived from the sale of 
resources, to obtain access to it with a view to control it. Rent-seeking and 
corruption, are interchangeably used some writers simply because of the morbid 
quest by rent-seekers to enrich themselves with derivable rents from the sales of the 
resources. 
 
UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
This is the opposite of development. It means a situation whereby a country fails to 
achieve advancement in virtually all key sectors of her national life and economy. It 
is usually characterized by lack of basic necessities of life. This is what Sen (1999) 
called “unfreedom” which impairs national growth and individual freedom.  Most 
global south countries including Nigeria in the face of oil wealth are seen as 
underdeveloped. 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D:  
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RESEARCH INFORMATION SHEET/CONSENT FORM 
 
                                                                                                           
PhD RESEARCH INFORMATION SHEET 
 
TITLE OF RESEARC PROJECT: Oil, Politics and Regional Development in Nigeria: Comparison of South-
South and South-West regions 
 
DETAILS OF PROJECT: 
This project is aimed at finding plausible explanation to the development challenges facing the 
Nigerian state and the Niger Delta region in particular in the face of oil exploration. Effort would be 
made to measure the impact of oil exploration on the economic life of the people of the Niger Delta. 
This is with a view to ascertain the developmental position of the region in the face of oil exploration. 
I am a PhD research student at the University of Exeter, United Kingdom. This study is driven by 
purely academic purpose, not prompted by either government or commercial interest. Findings from 
the study will enrich the body of literature on this subject as well as help policy makers to fashion out 
viable policies that can help address the developmental challenge of the Delta in the face of oil 
exploration. 
 
CONTACT DETAILS: 
For further information about the research or your interview data, please contact: 
 EGHWEREE, Ogheneruonah Charles, Department of Politics, Exeter University, Devon UK, Tel 
+447842617535, oce204@exeter.ac.uk 
 
If you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss with someone else at 
the University, please contact my supervisor:      
       Mathew Eagleton-Pierce, (Dr), Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Devon, UK,  
       Tell: +44(0) 1392722608, Email: e.eagleton-pierce@exeter.ac.uk,  
CONFIDENTIALITY: 
Interview tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence, to be used for stated purpose above and no 
third party will be allowed to access to them (except as may be required by the law). However, if you 
request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so that you can comment on 
and edit it as you see fit (please give your email below). Your data will be held in accordance with the 
Data Protection Act of Nigeria which requires that non-sensitive information can be kept for future 
use or permanently on anonymous basis. 
 
ANONIMITY: 
Interview data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of either your name or 
address. We will only refer to the group of which you are a member. 
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CONSENT: 
I voluntarily agree to participate and to the use of my data for the purposes specified above. I can 
withdraw consent at any time by contacting the interviewers.  
 
TICK HERE:      DATE…………………………..... 
 
Note: Your contact details are kept separately from your interview data 
Name of interviewee:....................................................................... 
Signature: ......................................................................................... 
Email/phone:..................................................................................... 
Signature of researcher…………………………………………………. 
 
2 copies to be signed by both interviewee and researcher, one kept by each 
 
APPENDIX E: 
SOME SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
 
SOME SURVEY QUESTIONS (Focus Group Discussion) 
(1) Why is Nigeria underdeveloped irrespective of oil wealth? 
(2) What is the role of natural resources in the development of your region and what are 
the challenges? 
(3) To what extent can we say the oil bearing Niger Delta region reflect the huge oil 
resources in development terms? 
(4) What role did institutional frailty play to enhance planning mechanism and 
development of your region? 
(5) Can we say leadership failure contributes to the development challenges of Nigeria in 
the midst of oil wealth? 
(6) What can we say of social and societal influence in inducing oil corruption in the 
Nigerian state and to what extent did that derail the development process in your 
region? 
(7) How is the environment now compared to what it was prior to oil exploration in your 
region? 
(8) What are some of the leadership qualities you feel aid development of your region in 
the face of oil wealth? 
(9) To what extent, does ‘Federal patronage’ encourage your regional development? 
(10) Where do you place governance in the development discourse in your region?  
 
SOME ELITE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
(1) What is your view on the development situation of in Nigeria and the Niger Delta in 
particular? 
(2) Can we say the Niger Delta is better off now compared what obtained before the 
discovery of oil? 
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(3) What are the factors you can hold responsible for the development woes of the 
region? 
(4) To what extent do you hold minority status of the region for their development plight? 
(5) Do you see other regions better off than the Niger Delta in development terms? 
(6) To what extent do you think internal political dynamics in the region, contributes to 
its development challenges? 
(7) Nigeria operates federal system seen largely as lopsided. To what extent in your view 
did this play to the disadvantage of the Niger Delta region in development terms?   
(8) If you were to situate blame in the development challenge of the Nigerian state and 
the Niger Delta in particular, who will you hold responsible? 
(9) Do you see oil as a curse or blessing and why? 
(10) Do you see the Nigerian development woes as resource or politically induced? 
  
APPENDIX F: ETHICS CERTIFICATES A1 & A2 
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APPENDIX G: QUESTIONAIRE RESPONSE ANALYSIS  
QUESTIONS/NO RESPONSES 
                          REGIONS  
SOUTH-SOUTH / % SOUTH-WEST/ % 
(11) Resource /Oil 
and its exploration 
have brought 
development to 
Nigeria. 
Strongly agree 879 66.43 695 66.57 
Agree 316 23.88 239 22.89 
No opinion 81 6.12 61 5.84 
Neutral 17 1.28 19 1.81 
Disagree 11 0.83 13 1.24 
Strongly disagree 19 1.43 17 1.62 
TOTAL  1323 99.97 1044 99.97 
  
(12) The South-South 
and South-West 
zones are richly 
endowed with natural 
resources capable of 
engendering 
development. 
Strongly agree 778 56.91 693 50.91 
Agree 523 38.25 601 44.15 
No opinion 09 0.65 12 0.88 
Neutral 33 2.41 19 1.39 
Disagree 21 1.53 29 2.13 
Strongly disagree 03 0.21 07 0.51 
TOTAL  1367 99.96 1361 99.97 
 
(13) Utilization of 
these resources has 
brought about even 
development in both 
zones. 
Strongly agree 19 1.21 17 1.18 
Agree 08 0.51 07 0.48 
No opinion 11 0.70 06 0.41 
Neutral 09 0.57 11 0.76 
Disagree 599 38.22 420 29.35 
Strongly disagree 921 58.77 970 67.78 
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TOTAL  1567 99.98 1431 99.96 
  
(14) There is efficient 
resource utilization in 
the South-South 
zone than in the 
South-West Zone. 
Strongly agree 201 14.79 198 15.73 
Agree 120 8.83 129 10.25 
No opinion 09 0.66 13 1.03 
Neutral 11 0.80 13 1.03 
Disagree  309 22.73 255 20.27 
Strongly disagree 709 52.17 650 51.66 
TOTAL  1359 99.98 1258 99.97 
  
(15) Development is 
obviously reflected in 
the South-West than 
in the South-South 
zones in the face of 
resource utilization 
Strongly agree 1027 59.81 361 39.97 
Agree 357 20.79 311 34.44 
No opinion 09 0.52 08 0.88 
Neutral 13 0.75 17 1.88 
Disagree 110 6.40 97 10.74 
Strongly disagree 201 11.70 109 12.07 
TOTAL  1717 99.97 903 99.98 
 
(16) Inefficient 
resource  utilization 
in both zones, leads 
to underdevelopment 
in the face of 
abundant resource 
wealth 
Strongly agree 820 50.83 774 55.01 
Agree 677 41.97 530 37.66 
No opinion 07 0.43 13 0.92 
Neutral 19 1.17 11 0.78 
Disagree 27 1.67 21 1.49 
Strongly disagree 63 3.90 58 4.12 
TOTAL  1613 99.97 1407 99.98 
  
(17) Development 
challenges are more 
pronounced in the oil 
bearing region 
Strongly agree 812 65.58 775 70.39 
Agree 317 25.60 219 19.89 
No opinion 71 5.73 51 4.63 
Neutral 07 0.56 17 1.54 
Disagree 10 0.80 20 1.81 
Strongly disagree 21 1.69 19 1.72 
TOTAL  1238 99.69 1101 99.98 
 
(18) Economic life is 
better in the South-
South states  than in 
the South-West 
States 
Strongly agree 503 20.98 231 13.24 
Agree 103 4.29 99 5.67 
No opinion 11 0.45 21 1.20 
Neutral 09 0.37 11 0.63 
Disagree 670 27.95 479 27.46 
Strongly disagree 1101 45.93 903 51.77 
TOTAL  2397 99.97 1744 99.97 
 
(19) Internal political 
differences and 
ethnic division of the 
Strongly agree 1117 52.88 921 51.30 
Agree 909 43.03 827 46.07 
No opinion 11 0.52 10 0.55 
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South-South zone 
deny the region 
development in the 
face of oil wealth. 
Neutral 31 1.46 07 0.38 
Disagree 21 0.99 13 0.72 
Strongly disagree 33 1.56 17 0.94 
TOTAL  2112 99.92 1795 99.96 
 
(20) Are politicians 
the bane of 
development in your 
region? 
Strongly agree 1019 48.06 985 47.40 
Agree 791 37.31 592 28.48 
No opinion 23 1.08 16 0.76 
Neutral 49 2.31 81 3.89 
Disagree 121 5.70 301 14.48 
Strongly disagree 117 5.51 103 4.95 
TOTAL  2120 99.97 2078 99.96 
 
(21) 
Community/youth 
leaders are the bane 
of development in 
the region 
Strongly agree 93 4.43 81 4.31 
Agree 77 3.67 21 1.11 
No opinion 01 0.04 03 0.15 
Neutral 11 0.52 17 0.90 
Disagree 903 43.10 763 40.62 
Strongly disagree 1010 48.21 993 52.87 
 TOTAL  2095 99.97 1878 99.96 
 
(22) Faulty 
federalism and 
minority status of the 
Niger Delta, 
contributes to 
underdevelopment 
Strongly agree 970 71.90 660 64.07 
Agree 235 17.42 212 20.58 
No opinion 75 5.55 62 6.01 
Neutral 39 2.89 19 1.84 
Disagree 19 1.40 22 2.13 
Strongly Disagree 11 0.81 55 5.33 
TOTAL  1349 99.97 1030 99.96 
 
(23) Corruption is 
one challenge of 
development in the 
region 
Strongly agree 1103 54.98 976 58.37 
Agree 599 29.86 471 28.16 
No opinion 21 1.04 17 1.01 
Neutral 31 1.54 39 2.33 
Disagree 171 8.52 89 5.32 
Strongly disagree 81 4.03 80 4.78 
TOTAL  2006 99.97 1672 99.97 
 
(24) Corruption is 
more in Niger Delta 
than in South-West 
States 
Strongly agree 737 34.58 871 44.92 
Agree 811 38.05 511 26.35 
No opinion 30 1.04 61 3.14 
Neutral 11 0.51 03 0.15 
Disagree 111 5.20 103 5.31 
Strongly disagree 431 20.22 390 20.11 
TOTAL  2131 99.60 1939 99.98 
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(25) People of the 
Delta are responsible 
for their development 
woes 
Strongly agree 70 3.26 480 48.87 
Agree 48 2.24 141 14.35 
No opinion 29 1.35 36 3.66 
Neutral 43 2.00 93 9.47 
Disagree 779 36.36 169 17.20 
Strongly disagree 1173 54.76 63 6.41 
TOTAL  2142 99.97 982 99.96 
 
(26) 
Underdevelopment  
is a Niger Delta 
problem and not 
Nigerian induced 
Strongly agree 09 0.39 131 28.85 
Agree 03 0.13 93 20.48 
No opinion 13 0.57 09 1.98 
Neutral 17 0.75 19 4.18 
Disagree 879 38.99 103 22.68 
Strongly disagree 1333 59.13 99 21.80 
TOTAL  2254 99.96 454 99.97 
 
(27) The Nigerian 
state  is responsible 
for 
underdevelopment of 
Niger Delta 
Strongly agree 1437 61.30 931 61.12 
Agree 731 31.18 374 24.55 
No opinion 11 0.46 19 1.24 
Neutral 33 1.40 14 0.91 
Disagree 93 3.96 101 6.63 
Strongly disagree 39 1.66 84 5.51 
TOTAL  2344 99.96 1523 99.96 
 
(28) Leadership 
failure contributes to 
the development 
woes of the Niger 
Delta in the face of 
oil production 
Strongly agree 734 72.52 579 59.50 
Agree 205 20.25 312 32.06 
No opinion 34 3.35 39 4.00 
Neutral 19 1.87 10 1.02 
Disagree 13 1.28 17 1.74 
Strongly disagree 07 0.69 16 1.64 
TOTAL  1012 99.96 973 99.96 
 
(29) Elites in the 
South-West are 
development 
oriented compared to 
those of the South-
South zone 
Strongly agree 203 39.18 479 60.70 
Agree 93 17.95 205 25.98 
No opinion 23 4.44 17 2.15 
Neutral 03 0.57 11 1.39 
Disagree 79 15.25 04 0.50 
Strongly disagree 117 22.58 73 9.25 
TOTAL  518 99.97 789 99.97 
 
(30) Discovery of oil 
is a curse to the 
Niger Delta 
Strongly agree 1202 50.86 1033 43.78 
Agree 873 36.94 870 36.88 
No opinion 33 1.39 41 1.73 
Neutral 49 2.07 53 2.24 
Disagree 97 4.10 131 5.55 
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Strongly disagree 109 4.61 231 9.79 
TOTAL  2363 99.97 2359 99.97 
 
(31) Negative impact 
of oil exploration, 
surpasses its benefit 
in the Delta 
Strongly agree 320 43.12 272 53.22 
Agree 127 17.11 101 19.76 
No opinion 09 1.21 03 0.58 
Neutral 33 4.44 17 3.32 
Disagree 74 9.97 39 7.63 
Strongly disagree 179 24.12 79 15.45 
TOTAL  742 99.97 511 99.96 
 
(32) Development 
occurs in the urban 
centres only 
Strongly agree 1216 53.07 1121 54.84 
Agree 879 38.36 753 36.83 
No opinion 03 0.13 13 0.63 
Neutral 93 4.05 47 2.29 
Disagree 11 0.48 17 0.83 
Strongly disagree 89 3.88 93 4.54 
TOTAL  2291 99.97 2044 99.96 
 
(33) Oil exploration 
has positively 
impacted your life in 
the last 10 years 
Strongly agree 1221 54.95 1003 54.01 
Agree 729 32.80 609 32.79 
No opinion 33 1.48 04 0.21 
Neutral 59 2.65 61 3.28 
Disagree 79 3.55 81 4.36 
Strongly disagree 101 4.54 99 5.33 
TOTAL  2222 99.97 1857 99.98 
 
(34) Your living 
standard prior to the 
discovery of oil is 
better compared to 
what is it now 
Strongly agree 32 4.11 79 11.66 
Agree 24 3.08 71 10.48 
No opinion 88 11.31 166 24.51 
Neutral 67 8.61 99 14.62 
Disagree 265 34.06 102 15.06 
Strongly disagree 302 38.81 160 23.63 
TOTAL  778 99.98 677  
 
(35) Allowing 
regional control of 
natural resources 
would bring about 
development 
Strongly agree 1391 57.19 181 7.63 
Agree 909 37.37 93 3.92 
No opinion 09 0.37 11 0.46 
Neutral 19 0.78 13 0.54 
Disagree 31 1.27 1155 48.69 
Strongly disagree 73 3.00 919 38.74 
TOTAL  2432 99.98 2372 99.98 
 
